Bombay High Court allows BNS Section 75 charge where complainant identifies as woman

The Bombay High Court rejected Vishal Ingle’s request for discharge. This means the court found that the allegations were sufficient to continue at this stage. It did not accept the argument that Section 75 was unavailable merely because the complainant is transgender.

The FIR alleges that Ingle outraged the complainant’s modesty. The complainant identifies as a woman and had undergone treatment involving hormone changes. Justice Mehroz Pathan said the allegations could sustain the Section 75 charge and refused to remove it from the case.

The order does not decide whether Ingle is guilty. It only means the prosecution and related proceedings can continue on the allegations recorded in the FIR. The police had also invoked Section 296 of the BNS and Section 18(D) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019.

Section 75 of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita is the provision dealing with sexual harassment. In established legal usage, it covers conduct such as unwelcome sexual advances, demands for sexual favours, showing pornography against someone’s will, and sexually coloured remarks. It is intended to protect people from specified forms of unwanted sexual behaviour.

The source article describes the FIR as alleging that Vishal Ingle outraged the complainant’s modesty. Justice Mehroz Pathan said the allegations appeared to make out a Section 75 case. The court therefore rejected the argument that the provision could not apply because the complainant is transgender.

The ruling concerns whether the charge can continue, not whether the accused is guilty. The court’s conclusion was limited to the material available at the discharge stage. The prosecution must still pursue the case under the provisions invoked, while the allegations remain to be legally tested.

The court held that allegations involving the assault or outraging of a woman’s modesty can be sustained when the complainant is transgender and identifies as a woman. This matters because the defence argued that Section 75 could not apply to a transgender complainant.

Justice Mehroz Pathan noted that the complainant identifies as a woman and had taken medicines for hormone changes. The FIR described allegations against Ingle involving the complainant’s modesty. On that basis, the judge said Section 75 appeared to be made out and rejected the defence argument.

The decision allows the charge to remain at this stage. It does not make a general finding about guilt or decide the entire case. It shows that, for the court’s preliminary assessment, the complainant’s stated identity and the FIR allegations were enough to prevent discharge.

The case involved three main legal provisions. Police invoked Sections 75 and 296 of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, along with Section 18(D) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019. Each provision addresses a different legal area connected with the allegations.

Section 75 concerns sexual harassment and was linked in the article to allegations of outraging modesty. Section 296 of the BNS concerns obscene acts or words in public. Section 18(D) of the 2019 Act addresses physical, sexual, verbal, emotional, or economic abuse of a transgender person.

The judge held that the allegations could attract the provisions invoked. The court also rejected the argument that Section 18(D) failed because the complainant lacked an identity certificate when the alleged assault occurred. The proceedings therefore continue under all three cited provisions, subject to later legal examination.

A certificate of identity under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, is an official document recognising a person’s transgender identity. It provides formal documentation under the Act and is obtained through the process laid out in Section 5.

The article states that a person may apply to the District Magistrate for the certificate. It also says Section 2(k) allows a person to identify as transgender even without already holding such a certificate. This distinction became central to the court’s reasoning in Ingle’s case.

The complainant received a certificate on February 12, 2026. The alleged assault occurred on October 28 and October 30, 2025, before the certificate was issued. The court held that the later certificate date did not prevent the Act from applying to the allegations.

The absence of a certificate on the alleged assault dates did not prevent the court from applying the 2019 Act. The judge relied on Section 2(k), which shows that a person may identify as transgender without already possessing a certificate of identity.

The alleged assaults occurred on October 28 and October 30, 2025. The complainant received the identity certificate later, on February 12, 2026. The judge said this timing did not bar use of the Act. Section 5 separately provides a route to apply to the District Magistrate for certification.

The court therefore rejected the defence argument that Section 18(D) was not made out. It found that the FIR had invoked Section 18(D) and that the allegations attracted the provisions used against Ingle. This ruling allowed the case to continue despite the certificate being issued later.

When a court refuses to discharge an accused, it finds that the case should not be ended at that preliminary stage. The allegations and materials are considered sufficient for the prosecution to continue. In Ingle’s case, the High Court rejected his request and kept the invoked provisions in play.

The court examined the FIR and the arguments about the complainant’s identity and certificate. It concluded that the allegations could support Section 75 and that Section 18(D) could apply despite the certificate being issued later. The order therefore allows the case to move forward under the cited provisions.

A refusal to discharge is not a finding of guilt. It does not prove that the alleged assault occurred or that Ingle committed the offences. The article does not state the next scheduled procedural step, but the criminal case remains pending rather than ending with the discharge request.