Shippers wishing to cross Bab al-Mandab email Houthis for permits, sign up for alerts - report

Shippers seeking safer passage are contacting the Houthis by email before transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait. They write to the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center, or HOCC, an administrative body created by the Houthis in early 2024. The goal is to obtain assurances that their vessels will not be attacked.

Their messages commonly state that neither the ship nor its crew has connections with Israel, the United States, or the United Kingdom. They also provide estimated schedules and promise to follow the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. The Houthis typically respond within 24 hours, according to the article.

One Chinese containership, Zhong Cheng Chang Ling, received a one-week authorization. The instructions included keeping AIS and VHF Channel 16 active. International maritime authorities officially advise vessels not to engage with or register through the HOCC, but some ship managers still view contact as an extra precaution.

The Bab al-Mandab Strait is a narrow sea passage at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. It connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and, beyond it, the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Its name is often translated as “Gate of Tears.”

Geographically, the strait separates Yemen, on the Arabian Peninsula, from Djibouti and Eritrea, on the African side. Ships using the Suez Canal route between Europe and Asia normally pass through this gateway, making it an important international shipping corridor.

The source article focuses on vessels seeking Houthi assurances before crossing it, rather than explaining its geography. Because the strait connects major seas and serves international navigation, attacks or threats there can affect commercial routes far beyond the immediate waters. The article identifies the Houthis as an Iran-backed armed group operating from Yemen.

The Houthis have said that ships not linked to Israel, the United States, or the United Kingdom may pass through the strait. That stated policy has encouraged some shippers to explain their affiliations directly, hoping their vessels will be treated as exempt from Houthi attacks or restrictions.

Emails seen by the Wall Street Journal reportedly say that neither the ship nor its crew has connections with those three countries. The messages also include estimated arrival and transit schedules. By supplying this information, operators appear to be presenting their ships as compliant with the Houthis’ declared conditions and easier to identify during passage.

This practice is unofficial and controversial. The article says international maritime authorities advise vessels not to engage with or register through the HOCC. Nevertheless, some ship managers have told captains to contact the Houthis as an additional precaution, showing how security fears can push operators toward armed-group channels.

AIS, or Automatic Identification System, automatically broadcasts information such as a ship’s identity, position, speed, and destination. VHF Channel 16 is an international marine radio channel used for distress, safety, and calling messages. Together, they help ships share movement information and maintain an emergency communications link.

In the article’s example, the Houthis told the Chinese containership Zhong Cheng Chang Ling to keep AIS operating throughout its transit. They also instructed the ship to keep VHF Channel 16 active. The vessel received a one-week permit from the Houthi-created Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center.

Keeping these systems on can make the vessel easier to identify and contact. It can also support urgent communication if a problem develops. However, continuous broadcasting may expose a ship’s location and movements. The article does not assess that security trade-off; it reports the Houthi instructions and the official advice not to engage with the HOCC.

The source article does not state how much international shipping or energy trade normally passes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Established external estimates commonly place the corridor’s share at roughly 12% of global trade, though the exact figure changes with the year, cargo type, and definition of “trade.”

Energy flows are also substantial. Recent international energy estimates have put traffic through the wider Bab al-Mandab route at about 9 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products in some years, with roughly 8% of global liquefied natural gas trade passing through the corridor. These are outside figures, not numbers supplied by the article.

The scale explains why security there matters globally. Disruption can affect ships connecting Europe, Asia, and energy markets. The article instead concentrates on the immediate response: vessels contacting the HOCC, reporting their schedules, and seeking permission or assurances before transit.

When vessels fear attacks in the Bab al-Mandab, operators may avoid the strait and reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. That detour adds thousands of nautical miles between Asia and Europe. It can also require more fuel, crew time, maintenance, and ships to maintain regular service.

Risk raises insurance premiums and may trigger special war-risk coverage. Carriers can pass those costs to customers through higher freight rates and surcharges. Longer voyages also tie up vessels for more days, potentially creating port congestion, equipment shortages, and missed delivery windows. These effects are established shipping consequences, but the source article does not quantify them.

The article shows why operators are seeking assurances instead. Some contact the HOCC and receive replies, while others avoid the channel on official advice. If threats continue, companies may face a difficult choice between an unsafe shortcut and a costly detour, with consumers and businesses feeling the delay.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states bordering an international strait exercise sovereignty over their waters, but ships generally enjoy a right of transit passage. That passage cannot normally be suspended. States may adopt lawful safety, environmental, and navigation rules consistent with international law.

An armed group does not ordinarily possess the legal authority to grant or deny international transit rights. Its email permit may be a practical security signal, not a recognized maritime license. A ship that follows it is dealing with a force controlling or threatening the route, rather than with the international legal system or an accepted navigation authority.

That arrangement is controversial because it can legitimize coercion, expose vessel data, and create conflicting instructions. The article says international maritime authorities advise ships not to engage with the HOCC. Yet the Zhong Cheng Chang Ling’s manager told its captain to contact the Houthis as an extra precaution.