Israeli opposition leader Eisenkot begins the hard work of forging a coalition government

Giving Eisenkot the task means President Isaac Herzog formally asked him to try to assemble Israel’s next government. Eisenkot must negotiate agreements with parties and secure enough support in the Knesset. The appointment is a mandate to negotiate, not an automatic transfer of power.

Herzog made the decision after consultations with the parties. He said a majority of Knesset members supported giving Eisenkot the task. Eisenkot promised leadership representing all parts of society and said he would act with patience, humility and composure.

The challenge is that neither bloc won a majority in the October 27 election. Eisenkot has up to six weeks, according to the article, to build a coalition. He may need Arab-led parties, a deal with Netanyahu, or support from ultra-Orthodox parties, each requiring difficult compromises.

A majority in Israel’s 120-seat Knesset requires at least 61 seats. That number is more than half the chamber. A party or alliance reaching 61 can normally support a government and pass legislation with a dependable parliamentary base.

The important mechanism is coalition arithmetic. Israel’s elections distribute seats among multiple parties, so one party often does not reach 61 alone. A potential prime minister must therefore negotiate agreements with smaller parties, which promise support in return for influence or policy commitments.

The article says neither bloc won a majority after the October 27 election. That leaves Eisenkot searching for partners among divided minor parties. Arab-led parties could provide crucial votes, while Yisrael Beytenu and ultra-Orthodox parties impose conditions that make reaching 61 politically difficult.

These parties are potential kingmakers because neither major bloc won a parliamentary majority. Their seats could decide whether Eisenkot reaches the 61 votes needed to govern. In a fragmented parliament, a smaller party can gain influence far beyond its size when both sides need its support.

Arab-led parties made historic gains after high turnout among Israel’s Arab citizens. Ra’am said it would support Eisenkot, while the Joint List offered support from outside the coalition. Ultra-Orthodox parties, meanwhile, could support a government if it preserves military exemptions for their community.

Each option creates political danger. Yisrael Beytenu rejects joining a coalition with Arab-led parties. Eisenkot’s partners also campaigned for equal military service, conflicting with ultra-Orthodox demands. The parties can therefore supply essential votes, but only through agreements that may alienate other supporters.

Eisenkot’s central compromise would be turning separate groups’ support into a workable governing agreement. Arab-led parties may support him, but they oppose policies connected to Israel’s wars and the expanding settlement project in the occupied West Bank. His coalition partners also disagree with relying on them.

The article identifies three broad routes. Eisenkot could accept outside support from Arab-led parties, negotiate a power-sharing agreement with Benjamin Netanyahu, or reach an agreement with ultra-Orthodox parties. His four conditions for partners include recognising Israel as Jewish and democratic, accepting its declaration of independence, supporting service for all citizens, and calling Hamas a terrorist group.

Each route risks breaking campaign promises. Arab cooperation may conflict with Eisenkot’s partners and his conditions. A deal with Netanyahu would mean sharing power. Ultra-Orthodox support would likely require preserving draft exemptions, despite Eisenkot’s campaign commitment to equal military service.

The dispute matters because military service became a central campaign issue for Eisenkot and his partners. They sought an end to long-standing exemptions for ultra-Orthodox citizens. For them, equal service represents fairness and a shared obligation to the state.

Ultra-Orthodox parties take the opposite position. They say exemptions are essential to their community’s lifestyle of religious study. Those parties were part of Netanyahu’s outgoing coalition and want the existing arrangement preserved. Their parliamentary support therefore comes with a demand that directly challenges Eisenkot’s campaign platform.

This creates a difficult coalition choice. Eisenkot could refuse the exemptions and risk losing ultra-Orthodox votes, or soften his position and anger partners who promised equal service. The disagreement shows why even a numerically possible coalition may be politically unstable.

The formal mandate gives Eisenkot 28 days to build a coalition. The president may add a further two weeks if Eisenkot requests or needs more time. Together, that creates a possible six-week effort, matching the article’s description of the maximum period.

The key mechanism is that the mandate is conditional. Eisenkot must secure agreements that produce a government able to command parliamentary support. If negotiations fail within the initial period and extension, he does not automatically become prime minister simply because he was chosen first.

The mandate would return to the president, who could ask another Knesset member to try forming a government. That would reopen negotiations among the same divided parties. The article therefore presents the timetable as pressure on Eisenkot, while warning that every likely route involves compromises or broken promises.

Israel elects a 120-member Knesset through a parliamentary system with multiple parties. Voters choose parties, and governments are then built around the group or leader most able to command parliamentary support. Winning the most seats alone is not enough if the leader lacks a majority.

The mechanism is coalition bargaining. A candidate negotiates with smaller parties, offering policy commitments, ministerial influence or other agreements in exchange for support. Those parties can join the coalition or, as the Joint List proposed, support a government from outside it. The combined backing must reach at least 61 seats.

That structure explains Eisenkot’s opportunity despite the unclear election result. Herzog said most Knesset members supported giving him the task, but Eisenkot still must turn that support into durable agreements. Arab-led, conservative and ultra-Orthodox parties can therefore decide who governs.