Israel's former chief of staff Eisenkot in strong position to replace Netanyahu as new PM

Gadi Eisenkot is currently the leading candidate because more Knesset party leaders recommended him to President Isaac Herzog than recommended Benjamin Netanyahu. Six lists, representing 67 of the Knesset’s 120 seats, backed Eisenkot. Four lists, representing 46 MPs, preferred Netanyahu.

The numbers shifted because Netanyahu’s coalition partners did not all support him. A party representing the ultra-Orthodox community abstained, removing seven recommendations from Netanyahu’s side. Eisenkot gained support from two Arab lists, adding 19 recommendations to his initial 48.

This does not yet guarantee Eisenkot a government. The recommendations show who party leaders believe should receive the first chance to form one. Herzog said he would announce his decision on Sunday, so Eisenkot’s lead mattered because it made him the strongest candidate at this stage, even though coalition negotiations still lay ahead.

The Knesset is Israel’s national parliament. It has 120 elected members, known as MPs in the article. Parties win seats in elections, and those seats determine how much support each political camp can bring to a prospective government.

After an election, party leaders recommend a candidate to the president. In this case, six lists representing 67 seats recommended Eisenkot, while four lists representing 46 MPs preferred Netanyahu. Those figures indicate the parliamentary backing each candidate appeared able to gather at that moment.

The Knesset’s members do not simply choose a government by a single direct vote for prime minister. Instead, the candidate who receives the mandate must build a coalition that can survive in the 120-seat parliament. The president uses party recommendations to decide who should receive the first opportunity, but the final test is sustained support among Knesset parties.

A majority in Israel’s 120-seat Knesset requires at least 61 seats. That threshold matters because a government needs enough parliamentary backing to pass legislation and remain politically viable. A candidate may lead the recommendations without yet having a stable coalition.

Eisenkot’s supporters represented 67 seats, six above the majority line. Netanyahu’s preferred lists represented 46 MPs, 15 below it. The article also describes the election result differently: Netanyahu’s bloc came first with 53 seats, while Eisenkot initially had 48 before two Arab lists added 19 recommendations.

The comparison therefore shows both Eisenkot’s advantage and the uncertainty. His 67 recommendations exceeded the majority threshold, but recommendations are not automatically a lasting coalition. Netanyahu’s 53-seat bloc also lacked reinforcements, and an allied ultra-Orthodox party’s abstention reduced his recommendations by seven. Coalition building remained decisive.

Party leaders’ recommendations are formal political signals to President Isaac Herzog. They tell him which candidate their parties prefer to receive the opportunity to form Israel’s next government. The process measures likely parliamentary support after an election, rather than directly installing a prime minister.

In the article, six lists representing 67 seats recommended Gadi Eisenkot. Four lists representing 46 MPs recommended Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s side also lost seven recommendations when an ultra-Orthodox allied party chose to abstain, while Eisenkot gained 19 from two Arab lists.

The recommendation matters because it can determine who receives the mandate first. That candidate must then negotiate with parties and assemble a workable coalition. A recommendation may reflect temporary cooperation rather than a firm governing agreement, so Eisenkot’s lead improved his position but did not guarantee that he could govern. Herzog said he would announce his decision on Sunday.

Receiving the mandate is only the beginning of government formation. Eisenkot would need to turn recommendations into a coalition with enough Knesset support to govern. The article shows why that could be difficult: parties changed position, abstained, or offered support without necessarily joining a government.

For example, Eisenkot’s support reached 67 recommendations after two Arab lists added 19. Yet the article does not say that these lists had agreed to enter his coalition or support every government decision. If negotiations failed, he would not have a reliable majority despite leading the initial recommendations.

Under Israel’s parliamentary system, the president can give another candidate an opportunity to form a government if the first attempt fails. If no candidate succeeds within the legal process, a new election may follow. The provided article does not detail those later steps, but it makes clear that Herzog’s designation would not itself settle the political contest.

A party does not need to lead the government to influence who forms it. In a 120-seat parliament, even a small group can provide or remove the support needed to approach the 61-seat majority threshold. Its bargaining power comes from the seats or recommendations it controls.

The article gives two clear examples. An allied ultra-Orthodox party abstained and deprived Netanyahu of seven recommendations. At the same time, two Arab lists gave Eisenkot 19 additional recommendations, raising his support from an initial 48 to 67.

These shifts can change which candidate appears able to form a government. They also show that constituency parties can matter without taking the prime minister’s office or leading the coalition. Their choices may determine who receives the mandate, whether a coalition reaches a majority, and whether negotiations succeed after the president makes a designation.

Israel’s proportional representation system gives parties seats in the Knesset rather than usually producing one dominant party. With 120 seats divided among multiple lists, a party or bloc may win the most seats without reaching the 61-seat majority needed to govern securely.

The article illustrates this pattern. Netanyahu’s bloc led the October 27 election with 53 seats, but it lacked reinforcements. An allied ultra-Orthodox party then abstained, costing him seven recommendations. Eisenkot began with support from lists holding 48 seats, then gained 19 recommendations from two Arab lists, reaching 67.

Because power is divided, coalition negotiations become central. Party leaders can support a candidate, abstain, or join an alliance without leading it. Those choices affect who receives the mandate and whether a government can function. Eisenkot’s lead therefore reflected shifting alliances, not a simple election victory, and Herzog’s decision was the next immediate step.