Leaked UN report 'establishes conclusively' that UAE hired Colombian mercenaries for Sudan's RSF

The report claims the UAE helped build and operate a foreign-fighter pipeline for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, or RSF. UN investigators say Global Security Services Group, a UAE-based company with close government ties, moved Colombian mercenaries toward Sudan. The allegation matters because it connects a powerful state to an armed group accused of grave abuses in Darfur.

The reported network used routes through Libya, Somalia, and Chad. Investigators identified training in Abu Dhabi, Ghayathi, and al-Wathba, as well as at the UAE-linked Puntland Maritime Police Force base in Bosaso. The mercenaries then supported RSF operations, including the battle for el-Fasher.

The UAE rejected allegations of wrongdoing and said it takes claims about mercenaries seriously. The report is marked strictly confidential, but its findings could increase diplomatic pressure on Abu Dhabi and intensify demands for accountability over outside support for Sudan’s war.

The Rapid Support Forces are Sudan’s paramilitary force, while the Sudanese Armed Forces are the country’s regular army. A paramilitary force is organized for military operations but remains separate from the standard army structure. This difference is central to Sudan’s war because the conflict pits two rival armed institutions against each other.

The article identifies the RSF as the force that received Colombian fighters and captured el-Fasher after a siege lasting more than 500 days. It describes the RSF as operating across Darfur and receiving arms, supplies, and foreign support through several routes. The regular army is not described in detail in the article.

The war has raged since April 2023. Because the RSF is not the regular army, alleged foreign assistance can reach a separate chain of command rather than Sudan’s formal military institutions. That makes attribution, oversight, and accountability more difficult when governments deny direct involvement.

The alleged network was not a single route. It linked UAE training facilities with transit points and territories controlled by Emirati partners or proxies. UN investigators traced Colombian mercenaries through the UAE, Somalia, eastern Libya, and Chad before their deployment to Sudan. Arms and supplies also reportedly moved through Ethiopia and Somalia’s Puntland and Somaliland.

The network’s mechanism was layered. Fighters were allegedly trained in Abu Dhabi, Ghayathi, and al-Wathba, then at the Puntland Maritime Police Force base in Bosaso. They moved through Libya, Somalia, and Chad, while supplies traveled by air and overland. Haftar family forces controlled key areas in eastern Libya, according to the article.

This structure allegedly allowed support to reach the RSF across several jurisdictions. The UAE and other involved entities denied wrongdoing. If confirmed, the findings show how allied territories and intermediaries can make a cross-border military supply system difficult to monitor and challenge.

The UN report says Colombian mercenaries played a significant role in the RSF’s military operations in Darfur. Their involvement reportedly extended beyond ordinary combat. They provided technical skills that strengthened the RSF’s ability to coordinate attacks, use weapons, and maintain pressure during the long siege of el-Fasher.

The report specifically names drone operation, artillery support, and infantry support. These roles suggest a mixed contribution: some fighters operated or supported military technology, while others helped use heavy weapons or fought alongside RSF ground forces. The mercenaries were allegedly trained through facilities in the UAE and at a PMPF base in Bosaso.

The RSF captured el-Fasher last October after more than 500 days of siege. The reported foreign assistance therefore matters not only as evidence of outside involvement, but also because it may have helped the RSF conduct the operation that ended in the city’s capture.

The article describes severe abuses against civilians after the RSF captured el-Fasher. Victims and eyewitnesses reported that RSF fighters raped, executed, and extorted thousands of people. Fighters also established makeshift clinics where they took blood from detained victims. These accounts show the human cost of the city’s fall after a siege lasting more than 500 days.

The UN report says Colombian mercenaries supported the operation through drone, artillery, and infantry roles. It does not state that they personally committed each reported abuse. However, it places them inside the military network that helped the RSF seize the city, while the RSF has been found by the UN and United States to have committed genocide in Darfur.

The findings could increase pressure for accountability by identifying alleged financiers, trainers, transit routes, and military contributors. The UAE denies wrongdoing, but the detailed evidence may make that denial harder to sustain politically.

The alleged UAE support matters directly to the UN Security Council because the leaked report was submitted to that body by the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan. It presents the UAE as part of a network supporting the RSF, which the article says has been found by the UN and United States to have committed genocide in Darfur. That places diplomacy, accountability, and the council’s credibility in tension.

The political stakes are higher because Lana Nusseibeh, a senior UAE diplomat and former permanent representative to the UN, is campaigning to become secretary-general. Sudan’s ambassador to the UK warned that her candidacy should not whitewash UAE support for the RSF.

The UAE rejected allegations of wrongdoing. Still, the report could influence scrutiny of Nusseibeh’s candidacy and pressure the Security Council to examine alleged foreign support more closely. Sudan’s ambassador said a successful candidacy could damage the UN’s credibility.

A government can influence a war without openly deploying its own soldiers by outsourcing tasks to private companies and foreign fighters. It can also rely on allied or proxy-controlled territory for training, transit, weapons, and logistics. This creates several layers between the state’s leadership and the fighting force, making responsibility harder to trace.

The article gives a concrete example. It says the UAE-linked GSSG moved Colombian mercenaries through Libya, Somalia, and Chad. The fighters allegedly trained in UAE facilities and at the PMPF base in Bosaso, while arms and supplies traveled through territory controlled by allies and proxies. The UAE and other entities denied wrongdoing.

Such arrangements can provide military capability while preserving political deniability. They also complicate investigations because evidence is spread across companies, borders, local forces, and foreign recruits. The leaked report’s detailed route and facility findings could therefore increase pressure for clearer accountability over indirect intervention.