Win or lose? Inside the 6 November Guardian Weekly

Israel’s 2026 election produced no straightforward winner. Benjamin Netanyahu lost his parliamentary majority, but the opposition could not immediately take power because it needs support beyond Jewish parties. Palestinian parties therefore became central to deciding who can form a government.

Their Arab coalition won an unprecedented 19 seats. Bedouin turnout was crucial, with women’s self-organisation helping produce turnout of up to 93% in some areas. This translated participation into parliamentary influence and gave the coalition what its leader called a historic opportunity.

Gadi Eisenkot could potentially become prime minister if the opposition bloc builds enough support. The Joint List is prepared to offer tactical backing to an Eisenkot-led minority government. However, working with Palestinian parties remains controversial because many Jewish voters and MPs may regard that cooperation as unacceptable.

The Knesset is Israel’s national parliament and legislature. It is the institution whose seats are contested in national elections and whose party balance determines whether a government can govern. The article focuses on parties trying to assemble enough Knesset support to offer Gadi Eisenkot the premiership.

Israel uses a parliamentary system. Voters choose parties, and those parties receive seats broadly according to their vote share. The prime minister must therefore command or secure support in the Knesset. A presidential system normally separates legislative elections from the election of a president who leads the executive.

That difference explains the uncertainty after this election. Netanyahu can lose his majority without an opposing leader automatically taking office. Eisenkot needs a workable parliamentary bloc, potentially involving Palestinian parties. The article does not describe a separate presidential contest or a directly elected executive leader.

The Palestinian-led Arab coalition won 19 seats in Israel’s 2026 election. That was described as unprecedented and gave Palestinian parties a pivotal role in deciding which bloc might form the next government.

The article links this result to strong Bedouin participation. Women’s self-organisation helped bring up to 93% of eligible voters to the polls in some areas. The higher turnout helped convert Palestinian votes into a larger parliamentary presence and gave the coalition leverage in negotiations.

The Knesset has 120 seats in total, a standard fact about Israel’s parliament that the article does not state directly. Nineteen seats are therefore a substantial minority, but not a majority. The bloc would need to use its seats strategically, such as offering tactical support to an opposition-led minority government.

In Israel’s parliamentary system, a government can lose its majority without an alternative government appearing automatically. The opposition must build a dependable bloc that can command enough support in the Knesset. That makes coalition negotiations as important as the election result itself.

The article says Netanyahu’s loss contains the path to a possible win. The opposition bloc needs more than Jewish parties to take control and offer Gadi Eisenkot the premiership. Palestinian parties, which won 19 seats, now hold the leverage needed to make that arithmetic work.

The immediate result is political uncertainty rather than a settled transfer of power. Netanyahu may remain able to exploit divisions among opponents, while Eisenkot must decide whether to cooperate with the Joint List. That choice could create a minority government, but it also risks alienating Jewish voters and MPs who oppose such cooperation.

Gadi Eisenkot’s route to the premiership runs through coalition-building. He would need the opposition bloc to gather enough Knesset support to replace Netanyahu’s government. The article makes clear that Jewish parties alone are insufficient, so Palestinian parties become essential to the arithmetic.

The Joint List has offered a possible route by preparing to give tactical support to an Eisenkot coalition that would operate as a minority government. This could let Eisenkot win enough parliamentary backing without bringing every supporting party formally into government. The arrangement would depend on continued cooperation.

The political cost could be high. The article identifies cooperation with Palestinian parties as a red line for many Jewish voters and MPs. Eisenkot therefore faces both a practical and philosophical puzzle: he may need the very partners whose inclusion could undermine support for his proposed government.

A minority government does not include every party that helps it survive. Outside support can allow a governing bloc to pass essential measures or survive decisive parliamentary votes, while supporting parties remain outside the cabinet. The article presents this as the Joint List’s possible role.

Yousef Jabareen says the Joint List is prepared to offer tactical support to an Eisenkot coalition becoming a minority government. In practice, that means the Joint List could back selected measures or confidence-related decisions without taking ministerial positions or formally joining the governing coalition. The exact terms are not given.

This arrangement could give Eisenkot a route around the opposition’s lack of a Jewish majority. It would also preserve the Joint List’s independence and bargaining power. But it could be fragile, because the government would need continuing support from parties that are not formally responsible for its policies.

Under proportional representation, parties receive parliamentary seats according to their share of the vote rather than one party winning every district. This creates a parliament with multiple parties. A government usually needs agreements among several groups instead of relying on one clear winner.

The election shows how turnout can change that balance. Women’s self-organisation helped produce up to 93% turnout among eligible voters in some Bedouin areas. The resulting Palestinian-led bloc won 19 seats, enough to become pivotal even without holding a majority. Its support could determine whether Eisenkot forms a government.

Small parties therefore matter when the larger blocs fall short. Netanyahu lost his majority, but the opposition still needs Palestinian parties. That creates bargaining power for the Arab coalition and makes government formation uncertain. The next government may depend less on the largest party than on which smaller bloc agrees to support it.