Jaishankar’s Baku Visit Opens a New Chapter in Azerbaijan–India Relations

On October 23, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited Baku, met Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and held talks with Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov. It was the first bilateral visit by an Indian foreign minister to Azerbaijan since April 2018. The visit followed a year of strained relations after Baku supported Pakistan during the May 2025 India–Pakistan conflict.

The reset matters because both governments discussed their disagreements directly instead of avoiding them. Bayramov said the issues had affected bilateral ties and cooperation in international organizations. Jaishankar called the talks productive and said they identified a pathway forward. Both sides also recognized that they could cooperate without abandoning their existing partnerships.

The two countries agreed to deepen cooperation in trade, energy, transport, and people-to-people ties. Security discussions included terrorism, conflict, instability, and the Azerbaijan–Armenia peace process. The reset has political backing from the Aliyev–Modi meeting in September, but unresolved disputes could still test its durability.

Relations deteriorated after India launched military strikes against Pakistan in May 2025. Azerbaijan expressed solidarity with the Pakistani people and condemned attacks that it said killed and injured civilians. India viewed Baku’s position as politically unfriendly during a serious conflict. The disagreement therefore moved beyond public statements and affected the wider relationship.

The clearest practical effect appeared in tourism. Major Indian travel platforms removed Azerbaijan listings or advised against non-essential travel. Indian visitors to Azerbaijan fell by 56 percent between May and August 2025 compared with the same period a year earlier. This showed how quickly diplomatic tensions could affect ordinary travelers and commercial links.

The dispute also entered multilateral diplomacy. Azerbaijan accused India of blocking its application for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. India said Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s applications were not discussed at the 2025 summit in Tianjin because of time constraints. These competing accounts complicated the relationship before the 2025 diplomatic thaw.

The latest figure shows a growing economic relationship despite the recent diplomatic strain. India–Azerbaijan trade reached approximately $600 million in the first nine months of the year. The article’s executive summary compares this with $401 million in 2025, indicating a substantial increase. Trade therefore provides a measurable sign of renewed engagement.

The change matters because economic ties are helping support the political reset. The two governments agreed to deepen cooperation in trade, energy, transport, and people-to-people links. These areas can create regular contacts between companies, officials, travelers, and communities. Such practical connections may make the relationship less vulnerable to a single political dispute.

The article excerpt does not provide the trade value at a 2022 peak, so that comparison cannot be calculated from the supplied text. It does show that current nine-month trade has already exceeded the 2025 total cited. The future scale will depend on whether the diplomatic thaw survives unresolved strategic disagreements.

Deepening cooperation in several sectors could give the reset a practical foundation. Trade can expand business exchanges, while energy cooperation can support investment and supply links. Transport ties can improve movement between markets. People-to-people contacts can rebuild trust after the sharp fall in Indian visitors during 2025.

The mechanism is regular interaction. Companies can pursue new deals, officials can coordinate projects, and travelers can restore connections. The article reports that bilateral trade reached about $600 million in the first nine months, up from $401 million in 2025. That growth suggests economic activity already gives both sides a reason to keep relations stable.

The agreement does not erase political disagreements. India and Azerbaijan still differ over Armenia, arms sales, and Azerbaijan’s SCO application. However, expanded cooperation could raise the cost of another rupture and create channels for managing disputes. The article does not specify individual projects, routes, or policy changes, so the practical results remain to be developed.

Energy is central because the article identifies it as the strongest economic foundation of the India–Azerbaijan rapprochement. It places energy alongside trade, transport, and people-to-people ties as a priority for deeper cooperation. This gives the relationship a concrete economic base after the political tensions that followed the May 2025 conflict.

The article excerpt, however, does not explain the volume of Azerbaijani oil exports to India or describe investments by India’s ONGC Videsh. It therefore cannot establish how much oil is traded, which assets are involved, or what financial role the company plays. Those details would be needed to assess the energy relationship precisely.

What the text does establish is that energy can connect the two countries’ commercial interests to the diplomatic reset. Greater energy engagement could encourage continued official dialogue and business cooperation. Yet the article also warns that the reset depends on managing unresolved issues, including India’s arms sales to Armenia and Azerbaijan’s SCO membership bid.

The diplomatic reset remains vulnerable because India and Azerbaijan have different strategic partnerships. India sells arms to Armenia, while Azerbaijan has a close relationship with Pakistan and has its own expectations in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process. These links mean that cooperation with one partner can be viewed negatively by the other.

A second pressure point is Azerbaijan’s application for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Baku accused New Delhi of obstructing the application. India rejected that account, saying Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s applications were not discussed at the 2025 summit in Tianjin because of time constraints. The disagreement shows how bilateral distrust can spread into multilateral institutions.

The October talks acknowledged that both countries are independent-minded and will make their own decisions. That formula allows cooperation without requiring either side to abandon existing partnerships. Still, the reset will last only if both governments manage these disputes while expanding trade, energy, transport, and people-to-people ties.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO, is a regional organization that brings member states together for political, security, economic, and cultural cooperation. This broader definition uses established knowledge beyond the supplied article, which mentions the SCO summit and membership applications but does not define the organization. Its meetings provide a forum for leaders and officials to coordinate and build relationships.

Membership can matter because it gives a country a regular platform with influential regional states. It may improve diplomatic access, support cooperation on security and economic issues, and increase a country’s visibility in regional decision-making. The value is therefore political as well as practical, rather than simply symbolic.

For Azerbaijan, full membership became a source of tension with India. Baku accused New Delhi of obstructing its application, while India said the applications of Azerbaijan and Armenia were not discussed at the 2025 summit because of time constraints. The dispute could complicate the wider diplomatic reset.