What’s next for Israel as Eisenkot tapped to lead government?

Herzog’s decision is an official opportunity, not an automatic transfer of power. Eisenkot now has the first chance to assemble a coalition that can command the Knesset. He has six weeks to complete the task.

The election produced no majority. Eisenkot’s opposition bloc won 48 seats, while Netanyahu’s bloc won 53 and Arab-led parties won 19. Eisenkot must negotiate with potential partners and satisfy their demands. Those conditions include recognizing Israel as Jewish and democratic, supporting its declaration of independence, accepting military or national service, and recognizing Hamas as a terrorist organization.

Eisenkot therefore becomes the leading candidate, but not prime minister yet. His routes include cooperation with Netanyahu, Arab-led parties, or ultra-Orthodox parties. Each option faces serious resistance inside his bloc. If talks fail, Herzog’s decision will not by itself install a new government.

Israel’s system is based on party representation. Voters choose parties rather than directly selecting a prime minister. Because no single party usually controls enough seats, parties negotiate an alliance called a coalition. The coalition supports the government and helps it pass legislation.

The Knesset has 120 members, so a government needs at least 61 supporters for a majority. Eisenkot’s bloc has 48 seats. It therefore needs partners, even if every member of his bloc stays united. Arab-led parties hold 19 seats, while other possible partners include Netanyahu’s bloc and ultra-Orthodox parties.

The 61-seat threshold makes negotiations decisive. Partners can demand policy commitments before joining or supporting a government. Eisenkot’s stated conditions include support for a Jewish and democratic Israel, military or national service, and recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization. Those demands may exclude or alienate potential allies.

The election divided the Knesset without producing a winner. Netanyahu’s coalition fell from 68 seats to 53. Eisenkot’s opposition bloc won 48 seats. Arab-led parties won the remaining 19, giving them a potentially decisive position in coalition talks.

The numbers explain the bargaining power. Eisenkot’s bloc needs at least 13 additional seats to reach 61. Arab-led parties could provide enough support together, although several of Eisenkot’s partners oppose that arrangement. The ultra-Orthodox parties are another possible source of support because they were part of Netanyahu’s outgoing coalition and could help create a majority.

These parties can demand major concessions because neither main bloc can govern alone. Arab-led parties want influence despite disputes over Israel’s policies and identity. Ultra-Orthodox parties want military exemptions preserved. Eisenkot’s campaign promise of equal service makes cooperation with them especially difficult.

Eisenkot has three basic routes to a majority. He could share power with Netanyahu. He could seek support from Arab-led parties. Or he could negotiate with ultra-Orthodox parties. None is straightforward because each potential partner conflicts with important parts of his bloc’s platform.

A Netanyahu deal would require both rivals to share power, despite competing for leadership. Arab-led support could reach the numbers needed, but Yisrael Beytenu has said it will not join a coalition with those parties. The Joint List would support Eisenkot from outside the coalition, while Ra’am has also offered support. Ultra-Orthodox parties could help numerically, but they seek to preserve military exemptions.

Eisenkot has said coalition members must support military or national service and recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization. He also demands support for Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Forming a government may therefore require compromises or broken promises.

Eisenkot’s opportunity is time-limited. The article gives the overall deadline as six weeks, while the question describes that period as 28 days plus a possible two-week extension. If he cannot assemble a majority, he cannot form the government simply because Herzog selected him.

The article does not specify the precise next constitutional step. Under Israel’s established parliamentary process, the president may give another candidate a chance to form a government. If coalition-building still fails, the Knesset can be dissolved and a new election may follow. These outcomes are general constitutional possibilities, not consequences detailed in the article.

The immediate political effect would be continued uncertainty. Netanyahu could remain a central figure, either as Eisenkot’s possible unity partner or as a rival seeking another opportunity. The election’s fragmented result means that failure would not resolve the underlying problem: no bloc currently controls 61 seats.

The exemption dispute is central because military service is a basic coalition condition for Eisenkot. He and his partners made equal military service a campaign issue. They want to end long-standing draft exemptions for ultra-Orthodox people, while ultra-Orthodox parties want those exemptions preserved.

The disagreement reflects two competing priorities. Eisenkot’s side argues that citizens should share military or civil-service duties. Ultra-Orthodox parties say exemptions are needed to preserve their devout way of life. Their position is also politically important because those parties were members of Netanyahu’s outgoing coalition and could become valuable partners again.

The article does not quantify the effect of years of war or describe specific wartime service demands. It does show why the issue threatens coalition talks. Eisenkot cannot easily abandon a central campaign promise, yet refusing compromise could block support from parties with enough seats to influence the government’s formation.

Israel’s parliamentary system turns coalition-building into the route to power. Voters choose parties, and those parties form alliances in the 120-member Knesset. A leader becomes prime minister only after securing enough parliamentary support to reach at least 61 seats.

This explains the election’s unusual result. Netanyahu’s bloc won 53 seats and Eisenkot’s bloc won 48, so neither could govern alone. The 19 seats held by Arab-led parties became potentially decisive. Ultra-Orthodox parties also gained bargaining power because they could help either side reach a majority, depending on the concessions offered.

The same structure can make governments unstable. Partners may disagree over military service, Israel’s identity, settlements, or relations with Arab-led parties. The article notes that unity coalitions are fragile and often collapse. Eisenkot’s success therefore depends not only on winning the first mandate, but on keeping a diverse alliance together after negotiations end.