Trump’s war secretary Hegseth and Pacific Command chief Paparo may ‘soon visit China’

Two senior US military leaders may travel to China: Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth and Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of the US Pacific Command. Stephen Orlins, president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, disclosed the possibility at a conference in Sanya. The visits matter because direct contact could reduce dangerous misunderstandings between Washington and Beijing.

The proposed trips would support regular military-to-military communication at every level. Hegseth and Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun have discussed reciprocal visits, while separate trips by Hegseth and Elbridge Colby had also been prepared. Paparo’s talks could address urgent risks in the South China Sea, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea.

The plans remain uncertain. The Pentagon and US Pacific Command said they had no announcement, and Hegseth faces impeachment calls after Republican losses. If confirmed, Paparo’s trip would be the first China visit by a US Pacific command chief since 2015.

Pete Hegseth is the Pentagon chief and US defence secretary, while Admiral Samuel Paparo leads the US Pacific Command. Their positions make them important channels for military contact between Washington and Beijing. Hegseth represents the senior civilian defence leadership, and Paparo directs the US command responsible for military operations across the Asia-Pacific.

Paparo’s responsibilities place him close to the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, where US and Chinese forces could confront one another. He assumed command in May 2024 and has promoted a strong deterrence posture toward Beijing. His proposed hellscape strategy would use thousands of autonomous air, surface, and underwater drones.

Hegseth’s possible visit has become less certain because he faces calls to resign or face impeachment. The two leaders’ possible China trips would therefore combine high-level political contact with operational military communication. The aim would be to prevent mistakes and enable faster de-escalation when incidents occur.

The article does not provide a precise area measurement for the US Pacific Command. It describes the command as overseeing American military operations across the Asia-Pacific. That makes its geographic responsibility broad, but the source supplies no exact size in miles, kilometers, or countries.

The command is headquartered in Hawaii, and its commander is exposed to the region’s most sensitive military pressure points. The article specifically names the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea as flashpoints involving potential confrontations with the People’s Liberation Army. Paparo’s role therefore connects him directly to incidents that could involve US and Chinese forces.

This regional reach explains why his possible China visit matters. Working-level discussions could address urgent risks across several seas and improve crisis communication. The Pentagon and Pacific Command have not confirmed the trip, so the timing and scope remain unclear.

Stephen Orlins warned that the South China Sea, rather than Taiwan, had become the most likely flashpoint for an accidental US-China military clash. The danger comes from military forces operating in a contested and strategically important area. A mistake or unsafe encounter could quickly create pressure for both governments to respond.

Orlins urged both sides to regularise military contact at every level. The key mechanism is simple: commanders and officials need reliable channels to discuss an incident immediately. That contact can clarify what happened, reduce miscalculation, and support de-escalation before a local encounter becomes a wider crisis.

Chinese scholar Zhu Feng said urgent talks could cover the South China Sea, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea. He also identified artificial intelligence as a subject requiring communication. The proposed Hegseth and Paparo visits could therefore help manage risks, although neither the Pentagon nor Pacific Command has confirmed them.

Regular military-to-military communication could give US and Chinese officials a direct way to handle dangerous incidents. Its value would be greatest after an unexpected encounter, when incomplete information and political pressure might cause each side to misread the other. Orlins said contact should be available at every level so mistakes can be addressed quickly.

The mechanism is immediate discussion. Commanders or defence officials could compare accounts, clarify intentions, and agree on steps to reduce tension. Zhu Feng linked this goal to possible urgent talks about the South China Sea, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea. Such exchanges could also cover artificial intelligence and new forms of military warfare.

The intended consequence is de-escalation and greater strategic stability, not an end to disagreements. The proposed Hegseth and Paparo visits could strengthen working-level communication. However, the Pentagon and Pacific Command have made no announcement, so the plans remain uncertain.

Paparo’s possible China trip would be historically unusual because the article identifies 2015 as the last time a US Pacific command chief visited China. If confirmed, it would mark the first such visit in roughly a decade. The gap highlights how uncommon direct travel by this regional military commander has been.

The significance comes from Paparo’s position. He commands the US Pacific Command, which oversees American military operations across the Asia-Pacific and sits close to flashpoints involving China. A visit could create working-level contact with the People’s Liberation Army and support urgent discussions about maritime incidents.

The trip is still only a possibility. Paparo and Hegseth may visit China, but the Pentagon and US Pacific Command said they had no announcements. Chinese scholar Zhu Feng called the prospect a positive step toward strategic stability. The trip’s timing could also be affected by political pressure on Hegseth and uncertainty after Republican losses.

Rival countries use deterrence to discourage attacks and communication to prevent accidents from becoming wars. Paparo has advocated a sharp deterrence posture toward Beijing. Orlins, meanwhile, urged regular military contact so mistakes could be discussed and de-escalated quickly. These approaches address different dangers: deterrence targets deliberate aggression, while communication targets miscalculation.

Paparo’s proposed hellscape strategy shows the mechanism behind deterrence. It would deploy thousands of autonomous aerial, surface, and underwater drones to deter the People’s Liberation Army and buy time for the US and its allies during a cross-strait war. The strategy relies on technology to complicate an opponent’s choices.

Zhu Feng said artificial intelligence is shaping new forms of military warfare. He argued that the two sides must communicate about it to avert unpredictable crises. The possible Hegseth and Paparo visits could bring deterrence, operational contact, and AI discussions into one broader effort to prevent conflict.