Cornered and dangerous, the lame-duck leader of the free world now poses a greater risk to Australia than ever | Paul Daley

A lame-duck leader is still in office but has weakened political authority and limited time to shape events. The label usually applies after an election or political defeat, when successors or opposing lawmakers gain momentum. It matters because such leaders may face fewer incentives to compromise while trying to secure their legacy.

The article applies the label to Donald Trump after what it calls a Republican rout and a new Democratic dominance of the legislature. Trump still has two years to serve, but his domestic political position has sharply deteriorated. His concession that the Iran war contributed to the defeat further complicates his standing.

The danger, according to the article, is that Trump could become more unpredictable when cornered. He has threatened to govern by decree without congressional support and has threatened to “annihilate” Iran. Australia therefore faces uncertainty over both the Iran conflict and its alliance commitments during Trump’s remaining term.

The political change was a Democratic takeover or dominance of the legislature following what the article calls a Republican rout. This means Trump faces a legislature less willing to support his agenda. The shift matters because Congress is normally central to approving laws, spending and major national policies.

The article says the new Democratic dominance is unlikely to stop Trump’s vow to govern by decree when congressional support is absent. That creates a direct conflict between an elected president and a legislature controlled by the opposing party. It also makes his actions harder to predict, especially on foreign policy.

Trump is not immediately removed from office. The article says he has two years left to serve, making him a lame-duck president rather than a former president. During that period, Australia and other allies must manage a weakened but still powerful American leader who may seek to shape his legacy.

A renewed US-Israeli attack on Iran could raise energy costs by increasing fears about oil production, exports and shipping. Higher fuel costs would feed into transport, food and business expenses. Those increases would add to inflation and could encourage policymakers to keep interest rates higher for longer.

The article links the existing war to Australians suffering at the fuel bowser, rising living costs and declining superannuation and other retirement savings. It also describes a “double whammy” of red-hot inflation and interest-rate resentment. If fighting intensifies, those pressures could worsen through renewed uncertainty in global oil markets.

The Strait of Hormuz is central to the article’s warning. It says further bloodshed could affect the strait and the normalisation of global oil trade. Australia would therefore face both household pain and broader economic instability, while the government would have to manage alliance commitments alongside electoral pressure.

AUKUS is a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Its best-known purpose is helping Australia obtain nuclear-powered submarines, alongside broader cooperation on advanced defence technologies. Strategically, it is meant to strengthen the three countries’ ability to deter threats and operate together.

For Australia, AUKUS represents a major long-term defence commitment and a closer military relationship with Washington and London. For the United States and United Kingdom, it extends their strategic reach and defence cooperation with a key Indo-Pacific ally. The article focuses especially on Australia’s dependence on Washington within the arrangement.

The partnership matters politically because the article calls it a bipartisan, shielded deal, while critics question its cost and risks. It says Australia is currently paying “hand over fist” for AUKUS. Any change would therefore affect defence planning, alliance management, national spending and the credibility of all three partners.

The article puts Australia’s AUKUS commitment at $500bn. It says that figure takes into account the management and storage of nuclear waste. This makes AUKUS not merely a diplomatic promise, but an exceptionally large, long-term financial and administrative undertaking.

The cost matters because Australia is described as the only country paying “hand over fist” for the arrangement right now. The article presents this imbalance as evidence of a deal that delivers immediate financial exposure to Canberra. It also helps explain why AUKUS has attracted criticism from former ministers and people within the Labor movement.

The figure creates a high barrier to changing course. Australia would have to reconsider major defence plans, spending commitments and nuclear-waste responsibilities. Yet the article says any modification or abandonment would have to come from within Australia, because the Pentagon, both parties in Congress and Trump understand the value of the arrangement.

Changing AUKUS would be difficult because Australia has already committed vast sums, long-term defence planning and responsibility for nuclear-waste management. The article says the deal is bipartisan and protected from ordinary political challenge. Those commitments create financial, operational and political costs if Australia reverses course.

The article also says the Pentagon, congressional Democrats and Republicans, and Trump all know AUKUS is a good deal. Australia is described as paying “hand over fist”, while the United States and its institutions have strong reasons to preserve the arrangement. That imbalance gives Washington influence and makes unilateral Australian change politically harder.

Still, the article says any modification or abandonment must come from within Australia. Critics exist inside Labor’s caucus and the wider party movement, including former senior ministers. A dramatic US threat to “annihilate” another nation could become the catalyst for change, but until then alliance management is likely to continue.

Major oil-trading routes connect producers with consumers across the world. If conflict threatens one of those routes, ships may face danger, delays or higher insurance costs. Traders may also fear shortages and bid up oil prices, even before supplies are physically interrupted.

The article identifies the Strait of Hormuz as a possible pressure point. It says further bloodshed could affect the strait and the normalisation of global oil trade. That mechanism links military escalation to fuel prices: uncertainty disrupts expectations, while restricted or threatened trade can reduce reliable supply and increase costs.

The shock spreads because energy is used throughout modern economies. Higher fuel prices raise transport and production costs, feeding inflation and squeezing households. The article connects this chain to Australia’s fuel pain, cost-of-living pressures, interest-rate resentment and falling retirement savings. A regional conflict can therefore become a global economic problem.