Polish deputy PM proposes “constitutional reset” to resolve crisis around top court

The “constitutional reset” is a proposed attempt to end Poland’s long-running crisis around the Constitutional Tribunal, or TK. It would start by removing all current judges. The aim is to restore a constitutional court that citizens can regard as independent and legitimate.

The proposal comes from deputy prime minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Parliament could declare the TK “permanently incapable of performing its duties,” but only after a request from the National Council of the Judiciary. That declaration would require three-fifths support from both houses combined. New judges would then be selected through a process involving parliamentary candidates and judicial opinions.

The plan would also require new judges to receive approval from 60% of members of parliament and the president. Because changing the constitution itself needs a three-fifths Sejm majority, the proposal faces a high political hurdle. It responds directly to the clash between judges appointed under PiS and judges chosen by the current government’s parliamentary majority.

The Constitutional Tribunal, known as the TK, is Poland’s constitutional court. Its central role is to assess whether laws and other state actions comply with the constitution. That makes it a crucial safeguard for constitutional rules and citizens’ rights. It is separate from the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court.

The tribunal’s decisions matter because they can determine whether legislation fits Poland’s highest legal framework. However, the article describes a serious dispute over who may sit on the court and whether its current composition is legitimate. Polish and European courts have found the tribunal in its current form illegitimate because three judges were unlawfully appointed in 2015.

The conflict has weakened confidence in the TK’s authority. Eight judges elected this year by the government’s parliamentary majority seized control, while chief justice Bogdan Święczkowski and six other judges rejected that takeover. The proposed reset seeks to create a new, more broadly accepted tribunal.

The proposal would require new Constitutional Tribunal judges to win approval from 60% of members of parliament, as well as the president. The article also describes a related three-fifths threshold, equal to 60%, for key decisions about the tribunal’s future. These rules are designed to make appointments less dependent on one political majority.

An ordinary parliamentary majority requires more support than opposition, but not necessarily cooperation from rival parties. A three-fifths or 60% threshold is higher. It therefore normally requires agreement across political groups, especially when no party or coalition controls that many seats. The proposal would also require a three-fifths majority in the Sejm to amend the constitution.

That high threshold could produce judges with wider political acceptance. It could also make appointments difficult when parties remain divided. The article shows why this matters: Poland’s government, president, and PiS-aligned judges currently disagree over appointments, qualifications, swearing-in, and control of the tribunal.

The rival sides disagree because they rely on different claims about legality and authority. The government says PiS unlawfully appointed three judges in 2015, and Polish and European courts have found the tribunal’s current form illegitimate. PiS-aligned judges and the president reject the government’s attempt to replace or control them.

The immediate clash followed the election of eight new judges by the current government’s parliamentary majority. Those judges seized control of the tribunal and suspended chief justice Bogdan Święczkowski, accusing him of failing to perform his duties. Święczkowski called the action an illegal “coup d’état,” backed by the tribunal’s remaining six judges.

President Karol Nawrocki, aligned with PiS, has refused to swear in five of the eight new judges. He cited concerns about their selection or qualifications. The result is a fight over both the tribunal’s membership and the validity of the procedures used to appoint, swear in, suspend, or replace judges.

If the Constitutional Tribunal remains divided or widely regarded as illegitimate, its authority to settle constitutional disputes will remain contested. The article connects the crisis to citizens’ access to an independent constitutional court. It also says the dispute has continued more than fifteen months after the change of government.

The immediate problem is that rival groups claim control. Eight judges elected by the government’s majority took over, while chief justice Bogdan Święczkowski and six other judges rejected the action. The government also says three PiS-era appointments were unlawful. These competing claims make the tribunal’s composition and decisions politically disputed.

The article does not list specific laws that would automatically fail or court rulings that would be cancelled if the division continued. It does state that the current tribunal has been found illegitimate by Polish and European courts. Kosiniak-Kamysz’s proposal therefore seeks a reset, new appointments, and a more consensual process to restore confidence.

The conflict traces back to 2015, when PiS unlawfully appointed three judges to the Constitutional Tribunal, according to the current government and later court findings. Those appointments became a lasting question about whether the tribunal was properly constituted. The issue did not disappear when political power changed.

PiS governed from 2015 to 2023 and, according to the article, brought the tribunal under its political influence. After the change of government, the new parliamentary majority elected judges of its own. This produced competing groups inside the court: PiS-aligned judges appointed earlier, and judges chosen by the current government.

The government proposed legislation in 2024 to remove unlawfully appointed PiS-era judges and annul rulings in which they participated. President Andrzej Duda sent the bills to the PiS-era tribunal for assessment, and it rejected them as unconstitutional the following year. The present reset proposal addresses that unresolved institutional conflict.

Judicial independence matters because constitutional courts must assess government action fairly, not simply follow the wishes of the ruling party. In a constitutional democracy, an independent court helps ensure that laws respect the constitution and that public power remains subject to legal limits. Without that trust, court decisions can become politically disputed.

Requiring broad agreement for appointments can reduce the chance that one party fills the court with loyalists. Poland’s proposal reflects that goal: new judges would need support from 60% of parliament’s members and the president. The process would also involve opinions from the heads of the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court.

Yet a high threshold can obstruct appointments when political camps are deeply divided. Poland already faces disagreement over qualifications, swearing-in, and control of the tribunal. The article therefore presents consensus as both a possible safeguard and a practical challenge. The proposal requires a constitutional amendment, itself needing a three-fifths Sejm majority.