‘We’ve been preparing for the worst all year’: uncertainty grips Iran after Trump midterms defeat

Midterm elections are nationwide elections held halfway through a US president’s four-year term. Voters choose members of Congress and many state officials. They do not choose a new president. The striking risk is that voters can sharply change the balance of power without changing the presidency.

A major defeat means the president’s party loses many seats, possibly its majority in the House of Representatives or Senate. That can block bills, delay spending, trigger investigations, and force compromises. A president may still direct much foreign policy, but Congress controls laws and much government funding.

The article gives the political result, but not its exact seat totals. Iranian officials portrayed the Republican losses as rejection of Donald Trump’s policy toward Iran. Inside Iran, people disagreed about what the setback meant. Some feared more war; others thought a full-scale conflict had become less likely.

Midterm elections decide all seats in the House of Representatives, roughly one-third of Senate seats, and many governorships and state legislative seats. These contests determine who writes federal laws, approves spending, conducts oversight, and shapes policy in many states. The president remains in office, but the political terrain can change dramatically.

If the president’s party wins or keeps congressional majorities, lawmakers can support the administration’s bills, budgets, appointments, and priorities. If the opposition gains control, it can refuse to pass legislation, investigate executive actions, restrict funding, or demand compromises. Senate control also affects confirmation of senior officials and judges.

The article does not give the election’s seat-by-seat outcome. It does show why the result mattered symbolically: Iranian officials called the Republican defeat a rejection of Trump’s war against Iran. In practice, election results can constrain policy, but they do not automatically end a war or change sanctions.

Iranian officials presented the Republican losses as evidence that American voters had rejected Trump’s approach toward Iran. Their message was political and symbolic. They portrayed the result as proof that what they called Trump’s war had lost public support, and as evidence that the US was entering decline.

The reaction appeared in Tehran almost immediately. Pro-regime crowds burned a giant banner showing Trump, JD Vance, Steve Witkoff, and Benjamin Netanyahu. Iran’s supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, said the process of the US’s collapse had accelerated. State television later showed an actor wearing a Trump mask and orange prison uniform in a mock hanging.

That interpretation was not shared by everyone inside Iran. Some people feared Trump’s setback could make another full-scale war more likely because he would not need re-election. Others thought war had become less likely. Across these views, uncertainty and fear remained strong.

An election defeat can change US policy indirectly by changing who controls Congress. A hostile Congress may challenge military action, restrict funds, demand information, or pass new sanctions. A supportive Congress can approve money, legislation, and appointments more easily. The political signal may also affect how allies and adversaries judge the president’s strength.

The mechanism is not automatic. The president remains commander in chief and usually has significant authority over diplomacy and military operations. Congress controls appropriations and can legislate sanctions, but changing those measures may require agreement across both chambers and the president, or enough votes to overcome opposition.

The article does not report any new US decision on war, sanctions, or relations with Iran after the defeat. It reports competing expectations in Iran instead. Some interviewees feared continued war, while others believed a full-scale conflict had become less likely. Everyone described the future as uncertain.

The article describes repression as widespread and persistent, not as an isolated response to one protest. Noor, a 24-year-old from Karaj, spent three weeks in prison after joining protests in January. She said authorities arrested her during the war and that their repression mechanism would keep operating under bombs or ordinary conditions.

The clearest figure is from the Oslo-based NGO Iran Human Rights. It reported that Iranian authorities had executed at least 696 people that year. Mehnaz, a Tehran-based journalist, said executions were happening daily and worsening. The article does not provide a total number of arrests, prisoners, or people killed in protests.

Interviewees feared repression would continue regardless of US politics or another war. Noor said no one could predict what would happen next, but she was certain repression would not end. That fear sits alongside economic hardship, uncertainty, and preparations for possible damage to infrastructure.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, is a major Iranian military and security organisation. Beyond defending the state, it has powerful political and economic influence and plays a central role in Iran’s regional strategy. Its importance helps explain why outside pressure has not simply removed the Iranian government.

The article focuses on two qualities: strategic capability and loyalty. Moein, a medic in central Iran, said he had underestimated how powerful and well placed the IRGC was. He described its personnel as still loyal and acknowledged that the organisation could confront the world’s most powerful military despite corruption. He also called it part of the state’s coercive machinery.

That combination creates a sharp contradiction. The same state apparatus that can endure sanctions and resist external military pressure can use force against its own citizens. The article links this repression to arrests, executions, and the killing of young girls in the streets, while offering no sign that the mechanism will stop.

A state can withstand pressure when its institutions remain loyal, its leaders preserve strategic capabilities, and its economy and society adapt to scarcity. Control over security forces also matters. Sanctions and military threats may weaken living standards without automatically breaking the government’s command structure or its ability to suppress opposition.

Moein described this mechanism through the IRGC. He said he had underestimated its power, strategic position, and personnel loyalty. He saw a system capable of lasting half a century under sanctions and confronting the world’s most powerful military. At the same time, he said that system could turn its coercive machinery against its own population.

The article shows the human cost of that resilience. Alborz described prices soaring and families preparing for possible infrastructure destruction. Noor said repression would continue whether the country was under clouds or bombs. Thus, state survival does not mean public security or prosperity; it can coexist with fear, poverty, executions, and political imprisonment.