Shipping firms email Houthis to cross Red Sea, wait for 24 hours. This is why

Some shipping companies are emailing the Houthis because the Red Sea has become dangerous enough to make direct contact part of voyage planning. The group has attacked vessels during the Israel-Hamas war and has warned that some Saudi-linked ships could face attack. Operators are trying to reduce risks to expensive ships, cargoes and crews.

The message goes through the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center, or HOCC. A company sends vessel details and its planned voyage. The Houthis then usually respond within about 24 hours, indicating whether they consider the ship a target. The Chinese container ship Zhong Cheng Chang Ling received such approval in September.

The system has no recognised legal authority. International maritime authorities have advised against using it, and many companies still avoid direct contact. Yet the exchange shows how security threats can push commercial operators toward unusual arrangements. Companies must weigh this risk against the extra time and cost of sailing around Africa.

The Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center is an organisation established by the Houthis in early 2024. Its purpose is to communicate the group's maritime restrictions to the shipping industry. It was not created by an internationally recognised maritime authority and has no legal power to control international waters.

In practice, a shipping company can email the HOCC with information about its vessel and planned voyage. The Houthis can then reply, usually within about 24 hours. Their response indicates whether they consider the ship a target. This gives operators an informal security signal before they cross the Red Sea or the Bab el-Mandeb strait.

The arrangement is controversial. International maritime authorities have advised ships not to engage with or register through the Houthi system. Contacting an armed group may create legal and security risks. Still, some operators use the channel because attacks have made normal route planning more uncertain and the alternative route around Africa is costly.

The Red Sea is the waterway used by ships travelling between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. The Bab el-Mandeb is the narrow strait at the Red Sea's southern entrance. Together, they form part of a maritime corridor connecting Asian and Middle Eastern waters with the Suez Canal and European markets.

The strait matters because ships must pass through a confined gateway to use this route. A threat there can affect vessels before they reach the wider Red Sea. The article describes the Bab el-Mandeb as a passage crossed by the Chinese ship Zhong Cheng Chang Ling before it entered the Indian Ocean.

This geography gives security incidents wider commercial consequences. Attacks or warnings can make the shorter route unattractive, even when ships are not directly attacked. Companies may instead sail around the Cape of Good Hope. That detour avoids the threatened waters but adds time and cost to voyages between Asia and Europe.

The article gives no precise percentage, tonnage or dollar value for global trade passing through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. It only says the waterway carries a major share of global trade. That makes the route commercially important, but the source does not support a more exact figure.

The route links the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal. Ships use it as a shorter connection between Asian and European markets, as well as for journeys involving the Middle East. The Bab el-Mandeb is a key passage on that route, so danger there affects ships before they continue through the Red Sea.

The absence of a figure does not reduce the disruption described. Since the route handles a major share of trade, threats can force operators to reconsider it. Companies that avoid the waterway must sail around the Cape of Good Hope, adding significant time and cost. The article does not quantify resulting cargo-price changes.

When companies avoid the Red Sea, they sail around the Cape of Good Hope at Africa's southern tip. This route is longer than the passage through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. The article says it can add significant time and cost to journeys between Asia and Europe.

The main mechanism is simple: ships spend more days at sea. Each extra day brings higher expenses for operating the vessel and carrying the voyage's cargo. Fuel is a major part of running a ship, but the article does not provide a fuel figure. It also does not state a specific increase in cargo prices.

The choice becomes a difficult calculation. Using the Red Sea can expose ships and crews to missiles, drones or other attacks. Avoiding it reduces that route-specific danger but creates a costly detour. If enough operators choose the longer route, the added time and expense can place upward pressure on transport costs, although the article does not quantify that effect.

The Houthis have no recognised legal right to decide which ships may sail through international waters. Their influence comes from control of the risk environment, not from formal maritime authority. Attacks, warnings and announced restrictions can make operators fear that a vessel will be targeted.

The informal mechanism runs through the HOCC. A company can submit vessel details and its planned voyage. The Houthis usually answer within about 24 hours and indicate whether they consider the ship a target. Some ships with no links to the United States, Britain or Israel generally do not need to contact them, but the system has expanded as threats have changed.

This influence is practical and coercive rather than legal. Companies may seek assurances, keep AIS switched on, or avoid the route entirely. International maritime authorities advise against engaging with the system. Even so, the fact that operators use it shows how an armed group's attacks can shape commercial decisions in international waters.

A maritime chokepoint is strategically powerful because many ships must pass through a narrow gateway to use an efficient route. The Bab el-Mandeb performs that role for traffic entering or leaving the Red Sea. A threat does not need to close the entire sea to affect commercial decisions; uncertainty at the gateway may be enough.

The article shows the mechanism through route choice. Ships travelling between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal can use the Red Sea as a shorter connection between Asia and Europe. If operators judge the passage too dangerous, they can turn toward the Cape of Good Hope instead. That adds significant time and cost.

The consequences spread through global shipping because the route carries a major share of world trade. Every extra day at sea raises expenses. Attacks can also endanger crews, vessels and cargoes. The article does not provide exact trade volumes or price increases, but it shows how a local security threat can reshape international voyage planning.