Netanyahu rival Eisenkot to form a govt: How Israel’s political shake-up could reshape its Iran, Gaza war strategy?

President Isaac Herzog chose Gadi Eisenkot to try forming Israel’s next government after neither political bloc won a majority. This matters because it gives Netanyahu’s rival the first formal opportunity to assemble a governing coalition and potentially end Netanyahu’s nearly two-decade leadership.

Eisenkot received support from parties representing 67 lawmakers. Netanyahu’s bloc received backing from 46. Eisenkot then vowed to make every effort to establish a government. His path depends on combining parties that do not naturally share the same political goals, including Arab parties and right-leaning opposition factions.

The appointment did not guarantee success. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties could provide crucial support, but some right-leaning groups oppose relying on Arab lawmakers. Herzog also supports exploring a national unity government, while Eisenkot’s bloc wants Netanyahu removed before joining one. A formal appointment was scheduled for Sunday.

A coalition government is an administration built by multiple political parties rather than one party alone. Parties agree to cooperate so their combined lawmakers can support a prime minister and pass legislation. This matters when an election produces no majority, as happened after Israel’s vote.

Eisenkot’s support came from parties with sharply different positions. Arab parties gained seats amid dissatisfaction with Netanyahu, while right-leaning opposition factions also backed Eisenkot but oppose depending on Arab lawmakers. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties could potentially join as another source of support.

The key mechanism is bargaining. Eisenkot must find enough partners willing to support a shared government, despite disagreements about identity, security, and relations with Palestinians. His challenge is not simply reaching the required numbers. He must also keep the coalition together after forming it, while satisfying parties whose goals may conflict.

Eisenkot received backing from parties representing 67 lawmakers during Herzog’s consultations. Netanyahu’s bloc received support from 46 lawmakers. The figures gave Eisenkot the stronger position and led Herzog to offer him the first opportunity to form the next government.

The numbers were not a ready-made majority coalition. Eisenkot’s supporters included Arab parties, which made significant gains, and right-leaning opposition factions. Those groups helped produce his larger total, but they did not share identical political aims. Some right-leaning factions specifically oppose relying on Arab lawmakers to govern.

That makes Eisenkot’s support politically complicated. He must turn a numerical advantage into a workable partnership, possibly with ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties. The article does not state that he had already secured a final coalition. He only promised to make every effort, so the government’s formation remained uncertain.

A leadership change could affect Israel’s military strategy because the Gaza war and tensions with Iran dominate the country’s security priorities. Eisenkot’s alliances and regional-security views would shape how aggressively the government uses military force and manages ongoing conflicts.

The article cites analysts who expect Tehran to remain Israel’s chief adversary and military force to remain the preferred tool. Netanyahu and Eisenkot also share opposition to an independent Palestinian state and a hardline approach toward Gaza. Both have indicated they would resume operations if Hamas refuses to disarm.

The likely difference concerns intensity. A future government could alter how aggressively it conducts campaigns, expands Jewish settlements in the West Bank, or approaches democracy. Israeli-Arab parties might press Eisenkot toward a more conciliatory Palestinian policy, but it remains unclear whether they can influence his decisions or produce a diplomatic shift.

Eisenkot’s opposition bloc is broad rather than ideologically uniform. It includes Arab parties that gained seats amid voter dissatisfaction with Netanyahu and right-leaning opposition factions that also want political change. This range gives Eisenkot numbers but complicates his coalition-building.

Arab parties may seek greater influence over policy toward Palestinians and could encourage a more conciliatory or diplomatic approach. Right-leaning factions generally favor tougher positions and oppose depending on Arab lawmakers to form a government. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties are a different potential partner: they could add coalition support, even though their priorities differ from both Arab and secular liberal groups.

The article does not list every party’s detailed platform. It does show the central tension. Eisenkot must connect groups that disagree about security, Palestinian policy, and who should hold political influence. Their support may help him take office, but sustaining cooperation could be difficult.

Analysts expect Israel’s broad security direction to change less than its intensity because Iran and Hamas remain central adversaries for both leaders. The article says military force is likely to remain the preferred tool, while Palestinian statehood is likely to stay a distant prospect.

The clearest example is Gaza. Netanyahu and Eisenkot both oppose an independent Palestinian state and have indicated they would resume military operations if Hamas refuses to disarm. Palestinian analyst Ghassan al-Khatib also expects little major change because parties compete by adopting tougher positions amid a rightward shift in public opinion.

A new government could still alter how policies are carried out. Analysts identify possible differences in the aggressiveness of military campaigns, the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and the approach to democracy. Israeli-Arab parties might push for diplomacy, but their influence over Eisenkot remains uncertain.

The article does not explain Israel’s electoral rules in detail. Under Israel’s parliamentary system, voters elect lawmakers, and a government normally needs support from a majority of parliament to govern effectively. When no single bloc reaches that level, coalition-building becomes central.

That mechanism explains Herzog’s decision to give Eisenkot the first opportunity. His supporters represented 67 lawmakers, while Netanyahu’s bloc had 46, but Eisenkot’s backers included parties with conflicting priorities. He may therefore need Arab, right-leaning, and ultra-Orthodox partners to combine their support behind one administration.

The result is that election night does not immediately determine the government. Negotiations decide which parties will cooperate, what policies they accept, and whether the coalition can survive. In this case, Eisenkot had the numerical advantage but still faced opposition to relying on Arab lawmakers and demands that Netanyahu leave before a unity government could form.