KP Governor rules out talks with those rejecting state, Constitution

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Governor Kundi has ruled out talks with people who reject the state and the Constitution. The position draws a boundary around any political or security dialogue. It says acceptance of Pakistan’s constitutional order is a basic condition for engagement.

The source does not name the excluded groups or describe a specific negotiation process. It only identifies them by their rejection of the state and Constitution. That wording makes the governor’s criterion broader than a list of named organisations. Anyone fitting that description would be outside the proposed talks.

The statement matters because it links dialogue to constitutional acceptance. It also appears alongside plans to strengthen counterterrorism institutions in the province. The available source does not say whether talks with other actors are planned, nor does it give conditions beyond the governor’s stated exclusion.

Anti-terrorism courts are specialised courts that hear cases involving terrorism and related offences. They are intended to handle such cases through a focused legal process. The source reports that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa plans to create “faceless” anti-terrorism courts, but it does not provide a formal definition.

In ordinary usage, a faceless court would conceal the identities or public profiles of judges and possibly other participants. This could involve protected procedures, rather than literally removing people’s faces. The exact mechanism matters because anonymity must preserve security while still allowing a fair and accountable trial.

The proposal reflects concern about pressure surrounding terrorism cases. The source does not specify whether judges, lawyers, witnesses, or court staff would be covered. It also does not state when the courts would begin operating. Their planned creation is presented as one part of wider provincial counterterrorism efforts.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa plans to spend Rs70bn on its Counter Terrorism Department and police over one year. That is the clearest figure in the reported security plan. The funding is meant to support counterterrorism institutions rather than stand alone as a court reform.

The plan links the Counter Terrorism Department and police in a single annual spending commitment. The source does not break the amount into separate allocations. It also does not identify whether the money will fund personnel, equipment, training, operations, or facilities. Those details would determine how strongly the spending changes frontline capacity.

The proposed amount signals that the province views security as a major priority. It comes with plans for faceless anti-terrorism courts and other counterterrorism initiatives. The source does not provide a previous budget for comparison, so it cannot establish how large the increase is.

The province’s reported counterterrorism plan goes beyond creating faceless anti-terrorism courts. It includes spending Rs70bn on the Counter Terrorism Department and police during one year. That combines institutional funding with a proposed change in how terrorism cases are handled.

The source gives no detailed list of the spending measures. It does not say whether the money will buy equipment, expand staffing, improve intelligence, or support training. It also does not describe the court procedures. The concrete measures identified are the faceless courts and the annual allocation for the CTD and police.

Governor Kundi has separately said Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s security policy will be set in Islamabad, not Kabul. That statement places the province’s security direction within Pakistan’s political framework. The source does not explain how the policy will be implemented or when any of these initiatives will begin.

Faceless anti-terrorism courts are generally intended to reduce security risks linked to terrorism trials. Concealing identities can make it harder for armed groups or other hostile actors to identify and target judges, lawyers, witnesses, or court staff. That protection can help courts hear sensitive cases with less fear.

The main mechanism is anonymity or restricted disclosure. If participants’ identities are shielded, threats, intimidation, and retaliation become more difficult. However, the source does not say exactly whose identities would be hidden. It also does not specifically mention threats against judges, lawyers, or witnesses; those risks are the general reason such a model is considered.

The proposal therefore points to security concerns around the justice process, but its success would depend on the rules adopted. The source gives no details about safeguards, oversight, appeals, or implementation. It only identifies faceless courts as part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s counterterrorism plans.

Governor Kundi attributed weakened counterterrorism efforts to a lack of political ownership. In this context, political ownership means leaders actively accepting responsibility for a strategy and backing it through decisions, resources, and oversight. The source presents that absence as a reason earlier efforts lost strength.

The reported criticism points to a gap between announcing a security policy and consistently supporting it. If political leaders do not own an approach, agencies may receive uncertain direction or insufficient backing. Priorities can also shift, making long-term counterterrorism work harder to sustain. These are the practical effects implied by the governor’s explanation.

The current plan appears designed to show stronger institutional commitment through funding and new courts. It proposes Rs70bn for the CTD and police in one year. Still, the source does not describe the earlier programmes, name the responsible political actors, or explain how the new plan will guarantee lasting ownership.

Saying security policy will be controlled by Islamabad rather than Kabul means Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s direction should be set within Pakistan, not by Afghanistan’s government or institutions. Governor Kundi’s statement presents this as a question of national authority and political alignment. The source does not describe any specific Afghan role in the province.

In Pakistan’s general constitutional structure, the federal government handles national defence, foreign affairs, and major national security policy. Provincial governments manage policing and internal administration within their territories. Counterterrorism often requires both levels to cooperate, because intelligence, policing, prosecution, and national security can overlap.

The statement therefore signals that Islamabad should lead the broader security framework while provincial institutions carry out local responsibilities. The source does not set out a formal division of powers or explain coordination arrangements. It only reports Kundi’s position that the policy will be set in Islamabad, not Kabul.