President Trump: History will remember Iran, not the US midterms - opinion

The article identifies two linked events as changing Iran’s position in 2026: the killing of supreme leader Ali Khamenei and military blows against Iran. Together, they have shaken the leadership and weakened important national capabilities. This is more serious than another round of pressure because it affects both command and military strength.

Yet the damage has not dismantled Iran’s political system. The Revolutionary Guards remain powerful, and the security establishment may try to consolidate control. Iran therefore faces two simultaneous challenges: rebuilding its military capabilities and maintaining internal political stability. Handling both could reduce its freedom to act abroad.

The result is an unusual opening for Washington. Iran may be less able to rebuild the capabilities behind its regional influence, but it still has leverage. The Strait of Hormuz can impose wider economic costs, and uncertainty about highly enriched uranium keeps the nuclear issue unresolved. Future policy must therefore address weakness and remaining threats together.

U.S. midterm elections are congressional elections held halfway through a president’s four-year term. They choose members of the House of Representatives and some senators. Unlike a presidential election, they do not directly decide who occupies the White House. Their importance comes from changing the political balance in Congress.

That balance can shape a president’s room to act abroad. Congress can influence funding, impose oversight, debate military action, and build public pressure around costs. The article says the 2026 Democratic victory in Congress is a political setback for Trump. It also says Iran expected rising pressure on the administration to make Washington more willing to compromise.

This creates a timing problem. Presidents think beyond elections, but Congress and public opinion can shift quickly. The article warns that congressional opposition, economic concerns, and fatigue with foreign conflicts may narrow the space for difficult decisions. Tehran may therefore wait for political pressure to weaken American resolve.

Iran’s Islamic Republic is the state and political order governing Iran. It combines elected institutions with powerful religious and security authorities. The Revolutionary Guards are not a separate country or replacement government. They are a powerful military and security force operating within the Islamic Republic and helping protect its ruling system.

That distinction explains why the article separates Khamenei’s death from regime change. The supreme leader was the central figure named in the article, but the system that sustained him includes other institutions. The Revolutionary Guards remain powerful after the military blows and leadership shock. They can seek to consolidate control while Iran repairs its armed capabilities.

The current reality is therefore uncertain, not settled. Iran’s leadership crisis may restrict its choices, but the state has not disappeared. Any American strategy aimed at lasting change would need to account for the Guards, internal stability, nuclear risks, and Iran’s ability to impose costs through regional pressure.

Military damage can reduce a country’s ability to project power, support partners, and threaten neighbors. The article says Iran must rebuild its military capabilities while maintaining internal political stability. Managing both demands at once could constrain Tehran’s room for maneuver and delay efforts to restore regional influence.

The key mechanism is pressure on capacity and attention. Iran’s security establishment may focus on consolidating control at home while repairing damaged forces. That leaves less freedom for wider operations. Still, the article emphasizes that Iran retains important leverage. The Revolutionary Guards remain powerful, and the Strait of Hormuz can create economic costs far beyond Iran’s borders.

Iran’s influence is therefore weakened, not erased. Washington has an opportunity to prevent the regime from rebuilding the capabilities that supported its regional role. But a temporary military advantage may not last. Durable results would require enforceable commitments covering nuclear restrictions, navigation, and violations, rather than relying on damage alone.

The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow sea passage connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the wider ocean. It is a major route for oil shipments from Gulf producers. The source article does not state a precise percentage, so the figure here comes from established energy estimates rather than the article itself.

Those estimates commonly place the share at about one-fifth of global oil consumption or petroleum liquids trade. That scale explains the waterway’s strategic power. Even a militarily weakened Iran could raise shipping risks, disrupt movement, or create uncertainty. The article uses Hormuz to show how Tehran can impose economic costs far beyond its borders.

The current implication is that military damage has not removed Iran’s leverage. Any durable settlement would therefore need enforceable commitments on freedom of navigation. Without them, pressure on Iran could still produce a broader economic shock and force neighboring states to prepare for another crisis.

Highly enriched uranium is uranium containing a greatly increased share of the fissile isotope uranium-235. At high enrichment levels, it can support sensitive nuclear applications, including a potential weapons pathway. The article treats uncertainty over its location and status as a central reason the nuclear threat may survive military attacks.

The mechanism is simple but serious: facilities are places where nuclear material is processed or stored, while the material itself may be elsewhere. If highly enriched uranium has been moved, concealed, or remains unaccounted for, destroying buildings does not necessarily eliminate the danger. Damage can therefore reduce capability without proving that the threat is gone.

The article says Iran’s nuclear uncertainty remains alongside its military weakness. That makes verification essential. A durable settlement would need verifiable nuclear restrictions and enforceable consequences for violations. Washington must judge success by whether Iran can evade commitments, not merely by whether facilities were struck.

Removing a regime and building a stable political order are different tasks. Regime removal can eliminate leaders and institutions, but stability requires legitimate authority, functioning governance, security, and a workable political future. Without those foundations, power struggles and disorder can replace the old system. The article warns that changing Iran must not mean pursuing regime change at any cost.

Iraq provides the article’s central lesson. It says Iraq demonstrated the dangers of removing a dictatorship without securing a stable political future. The example shows the key mechanism: military success against a ruler does not settle who governs next or how society remains secure. A vacuum can make the aftermath as consequential as the initial intervention.

That warning shapes the article’s proposed objective for Iran. The goal should be a durable regional order and conditions in which Iranians can determine their own political future. Any settlement must also survive an American administration change, include verifiable commitments, and avoid an open-ended campaign without a credible political purpose.