8 calls between Delhi, Washington in May-June: US lobbying firm

SHW Partners acted as a bridge between Indian representatives and senior US officials. Its filings show that the firm arranged government-level phone calls on India’s behalf. This matters because lobbying can create direct contact with policymakers beyond formal embassy meetings.

In May, ahead of Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to India, calls were arranged with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Deputy NSA Michael Needham, and Under Secretary Gene Lange. In June, after Rubio’s visit, calls were arranged with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, Assistant to the President Walker Barrett, and communications director Steven Cheung.

The filings do not describe the substance of each call. They show, however, that the firm connected Indian representatives with officials handling finance, national security, trade, policy, and White House communications. The timing placed the calls around Rubio’s visit and other India-US engagement.

The article identifies six arranged calls in total. Three took place in May, before Marco Rubio’s India visit, and three took place in June, after the visit. SHW Partners listed these contacts in its filings.

The May participants were Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Deputy NSA Michael Needham, and Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Gene Lange. The June participants were US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, Assistant to the President for Policy Walker Barrett, and Director of White House Office of Communications Steven Cheung.

Together, the list covers several powerful parts of the US government. The contacts reached the Treasury, national security, financial intelligence, trade, presidential policy, and White House communications offices. The filings identify the calls and participants, but do not report what was discussed or whether any policy decision followed.

The Indian Embassy in Washington paid Miller’s firm a monthly retainership of $150,000. That figure shows the scale of the embassy’s effort to secure policy access and advocacy in the United States. The contract was not limited to one agency or one issue.

The stated scope included strategic counsel, tactical planning, and government relations assistance. The work covered policy matters before the US government, Congress, state governments, academic institutions, think tanks, and other relevant stakeholders. SHW Partners’ filings also recorded calls with senior administration officials.

This broad mandate positioned the firm across several channels of influence. It could advise India on strategy, plan outreach, and help communicate with officials and institutions that shape policy debate. The contract was renewed for another year in April, but it ended on June 23 after Miller joined the Trump administration as a special government employee.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act is a US disclosure law covering agents of foreign principals who engage in political activities. Its purpose is transparency: the public should be able to see when political work is being performed for a foreign government or other foreign principal.

Under the requirement described here, covered agents must make periodic public disclosures. Those disclosures include the nature of their relationship with the foreign principal, the activities they perform, and the financial compensation they receive. SHW Partners’ filings are an example of this reporting system in practice.

FARA disclosure does not, by itself, mean that the reported activity is prohibited. It makes the relationship and work visible. In this case, the filings identified calls arranged for Indian representatives, embassy events, and the financial terms of Miller’s contract. Those records provide the basis for understanding the lobbying effort.

A foreign embassy uses official diplomacy for government-to-government communication. A US lobbying firm adds a separate advocacy channel. It can help frame policy concerns for American audiences, identify relevant decision-makers, and arrange meetings or calls. The article does not state the embassy’s internal reason for hiring SHW Partners, but it documents the channel’s reach.

For example, SHW arranged calls with Treasury, national security, financial intelligence, trade, policy, and White House communications officials. The contract also covered Congress, state governments, academic institutions, think tanks, and other stakeholders. That is a wider network than one diplomatic office’s formal contacts.

The arrangement does not replace diplomacy. It supplements it with specialized planning and government relations work. FARA reporting makes the relationship and compensation public. In this case, the embassy paid Miller’s firm $150,000 monthly, while another firm, Mercury Public Affairs, worked for $75,000 monthly.

Miller’s position changed when he joined the Trump administration as a special government employee. Before that move, his firm held a lobbying contract with the Indian Embassy in Washington. The contract had been renewed for another year in April, showing that the arrangement was active shortly before the change.

On June 23, the contract was terminated after Miller joined the administration. The article does not state a separate legal explanation or identify who made the termination decision. It establishes the sequence: Miller entered government, and the embassy’s contract with his firm ended.

The change removed Miller from his outside lobbying role while he served inside the administration. That matters because the firm’s work involved policy matters before the US government and contacts with senior officials. The article does not say whether the administration imposed a specific restriction, but the timing links the appointment to the contract’s termination.

In the United States, diplomacy is the official channel between governments. Lobbying is paid advocacy that explains a foreign client’s priorities and seeks attention from policymakers. Government decision-making happens across several centers, so influence is rarely limited to one office. FARA adds transparency when political work is done for a foreign principal.

The article gives a concrete example. SHW’s contract covered the US government, Congress, state governments, academic institutions, think tanks, and other stakeholders. Its filings listed calls with Treasury, national security, financial intelligence, trade, presidential policy, and White House communications officials. These contacts show how lobbying can connect one foreign embassy to multiple policy arenas.

Diplomatic officials still represent the government directly, while lobbyists provide strategy, planning, and outreach. Agencies can shape implementation, Congress can shape legislation, the White House can set priorities, and think tanks can influence debate. The article documents these channels, but does not claim that any call produced a policy decision.