Eisenkot calls for Israeli national emergency government

A national emergency government is a broad partnership formed when a country faces an exceptional threat or crisis. It brings rival parties together, prioritising urgent national action over ordinary political competition.

In the article, Gadi Eisenkot proposed one because Israel faced diplomatic isolation, war pressures, and deep polarisation. He invited Netanyahu’s Likud and Bezalel Smotrich’s far-right party, but only under Eisenkot’s leadership, showing the difficult bargaining involved.

This differs from a normal coalition, which usually joins compatible parties seeking a stable parliamentary majority. Eisenkot’s bloc lacked a clear majority, and his government might begin with only 48 of parliament’s 120 seats. It would need outside Arab-Israeli support and constant negotiations, making it unusually fragile.

Israel’s parliament has 120 seats, so a governing majority requires at least 61 lawmakers. This number matters because a government below that threshold must negotiate constantly to pass laws and survive votes.

After consultations with President Isaac Herzog, Eisenkot received recommendations from parties representing 67 lawmakers. However, that total includes Israeli Arab parties, which some potential coalition partners reject. The article says Eisenkot may instead begin with a minority government backed by 48 lawmakers.

That means Eisenkot appears to have 67 recommended supporters on paper, but only 48 in a possible starting coalition. Political expert Assaf Shapira called such a government exceptionally fragile. Eisenkot would need outside support for legislation and continued negotiations with Netanyahu’s Likud, far-right lawmakers, or ultra-Orthodox parties.

A 48-member government would be a minority administration in Israel’s 120-seat parliament. It could take office, but survive only by winning support from lawmakers outside its coalition, including Arab-Israeli parties. That would make every major vote uncertain and the government extremely fragile.

For example, Eisenkot could rely on Arab-Israeli parties to pass legislation without formally bringing them into government. Those parties might support or abstain on specific votes while seeking policy concessions. Their participation remains politically difficult because several parties oppose including Arab Israelis in government.

Political expert Assaf Shapira warned that such a government would need extensive negotiations on every bill. Eisenkot would struggle to govern consistently, especially on security and military-service issues. He would need additional lawmakers, potentially from Netanyahu’s Likud allies or ultra-Orthodox parties, to build a stable majority.

Ultra-Orthodox parties matter because their two main groups could help Eisenkot reach a parliamentary majority. They previously supported Netanyahu, and their backing could decide who controls the 120-seat parliament.

Their central demand is preserving exemption from military service. That exemption angers many Israelis, especially reservists serving repeated tours while ultra-Orthodox men remain exempt. Liberman illustrates the trade-off. He softened opposition to partnering with them, making Netanyahu’s removal his higher priority. He still says everyone should serve.

Eisenkot’s consultations produced recommendations from 67 lawmakers, but that included Arab parties many opponents reject. His bloc could otherwise begin with only 48 lawmakers, creating a fragile minority government. Every law would require difficult negotiations, so the exemption could become a condition for support and a major source of instability.

Eisenkot may need unlikely partners because his bloc lacks a clear majority. His proposed national emergency government would prioritize preventing a crisis over preserving usual political alliances. Different groups could support separate goals without agreeing on Israel’s broader direction.

For example, he appealed to Likud and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s far-right party, but only under his leadership. He could also rely initially on Arab-Israeli lawmakers, whose parties helped produce 67 recommendations for him. That support might help him pass votes or remove Netanyahu, even while other coalition members reject Arab participation.

These partnerships would remain unstable. A government with only 48 of parliament’s 120 lawmakers would need outside support and negotiations for every law. Eisenkot has 28 days, so his outreach reflects arithmetic as much as shared ideology. His challenge is building a workable majority while managing disputes over military exemptions, security, and relations with Palestinians.

Israel’s prime minister does not need a party majority alone. The president asks a lawmaker to build a coalition, combining parties that together can govern parliament and pass laws. The largest party does not automatically rule, so bargaining is essential after elections and coalition agreements set priorities.

Those parties negotiate a shared government, but each keeps its own priorities and parliamentary seats. For example, Gadi Eisenkot received recommendations from parties representing 67 lawmakers, yet Arab parties’ support was disputed. If partners withdraw, the government can lose its working majority and face votes it cannot win.

That is why coalitions can collapse: disagreements over military exemptions, war policy, or leadership can make cooperation impossible. Eisenkot may begin with only 48 lawmakers in the 120-seat parliament, relying on outside Arab support. Such a minority government would need negotiations for every law, making it fragile.