Comando Vermelho taxes water, and a city in Ceará begins buying bottled water under police escort

Banabuiú faced a disruption in ordinary water sales after merchants received a message called the “Edital Banabuiú” on October 19. It said selling water required authorization from the Comando Vermelho. Fear led merchants to stop selling garrafões, cutting residents off from their usual supply. The incident mattered because water is essential, and some residents had no safe replacement.

The response became a police operation. Since the end of October, residents have lined up at the main square for a truck escorted by police. The truck carries garrafões from the state water company. Each person can buy no more than two containers, at R$6 each. Three men suspected of collecting money were arrested on October 22.

The state increased policing, and Mayor Marcílio Coelho announced on Wednesday the 4th that shops would resume sales with support. Similar reports later appeared in Fortaleza, Meruoca, and Caridade. Police are still investigating the number of threatened merchants and sellers who stopped operating.

In this case, “taxing” water describes an alleged extortion scheme. The faction reportedly demanded money from merchants in exchange for keeping shops open or selling garrafões. The payment was not presented as a public service charge. It was linked to the group’s claimed authorization and backed by fear. This matters because it turns access to an essential product into a source of criminal control.

The article gives specific alleged charges. Merchants reportedly paid R$200 to keep a store open and R$750 per week to sell garrafões. Some distributors allegedly owed R$1,50 for each unit. The message called the “Edital Banabuiú” said water sales depended on Comando Vermelho authorization. Merchants then stopped selling, according to the report.

A legal government tax follows public rules and is collected by authorized institutions. The alleged criminal “tax” operates outside that system and is enforced privately. In Banabuiú, the result was not public revenue, but disrupted commerce, police escorts, and residents seeking unsafe or distant alternatives.

The reported scheme had several layers of payment. According to victims, a merchant allegedly paid R$200 to keep the store open. Selling garrafões supposedly required another payment of R$750 every week. Some distributors were allegedly charged R$1,50 for each unit. These figures describe demands attributed to the Comando Vermelho, not lawful government fees.

The emergency distribution used a different price. At the square in Banabuiú, each resident could buy a maximum of two garrafões. Each container cost R$6. Residents waited for a police-escorted truck carrying water from the state company. This arrangement was introduced after ordinary sellers stopped operating out of fear.

The article does not state how many merchants paid or how much money was ultimately collected. Police had arrested three suspected collectors and were seeking other suspects. They were also still investigating how many merchants had been threatened and how many stopped selling. The figures show both the alleged pressure on sellers and the limits placed on buyers.

Comando Vermelho is identified in the article as a criminal faction. The report presents it as the group allegedly demanding authorization and payments connected to water sales in Banabuiú. This matters because criminal influence can cross municipal and state borders when local collectors act on instructions from a distant leader.

Police said the alleged mandante gave orders from the Rocinha favela in Rio de Janeiro. In Ceará, three men suspected of collecting money were arrested on October 22, while other arrest warrants remained open. The alleged mechanism was simple: a message reached merchants, local collectors were expected to collect payments, and fear caused sellers to stop offering water.

The result was felt in Banabuiú, despite the alleged orders coming from Rio. Merchants stopped selling, residents lined up for escorted deliveries, and some sought untreated water. Similar complaints later appeared in Fortaleza, Meruoca, and Caridade. Police were investigating, but had not stated how many merchants were threatened or stopped selling.

The immediate consequence was a loss of access to ordinary drinking water. After merchants stopped selling because of fear, some Banabuiú residents turned to water from an açude, or reservoir. That water was untreated. The article reports that residents became sick after drinking it, showing how a supply disruption quickly affected people’s health.

The chain of events was direct. The “Edital Banabuiú” allegedly made water sales depend on faction authorization. Merchants withdrew from the market. Residents still needed water, so part of the population used the reservoir instead. Unlike the garrafões normally sold by merchants, this source did not receive treatment before consumption, according to the report.

Authorities responded with police-escorted trucks carrying garrafões from the state water company. Each person could buy two containers at R$6 each. The article does not identify the illnesses or report a death toll. It does show that the police operation was needed while authorities worked to restore regular sales and investigate the threats.

When regular sales were disrupted, residents found other sources. In Banabuiú, some drank water from the açude. In Meruoca, residents reportedly sought wells and chafarizes. Authorities used a more organized response: the state increased policing and transported garrafões in trucks from the state water company. Residents collected them at the main square.

These alternatives worked differently. The açude, wells, and chafarizes offered water outside ordinary shops, but the article says the reservoir water was untreated and made some people ill. The official trucks provided a controlled supply, yet each person could buy only two garrafões. Distribution also required a police escort, a sign that normal commerce had not fully recovered.

The limits remained visible beyond Banabuiú. Reports emerged from Fortaleza neighborhoods and Meruoca, while Caridade also had reports of faction interference. Mayor Marcílio Coelho said shops would resume sales with support. Police continued investigating, but had not disclosed the total number of threatened merchants or sellers who stopped.

Reliable access to treated drinking water is a basic government function because residents need a safe, continuous supply for daily life. Banabuiú shows what happens when that access is disrupted. Merchants stopped selling after alleged threats, some residents drank untreated açude water, and people became ill. The state then had to organize escorted deliveries while regular commerce was interrupted.

Controlling an essential service can increase a criminal group’s power in several ways. The group can demand payments from sellers, decide who may trade, and create fear around a product everyone needs. In the reported case, merchants allegedly faced charges to keep stores open or sell garrafões. Their withdrawal left residents with fewer choices and made the group’s alleged authorization central to the local market.

Authorities increased policing and supported deliveries, while the mayor announced that shops would resume sales with that support. Similar reports appeared elsewhere in Ceará. Police still lacked a public count of affected merchants. The case shows why restoring normal, safe access matters alongside investigating those responsible.