Poland warns allies: Don't negotiate with Russia over Eastern Europe's head

Poland wants Eastern European and Scandinavian countries included in negotiations aimed at ending Russia’s war in Ukraine. Its central concern is that Western European governments might make security decisions with Moscow without consulting states closest to Russia. Those countries would face the most immediate consequences of any agreement.

Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski said Western Europe must not deal with Russia “over the heads of the east Europeans.” He identified Finland, Norway, the Baltic states and Poland as countries whose security interests cannot be ignored. Prime Minister Donald Tusk also urged caution about Vladimir Putin’s intentions and the US-led diplomatic process.

The warning comes as technical talks among Ukraine, Russia and the US are due to resume in Abu Dhabi. Poland also opposes proposals to restore Russian gas imports. Warsaw expects little progress unless Putin shows a genuine willingness to end the war and wants Europe represented legitimately in future discussions.

Poland describes Eastern Europe and Scandinavia as the frontline of Europe’s security problem. Sikorski specifically names Finland, Norway, the Baltic states and Poland. Finland, Norway and Poland border Russia, while Poland also borders Ukraine. Their geography places them closest to the war’s military and political consequences.

Their concern goes beyond conventional fighting in Ukraine. Tusk said Russia has increased hybrid attacks, cyber activity and provocations near Kaliningrad. Poland recently launched a large-scale border operation to prevent possible sabotage. He said the Baltic states and Poland would be the first targets if Russia’s threat escalates.

These countries also say their warnings about Russia were overlooked for years. Their concerns became more widely accepted only after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Poland therefore argues they must participate directly in negotiations that could reshape Europe’s security architecture for generations.

Sikorski’s figure is about 120 million people. He uses it to show that Eastern Europe and Scandinavia are not marginal voices in European security discussions. Together, these countries form a large population whose governments directly confront the risks created by Russia’s war and wider pressure.

He links the figure to Finland, Norway, the Baltic states and Poland. These countries either border Russia, as Finland, Norway and Poland do, or sit directly on its eastern flank. Poland also borders Ukraine. Their proximity makes them especially sensitive to military spillover, sabotage, cyber operations and political pressure.

The population figure strengthens Poland’s argument for a formal place in negotiations. Warsaw says Western governments should not decide the region’s future without the countries most exposed to Russia. This matters as talks involving Ukraine, Russia and the United States are expected to continue, followed by possible wider European participation.

Negotiating without countries closest to Russia could produce a settlement that overlooks their security risks. These states would still have to live with the agreement’s consequences, even if they had little influence over its terms. Poland fears that Western governments could trade away eastern security interests for a quick diplomatic result.

The article points to hybrid attacks, cyberwar and provocations near Kaliningrad as current dangers. Tusk said Russia’s threat is expected to grow and that the Baltic states and Poland could be first targets. Any security arrangement that ignores these countries could therefore fail to address the threats they experience directly.

The dispute also concerns political legitimacy. Italy’s Giorgia Meloni complained that commitments might be negotiated without a mandate and later imposed on countries expected to assume them. Poland supports her call for legitimate European representation before broader talks continue after the Abu Dhabi meeting.

Hybrid warfare is a coordinated campaign that mixes different forms of pressure against a country. It can include sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, coercion, political interference and covert operations. The goal is often to weaken an opponent without launching a clearly declared conventional attack.

A conventional military attack uses overt armed force, such as troops, missiles or airstrikes. Cyberwar focuses mainly on digital systems, including networks and critical infrastructure. Hybrid warfare is broader. It can combine cyber operations with physical sabotage, propaganda or border provocations. The article gives no single formal definition but describes these activities occurring together.

Tusk said Poland struggles to distinguish hybrid war, cyberwar and provocations near Kaliningrad because they happen at the same time. Poland launched a large-scale border operation after concerns about possible sabotage. The broader implication is that European security planning must prepare for threats that are coordinated, ambiguous and not limited to battlefields.

Poland opposes restarting Russian gas imports because it believes dependence would make Europe vulnerable to renewed pressure from Vladimir Putin. Energy supplies are not only commercial goods in this dispute. If countries rely heavily on one supplier, that supplier can threaten disruption or demand political concessions, giving energy policy a security dimension.

Energy Minister Miłosz Motyka said buying Russian gas to “buy time” would be short-sighted and expensive. He argued that renewed imports would expose Europe to Putin’s blackmail, conflict with US economic interests and further damage transatlantic relations. Poland also rejects calls from right-wing European parties to restore Russian fuels.

Warsaw says its position will not change, regardless of who is in power. The disagreement has intensified because US negotiators reportedly floated restarting Russian flows as an incentive for Moscow. Poland believes such a deal could weaken Europe’s independence while rewarding Russia before it demonstrates a genuine willingness to end the war.

NATO and the European Union are separate organizations, so neither automatically speaks for the whole continent. NATO handles collective defence through its member governments and consensus decisions. Its Secretary General can represent the alliance politically, but major security commitments require allied agreement. Non-NATO European countries are not bound by NATO positions.

Within the EU, foreign and security policy remains mainly controlled by member states. The European Council sets broad direction, while the Council of the EU adopts decisions, usually requiring unanimity in this policy area. The High Representative and European External Action Service coordinate and represent agreed EU policy. The Treaty of Lisbon created and strengthened these roles.

The article does not detail these arrangements. It shows the practical dispute: Meloni demanded a unifying envoy, while Sikorski wanted legitimate European representation. In practice, who speaks depends on the mandate granted by EU governments, NATO allies or both, rather than geography alone.