Israel’s political reckoning: Power, alliances and post-Netanyahu question

When Israel’s president gives a politician the mandate, that politician receives the formal opportunity to try forming a government. The mandate recognizes who appears most capable of assembling parliamentary support after consultations with Knesset members. It matters because it begins the coalition-building process, but it is not the same as becoming prime minister with a stable government.

In this case, President Isaac Herzog gave Gadi Eisenkot the mandate after 67 Knesset members recommended him. Netanyahu received 46 recommendations, while seven members backed neither candidate. Those figures gave Eisenkot the stronger starting position, but they did not create a governing majority.

Eisenkot must still negotiate with parties that have different views on security, religion, military service, settlements and the Palestinian question. He also ruled out including the Arab-led parties in his coalition, despite their numerical importance. The mandate therefore gives him a chance, not certainty. If he cannot assemble enough support, the transition may fail.

The election produced three main parliamentary groupings rather than a clear winner. Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious bloc won 53 seats. Jewish-led opposition parties aligned behind Eisenkot hold 48. Arab-led parties won 19, bringing the total to all 120 Knesset seats.

The key threshold is 61 seats. That is a majority of the 120-member parliament and the support a government ordinarily needs to function. Neither Netanyahu’s bloc nor Eisenkot’s Jewish-led opposition reaches that number alone. The arithmetic forces politicians to seek partners, outside support or carefully negotiated agreements.

The numbers also explain why the Arab-led parties matter so much. Their 19 seats helped Eisenkot win more recommendations during consultations, even though he says they do not meet his coalition conditions. The immediate result is an unresolved contest: Eisenkot has the stronger recommendation, but no confirmed governing majority. Every additional supporter could determine whether his proposed government survives.

A recommendation tells the president which politician a Knesset member wants to receive the first chance to form a government. It does not necessarily promise votes in a confidence decision, coalition membership or long-term cooperation. That distinction is central to Eisenkot’s challenge.

The Arab-led parties illustrate the gap. Their 19 seats helped produce Eisenkot’s 67 recommendations, while Netanyahu received 46 and seven members recommended neither candidate. Yet Eisenkot has said Arab parties do not satisfy his four coalition conditions and has ruled out including them in his government. Their recommendation therefore gives him momentum, not a ready-made coalition.

Eisenkot must unite parties with different views on security, religion, military conscription, settlements and the Palestinian question. He also needs an arrangement that can survive after formation. The election left no clear 61-seat majority. His stronger recommendation marks a political setback for Netanyahu, but it cannot by itself turn an unlikely alliance into a functioning government.

Arab-led parties can influence government formation in two separate ways. First, their parliamentary recommendations affect which politician receives the president’s mandate. Second, their seats can provide crucial support in later votes, even if they remain outside the governing coalition. Their influence therefore does not depend on holding ministries.

Their 19 seats helped lift Eisenkot’s recommendation total to 67, above Netanyahu’s 46. But the parties recommended Eisenkot mainly to prevent Netanyahu’s government from continuing. They did not endorse Eisenkot’s security or political positions. A Joint List representative described the choice as between what they considered bad and even worse.

Eisenkot has set conditions involving Israel’s Jewish and democratic character, mandatory military, national or civilian service, and dismantling Hamas’s capabilities. He says the Arab parties do not meet them and has excluded them from his coalition. They can still shape the outcome by enabling his opportunity or withholding support later.

The 2021 example showed that Israeli parties can cross major ideological lines when preventing Netanyahu’s return becomes the immediate goal. Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid formed a government that relied on parliamentary support from Mansour Abbas’s United Arab List, Ra’am. It was historic because an Arab party helped enable a government to take office.

The mechanism was practical rather than complete ideological agreement. Ra’am’s support supplied the parliamentary backing needed for a coalition assembled from parties with different interests. That arrangement demonstrated that Arab political participation could have direct national influence, not merely opposition status.

It also exposed the arrangement’s weakness. The government eventually collapsed, showing that a coalition built across deep divisions may struggle to last. The present situation is different, but it raises the same question: how far will parties go to block Netanyahu, and can they agree on governing afterward? Eisenkot faces that durability test now.

A government needs more than a shared opponent. It must make decisions, pass policies and manage disputes after the immediate political objective has been achieved. If Eisenkot’s alliance is held together mainly by opposition to Netanyahu, its members may lack a common program for governing Israel.

The proposed alliance includes parties with differing positions on security, religion, military conscription, settlements and the Palestinian question. Eisenkot also demands agreement on issues including mandatory service and dismantling Hamas’s military and governing capabilities. These differences could turn coalition negotiations into continuing internal battles.

The result could be a government that forms but cannot act decisively or survive for long. The 2021 government involving Bennett, Lapid and Ra’am offers a warning: cross-ideological cooperation made government formation possible, but the arrangement eventually collapsed. Eisenkot therefore must convert shared opposition into workable compromises. Without that shift, Netanyahu may remain politically weakened, yet the replacement government could be unstable.

Israel’s parliamentary system allows governments to be built from several parties rather than one party winning power alone. When no bloc reaches 61 seats, larger parties must negotiate with smaller parties for support. A small party can then gain influence beyond its seat count because its votes may decide whether a government forms or survives.

The election shows this mechanism clearly. Netanyahu’s bloc has 53 seats and Eisenkot’s Jewish-led opposition has 48, so neither reaches the 61-seat threshold. The Arab-led parties’ 19 seats helped Eisenkot win the recommendation contest. The 2021 government similarly relied on Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am, an Arab party, to take office.

This system can make government more representative by bringing different communities and interests into national decisions. But it can also make governments fragile. Parties may support a government for a limited purpose while disagreeing on major policies. If compromises fail, the coalition can lose its backing or collapse, as the 2021 example demonstrated.