Japan Plans New Defense Industrial Strategy to Prepare for Prolonged Conflicts

Japan’s proposed Defense Industrial Base Strategy is a plan to make the country’s defense industry able to sustain the Self-Defense Forces during a long conflict. It matters because Russia’s war against Ukraine showed how rapidly fighting consumes ammunition and equipment. The strategy responds to security concerns involving China, North Korea, and Russia.

Its priorities are sustaining defense capabilities, adapting to drones and artificial intelligence, and linking defense investment with economic growth. A proposed government-backed organization would connect manufacturers with the state. It could support production, research, exports, and startups developing dual-use technologies.

The government plans to submit legislation in 2027. It is also considering government-owned, contractor-operated factories to preserve production capacity during peacetime. The challenge extends beyond funding. Japan would need skilled workers, components, suppliers, and factories capable of expanding output quickly during an emergency.

The supplied article does not state how much Japan plans to spend on defense. It also does not give the size of Japan’s current five-year defense budget. A numerical comparison would therefore require information outside the article, which is not provided here.

The article instead describes how Japan may use defense investment. The emerging strategy seeks to sustain defense capabilities, support research and development, bring civilian technologies into defense, and preserve reserve production capacity. It also considers a government-backed organization and government-owned, contractor-operated factories.

Those proposals could involve substantial public funding, especially when peacetime orders cannot support necessary production lines. However, the article does not quantify that burden. It emphasizes that money alone cannot guarantee readiness: Japan would also need skilled workers, critical components, reliable suppliers, and the ability to expand output rapidly.

A prolonged conflict does not use equipment only once. Ammunition is fired, drones are lost, vehicles and aircraft require repairs, and spare parts and components are consumed. Heavy losses can continue even when factories are already working at full capacity. Existing stockpiles may therefore shrink faster than peacetime procurement can replace them.

Japan’s geography could intensify the pressure. A contingency around the Taiwan Strait or Japan’s southwestern islands could require sustained operations across considerable maritime distances. That would challenge ammunition stocks, repair systems, and replenishment. Japan plans to acquire thousands of unmanned systems under SHIELD, but Ukraine plans to produce more than 7 million drones in 2026.

The figures are not directly comparable, the article cautions. Still, they expose the underlying issue: Japan needs production lines, workers, suppliers, and logistics able to replace losses quickly. Reserve capacity must remain available before a crisis begins, not be created afterward.

If domestic factories cannot rapidly replace consumed or damaged equipment, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces could lose operational endurance. Ammunition stocks might fall, damaged systems could remain unrepaired, and drones could not be replaced as quickly as they are lost. The force might still possess advanced equipment, but fewer systems would be available for continuing missions.

The article links this risk to a possible contingency around the Taiwan Strait or Japan’s southwestern islands. Such operations could stretch across considerable maritime distances. That would increase pressure on ammunition, maintenance, components, suppliers, and replenishment. SHIELD’s planned acquisition of thousands of unmanned systems makes replacement capacity especially important.

The broader consequence would be a gap between Japan’s planned capabilities and what it could actually sustain in war. The proposed strategy seeks to prevent that gap through reserve production capacity, broader supply chains, civilian technology, and possible government-owned factories operated by contractors.

Government-owned, contractor-operated factories would shift much of the burden for reserve capacity to the state. The government would own manufacturing facilities, while private companies would operate them. This arrangement could keep production lines available even when normal peacetime orders are too small to justify maintaining them commercially.

The article identifies a central funding question: who pays for lines that must remain ready but may not be fully used? Under GOCO, the government would likely carry much of that responsibility. That means the cost would ultimately fall on taxpayers rather than solely on defense companies.

Funding, however, would not solve every problem. Factories would still need skilled workers, critical components, dependable suppliers, and the ability to increase output quickly. Japan’s 2023 defense production legislation already permits the government to acquire facilities and entrust them to contractors when other measures cannot secure supplies.

Defense exports and civilian technology companies could broaden Japan’s industrial base instead of leaving production mainly to traditional prime contractors. Foreign orders can support larger production runs, lower unit costs, and stronger supply chains. Civilian firms and startups may also bring useful dual-use technologies into defense work.

The proposed government-backed organization would support domestic production, research and development, defense equipment transfers abroad, and startups developing dual-use technologies. METI’s industrial policy experience could help connect smaller suppliers and civilian companies with defense production. Akazawa specifically emphasized expanding supply chains and using civilian technologies for defense.

Exports are not a complete substitute for public preparedness. Japan loosened restrictions in April 2026, and Australia signed contracts for the first three of 11 planned upgraded Mogami-class frigates. Yet foreign contracts create delivery obligations. In an emergency, Japan would still need to decide how to prioritize overseas customers and its own Self-Defense Forces.

National security depends not only on possessing military equipment but also on replacing what war consumes or destroys. Ammunition, drones, spare parts, and repairs determine how long forces can continue operating. If production is slow, a country’s military plans may exceed the equipment it can actually sustain.

The article uses Ukraine and a possible Taiwan Strait contingency to show the problem. Ukraine plans to produce more than 7 million drones in 2026. Japan could face prolonged operations across maritime distances around the Taiwan Strait or southwestern islands. Those conditions would pressure stocks, maintenance, suppliers, and replenishment.

That makes industrial capacity a defense requirement, not merely an economic benefit. Japan’s proposed strategy combines reserve production, broader supply chains, civilian technology, exports, and possible GOCO facilities. The aim is to ensure that investment, manufacturing capability, and military readiness reinforce one another before a crisis begins.