Netanyahu rival given first chance at forming new government

Israel’s president does not automatically choose the leader of the largest bloc. After consulting elected parties, Isaac Herzog selects the candidate he believes has the best chance of winning enough support to govern. This matters because no bloc won the 61 seats needed for control of the Knesset.

Netanyahu’s coalition fell from 68 seats to 53. Eisenkot’s opposition bloc won 48 seats, while Arab-led parties won 19. Those parties said they were ready to support Eisenkot, giving him a possible path to a majority. That potential support outweighed his bloc’s smaller total.

The choice is not a guarantee. Eisenkot must still negotiate with parties that disagree over Arab cooperation, military service, and other issues. Netanyahu can also try to block him, including by seeking a power-sharing agreement or pressuring potential partners against Eisenkot.

A coalition government is formed when several political parties agree to govern together. Israel uses a parliamentary system in which people vote for parties rather than directly choosing a government. A party or alliance therefore needs enough parliamentary support to pass legislation and survive confidence votes.

The key threshold is 61 seats in the 120-member Knesset. No single bloc in this election reached that number. Netanyahu’s coalition had 53 seats, Eisenkot’s opposition bloc had 48, and Arab-led parties held 19. These figures show why negotiations are essential.

Coalition partners usually exchange support for policy commitments or influence. In this case, possible agreements involve Arab-led parties, ultra-Orthodox parties, or Netanyahu himself. Each option creates political costs, so reaching a majority may require compromises that anger parts of Eisenkot’s bloc.

Israel’s Knesset has 120 seats, so a governing coalition needs at least 61. That number represents a majority and gives a government the parliamentary support needed to govern. Because Israelis vote for parties, the winning government is usually assembled through negotiations among several groups.

The election produced three main groupings. Netanyahu’s coalition plunged from a peak of 68 seats to 53. Eisenkot’s opposition bloc won 48 seats. Arab-led parties secured the remaining 19 seats. Neither main bloc could govern alone, and even their totals do not automatically create a stable alliance.

The figures explain Herzog’s decision. Arab-led parties said they would support Eisenkot, potentially taking his side from 48 to beyond 61. But support is politically difficult, and not every party in Eisenkot’s bloc accepts cooperation with them. The seat arithmetic creates an opening, not a guaranteed government.

Eisenkot has three broad coalition routes. He could share power with Netanyahu, seek support from Arab-led parties, or negotiate with ultra-Orthodox parties. Each option could provide crucial seats, but each clashes with promises or positions held by Eisenkot and his partners.

A power-sharing deal with Netanyahu may be fragile because the two are rivals. Arab-led parties offer support, but cooperation is controversial after years of wars and because some reject Israel’s identity as a Jewish state. Eisenkot has demanded recognition of that identity and recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization. Ultra-Orthodox parties want military exemptions preserved.

Eisenkot’s bloc campaigned for equal military or civil service, directly opposing those exemptions. Yisrael Beytenu has also rejected joining a coalition backed by Arab-led parties. Eisenkot therefore faces a choice between conflicting partners, broken promises, or failure to reach 61 seats.

Eisenkot’s mandate is a race against time. The supplied article says he will have up to six weeks to form a government. The question’s 28-day deadline and possible two-week extension reflect Israel’s formal procedure, which allows the president to give a candidate an initial mandate and extend it in certain circumstances.

If Eisenkot cannot assemble a coalition, the mandate can move to another candidate. That person would then try to win enough support in the Knesset. The president’s choice is therefore an opportunity, not a promise that Eisenkot becomes prime minister.

If no candidate can form a government, Israel can face another election after the available parliamentary options are exhausted. The article does not spell out these final procedural steps, but it makes the immediate danger clear: Netanyahu will work to stop Eisenkot, while coalition talks must resolve disputes over Arab cooperation and military exemptions.

These parties matter because neither major bloc won 61 seats. Arab-led parties hold 19 seats and said they were ready to support Eisenkot. Ultra-Orthodox parties were part of Netanyahu’s outgoing coalition and could become alternative partners. Their support could determine whether Eisenkot reaches a majority.

Arab cooperation is controversial after three years of wars in Gaza and across the Middle East. The Joint List would support Eisenkot from outside the coalition, while Ra’am has said it will support him. Eisenkot wants Arab parties to recognize Israel as a Jewish state and call Hamas a terrorist organization. Ultra-Orthodox parties instead focus on preserving military exemptions.

Eisenkot’s bloc campaigned for equal military or civil service, making a deal with religious parties difficult. Some of his partners also reject Arab-backed cooperation. These parties are therefore mathematically valuable but politically costly, making coalition talks especially unstable.

In Israel’s system, voters choose parties for the Knesset. Seats are distributed among those parties, so several groups can win meaningful representation without any one party controlling government. Governing power then depends on alliances formed after the election.

This election illustrates the mechanism. Eisenkot’s bloc won 48 seats, Netanyahu’s coalition won 53, and Arab-led parties won 19. Since none reached 61, the blocs must negotiate. If Eisenkot gained enough support from Arab-led or ultra-Orthodox parties, or reached an agreement with Netanyahu, their combined seats could cross the majority line.

The system creates both representation and uncertainty. Smaller parties can become decisive coalition partners, but their demands may conflict sharply with larger blocs. Here, military exemptions, Arab cooperation, and Israel’s identity as a Jewish state could determine whether the seat arithmetic becomes a functioning government.