India’s deep-sea fishing ambitions are floundering

India’s Deep Sea Fishing Vessel Scheme is a government programme under the Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana. It offers traditional fishers subsidised vessels, mainly tuna longliners and gillnetters, costing at least Rs 1.2 crore. The boats enable fishing beyond 200 metres, where species such as tuna, billfish, sharks and oceanic squid are more available.

The usual funding model requires fishers to provide about 60% of the vessel cost, while the government provides 40%. The split varies by state, and women and some disadvantaged groups can receive higher subsidies. Fishers must still pay separately for fishing gear. The policy is designed to expand incomes while reducing pressure on crowded coastal waters.

The scheme has delivered fewer boats than planned. The government approved funding for 392 vessels during 2020-’25, but only 131 had been ordered by September 2026. Defective boats, delayed subsidies and weak markets have made the promised transition financially risky for many traditional fishers.

The scheme’s 2020-’25 implementation period included government approval for around Rs 470 crore to build 392 deep-sea fishing vessels. This was a major investment intended to help traditional fishers enter deeper waters and target valuable species. The approval represented the programme’s planned scale, not the number of vessels already operating.

By September 2026, only 131 vessels had been ordered. The count includes boats that were constructed or under construction, according to information compiled from Right to Information applications and state officials. Thus, the scheme had advanced on less than half of its approved vessel target.

The gap points to serious implementation problems. Fishers have faced large personal investments, delayed subsidies, boat defects and uncertainty about markets. These difficulties help explain why the scheme has attracted few participants despite its promise of better catches and livelihoods. The low number also raises questions about whether the programme matches fishers’ practical needs.

Traditional fishers are hesitant because the scheme transfers major financial risk to them. A deep-sea vessel costs at least Rs 1.2 crore, and fishers typically contribute 60% of that amount. They must also purchase fishing gear separately. For families dependent on fishing, this is a large commitment before the boat has proved reliable or profitable.

The experiences of early participants reinforce those fears. Shaju Antony contributed about Rs 72 lakh, received his vessel in December 2023, and then spent another Rs 30 lakh repairing it. Kiran Koli waited nearly a decade for his boat and, by June 2026, was still waiting for two subsidy instalments. These delays can leave fishers borrowing money while income remains uncertain.

The scheme also lacks a robust supply chain and dependable market for catches. High operating costs and poor boat design can erase earnings. As a result, many fishers see the promised transition as a possible debt trap rather than a secure route to prosperity.

When a vessel is defective or subsidies arrive late, fishers carry costs without receiving the income the scheme promised. They may still owe money for their contribution, repairs, gear and daily operations. This reverses the scheme’s intended benefit: instead of improving livelihoods, the boat becomes a continuing financial burden.

Shaju Antony’s case shows the mechanism clearly. He gathered about Rs 72 lakh for his share, received his boat in December 2023, and spent another Rs 30 lakh repairing it. After months of petitions to the state government, he gave up. Kiran Koli faced a different problem: his boat arrived in June 2026, but the final two subsidy instalments were still unpaid.

These problems leave fishers with more money lost than gained. High operating costs, weak markets and poor boat design make recovery difficult. The experiences also discourage other traditional fishers from joining, reducing the scheme’s reach and undermining its goal of expanding livelihoods.

The government is encouraging fishing below 200 metres as part of a broader effort to expand India’s fisheries sector. Coastal fishing already faces overfishing, coastal erosion and development pressures. Moving farther offshore is presented as one way to reduce dependence on crowded nearshore waters while creating new fishing opportunities.

Deep-sea vessels can reach species that are less available near the coast. The article identifies oceanic tuna, billfish, sharks and oceanic squid as important examples. These catches can have higher value, especially for exports. The policy also promises better livelihood opportunities for traditional fishers and supports India’s aim of gaining greater access to waters beyond its national jurisdiction.

The strategy is ambitious, but implementation has been difficult. Boats can be poorly designed, operating costs can be high, and markets and supply chains remain weak. Unless those practical problems are addressed, deeper fishing may not deliver the improved incomes and sectoral growth the government expects.

The supplied article does not explain how global demand for prawns and tuna historically changed India’s fishing sector. It does state that India now seeks high-value catches for export, including oceanic tuna, and that the government wants traditional fishers to move into deep-sea fishing. Those points show the current economic direction, but not the full historical pathway.

More broadly, established fisheries history links export demand for prawns and tuna with investment in larger boats, engines, refrigeration, processing and fishing gear. Mechanised fleets can travel farther and catch more consistently than many traditional boats. Export markets therefore encouraged a shift from local, nearshore fishing toward commercial operations and, eventually, deeper-water fleets.

This history also helps explain the present tension. A policy built around export species and larger vessels may not fit traditional fishers’ knowledge, finances or markets. The article’s reported defects, debts and delays show why expanding fleet capacity alone does not guarantee better livelihoods.

An exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, is a sea area extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal country’s shore. The country has special rights to explore, manage and use natural resources there, including fish. It does not mean the country owns the entire ocean or can block every other lawful use. Areas beyond national jurisdiction lie outside national EEZs and territorial waters.

These areas matter because fish stocks move across boundaries, while fishing fleets can travel long distances. A country seeking more catch may need vessels capable of reaching offshore grounds and agreements or permissions governing access. Management also requires cooperation, because one country’s fishing activity can affect shared or migratory species elsewhere.

The supplied article mentions India’s aim of securing greater access to waters beyond its national jurisdiction, but it does not explain EEZ law. Its scheme focuses on vessels able to fish deeper than 200 metres, a depth measure that is different from the distance-based boundary of an EEZ.