Will Eisenkot be able to form Israel’s next gov’t amid divided opposition?

The surprising opening is that Eisenkot, not Netanyahu, gets the first chance to form Israel’s next government. President Isaac Herzog selected him after consulting political parties. This matters because Netanyahu’s ruling coalition lost its majority in the October election, creating a possible path to end his long tenure in power.

Eisenkot has 28 days to assemble enough support for a government. If he cannot finish within that period, he may request a further 14 days. His proposed partners include centre-left, centre-right and right-wing parties, but they disagree sharply over security, religion and the occupation.

The task is difficult because Eisenkot’s four-party bloc holds only 48 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. Arab-led parties could lift the wider anti-Netanyahu camp above the 61-seat majority threshold, but Eisenkot has ruled out formally including them. His deadline therefore creates pressure for rapid negotiations and difficult compromises.

Eisenkot is a 66-year-old former military chief who leads the Yashar party. He is also Israel’s opposition leader and has been chosen to try forming a government after the election produced no clear majority. His challenge is political as much as numerical: potential partners hold conflicting views on national security, religion and Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory.

His possible core bloc combines four parties. They are Eisenkot’s Yashar, Yair Golan’s centre-left Democrats, Naftali Bennett’s centre-right Together party, and Avigdor Lieberman’s right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu. Together, they control 48 seats, far fewer than the 61 needed for a majority in the 120-member Knesset.

Arab-led parties Ra’am and the Joint List have endorsed Eisenkot’s attempt and hold 19 seats jointly. That would give the broader anti-Netanyahu camp 67 seats. Yet Eisenkot rejects bringing those parties into his government, leaving the bloc united mainly by opposition to Netanyahu.

The central arithmetic is stark: neither Eisenkot nor Netanyahu currently commands the 61 seats required for a majority in Israel’s 120-member Knesset. Eisenkot’s potential four-party bloc holds 48 seats. That leaves him 13 seats short before considering outside allies or additional coalition partners.

Arab-led parties Ra’am and the Joint List jointly hold 19 seats. If their support is counted, the wider anti-Netanyahu camp reaches 67 seats. This support could make Eisenkot viable, even if those parties stay outside the cabinet. The arrangement would depend on parliamentary backing rather than formal coalition membership.

Netanyahu’s religious-nationalist coalition now has 53 seats, eight below a majority. It previously held 64 after the 2022 election. Likud remains the largest individual party with 27 seats, while Eisenkot’s Yashar won 21. United Torah Judaism’s refusal to endorse Netanyahu further weakened his immediate position, though it could still negotiate later.

A minority government is one whose cabinet parties do not collectively control most parliamentary seats. It can still govern by securing support from lawmakers outside the coalition. Those outside parties may back legislation or confidence votes without taking cabinet positions, usually in return for policy concessions.

Eisenkot could form such an administration with his four-party bloc, which holds 48 seats. Ra’am and the Joint List could provide external parliamentary support. Their 19 combined seats would give the broader anti-Netanyahu camp 67 seats, but the Arab-led parties would not necessarily formally join the government.

This path offers Eisenkot a way around his refusal to bring Arab parties into the cabinet. However, it would require continuing negotiations and dependable support. A previous example came in 2021, when Ra’am joined Bennett’s government. That administration collapsed after 18 months, mainly over settlements and Palestinian statehood.

Arab-led parties could be decisive because neither main camp has 61 seats. Eisenkot’s potential four-party bloc has 48, while Netanyahu’s coalition has 53. The 19 seats held jointly by Ra’am and the Joint List could therefore determine which side survives parliamentary votes and forms a government.

Their support would not require cabinet membership. Eisenkot could lead a minority government while negotiating policy concessions with the Arab-led parties in exchange for votes. The parties have already endorsed his attempt to form a government. Hadash, Ta’al and Balad make up the Joint List, while Ra’am is the United List.

The obstacle is political resistance. Eisenkot has ruled out bringing Arab parties into his government, and Lieberman rejects a minority administration dependent on them. Golan’s Democrats are more open to cooperation. That divide makes Arab support both essential and controversial in coalition negotiations.

Eisenkot has more than one route, but each requires breaking a political taboo or reaching a difficult bargain. He could form a minority government with his four-party bloc and seek outside support from Ra’am and the Joint List. He could also try to attract parties or lawmakers currently linked to Netanyahu’s camp.

The clearest obstacle is United Torah Judaism, a longtime ultra-Orthodox ally of Netanyahu. The party declined to endorse any candidate during Herzog’s consultations, leaving open the possibility of future negotiations. Its support could help change the parliamentary balance, but it would come with demands.

United Torah Judaism particularly opposes compulsory military service for ultra-Orthodox Jews. The article identifies that issue as central to possible negotiations. Eisenkot would therefore need to accommodate its position, or otherwise secure a compromise on military service, while also managing disagreements over religion, security and Palestinian territory.

If Eisenkot cannot form a government within 28 days, he can ask for a 14-day extension. The article does not specify what happens after that extension if he still fails. His deadline therefore marks the first stage of a broader process, not a guaranteed transfer of power from Netanyahu.

Coalition-building matters because Israel’s parliament has 120 seats, and a governing majority requires 61. Eisenkot’s potential bloc has 48 seats, while Netanyahu’s coalition has 53. Neither can govern with its core partners alone. They must win additional support, create a minority arrangement or persuade other parties to join.

The negotiations are especially difficult because opposition parties disagree over security, religion and the occupation. Arab-led parties could provide crucial votes, but Eisenkot and Lieberman resist depending on them. United Torah Judaism could also become relevant if its demands, including opposition to compulsory ultra-Orthodox military service, are addressed.