Iran demands US action, says it will not accept commitments on paper

Iran is demanding proof through action before opening what Ali Baqeri called a new chapter in diplomacy with Washington. The central issue is trust. Tehran says written commitments alone cannot repair confidence after what it describes as earlier breaches and hostile conduct.

Baqeri’s wording is deliberately broad. He says Iran must see “practical actions” from the Americans, but the article gives no detailed list of measures. It therefore supports a clear conclusion about the standard Iran wants, but not a precise checklist. The demand is for conduct that can be observed in practice.

This condition could make renewed negotiations harder to begin. Washington would need to demonstrate action before Tehran accepts another diplomatic phase, while Iran would judge whether those steps are real. Until such evidence appears, written promises are unlikely to satisfy Iran, according to Baqeri’s comments.

In international diplomacy, a commitment “on paper” means a government has formally written down a promise, obligation, or assurance. It may appear in an agreement, statement, or other official document. The written text records what a country says it will do, but it does not automatically prove that the country will follow through.

The article uses this idea to explain Iran’s distrust of the United States. Ali Baqeri says Tehran will not rely on American commitments on paper after four rounds of negotiations that Iran believes were derailed by hostile actions and breaches of commitments. Iran wants more than formal language.

The practical meaning is that Iran is looking for conduct it can observe. The article does not identify specific verification systems or enforcement tools. It does show that written assurances alone may not begin a new diplomatic phase, because Tehran wants evidence that Washington’s commitments operate in practice.

The two countries have held four rounds of negotiations during the past 18 months. That figure provides the article’s main measure of recent diplomatic contact between Tehran and Washington. It shows that the disagreement follows repeated talks, rather than a single failed meeting.

Ali Baqeri referred to these rounds while explaining why Iran is cautious about another diplomatic phase. According to him, Tehran believed the United States derailed each round through hostile actions and breaches of commitments. The number of rounds matters because Iran’s concern is presented as a repeated pattern.

The article does not name the dates, locations, topics, or outcomes of the four rounds. It also does not say whether another round has been scheduled. It establishes only that negotiations took place four times over 18 months and that Iran wants practical US action before diplomacy moves into a new chapter.

Iran attributes the failure of previous negotiations to two kinds of US conduct: hostile actions and breaches of commitments. Ali Baqeri said Tehran believed Washington had derailed each of the four rounds held over the past 18 months. These claims explain why Iran is demanding evidence before restarting a new diplomatic chapter.

The key mechanism is broken confidence. A commitment has value only if the other side believes it will be respected. From Iran’s perspective, earlier American behavior showed that promises could be followed by actions that undermined the talks or by failures to honor commitments. That history makes another written assurance less persuasive.

The article reports Iran’s view and does not independently establish that the United States caused the rounds to fail. It also gives no specific examples of the alleged hostile actions or breaches. The immediate implication is clear, however: Tehran wants practical American steps before it treats future diplomacy as credible.

If Iran refuses written promises without visible action, future US-Iran diplomacy could remain delayed or limited. Tehran has said practical American steps are necessary before a new chapter can begin. This makes action, rather than signed language alone, the gateway to renewed engagement.

The mechanism is a higher threshold for trust. Iran says the United States derailed four negotiation rounds through hostile actions and breaches of commitments. Because of that history, another document may not persuade Tehran. Iran would instead look for conduct that demonstrates a change, although the article does not define the required actions or how they would be measured.

The result could be a prolonged diplomatic impasse if Washington does not meet Iran’s condition. The article does not predict a definite outcome or describe a planned next meeting. It indicates that progress depends on practical US actions convincing Iran that commitments will be respected in reality.

Iran’s communication with Russia is presented as a separate diplomatic channel alongside its cautious consideration of renewed talks with the United States. Ali Baqeri said Iran was cooperating with Russia, showing that Tehran is engaging with Moscow while demanding action from Washington. The article does not state that Russia is replacing the United States in negotiations.

A concrete example was Mohsen Rezaei’s recent visit to Moscow. Baqeri said the visit was intended to convey a message from Iran’s leader to President Vladimir Putin. That explains the immediate purpose of the trip. It also shows that Iran’s diplomatic activity includes direct communication with Russia, not only discussions about Washington.

The article does not identify the message’s contents or explain a broader strategy behind the Russia contact. It also does not say how Moscow might affect US-Iran diplomacy. The current reality is simply that Iran is pursuing cooperation with Russia while requiring practical US action before opening a new diplomatic chapter.

International agreements depend on more than promises because governments need confidence that commitments will be carried out. A written pledge records an intention, but it does not by itself reveal whether the promised behavior is happening. Verification provides evidence, while enforcement gives an agreement practical weight when a party fails to comply.

For example, parties can use agreed checks or reports to compare real conduct with written obligations. If a breach is found, enforcement mechanisms can require correction or impose consequences. The specific tools vary by agreement. The supplied article does not describe any verification system, enforcement process, or particular obligation.

Iran’s position illustrates why this distinction matters. Baqeri said Tehran would not rely on US commitments on paper and demanded practical American actions. Iran also says earlier US hostile actions and breaches derailed four negotiation rounds. In that context, visible compliance would matter because it could make future promises more credible, while unverified promises may not reopen diplomacy.