Is the PLA rehearsing operations to keep US forces out of a Taiwan conflict?

The striking feature was the combination of scale, distance and coordination. More than 100 PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels operated across the western Pacific and South China Sea. Analysts saw formations moving beyond Taiwan because they could be preparing to block US and allied forces from reaching the island during a conflict.

The Liaoning aircraft carrier sailed around the southern Philippines into the Philippine Sea in late October. Other Chinese warships passed through straits near Japan in late October and early November. The ISW identified four task forces between Taiwan and Guam, drawing ships from eastern, northern and southern theatre commands. Taiwan also reported 49 PLA aircraft sorties in 24 hours, including 36 to the south.

China did not announce a large-scale drill. The air activity was still below earlier exercises, which exceeded 100 sorties daily. Analysts therefore described the movements as possible preparation, coordination and signalling rather than confirmed proof of a Taiwan blockade rehearsal.

In this context, counter-intervention means making it dangerous or difficult for outside forces to reach Taiwan or operate near it. The outside forces would chiefly be US and allied forces responding to a conflict. The goal would be to protect PLA operations by controlling access to the surrounding waters and airspace.

Analysts described several possible methods. Chinese warships east of Taiwan could seek and attack US submarines, surface ships and aircraft. Other forces could establish layered air, missile, drone and anti-submarine defence zones. Northern and southern naval formations could screen against foreign intervention, while operations could also target resupply routes.

This would not necessarily mean one announced blockade exercise. The article says China had not announced a large-scale drill. Instead, the recent movements may be improving coordination, monitoring adversaries and practising how multiple forces could isolate Taiwan and delay outside help.

The deployments were unusually large and geographically broad. Taiwan’s National Security Council secretary general Joseph Wu reported more than 100 PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels operating across the region. The ships were not concentrated only around Taiwan, which made the activity more notable to analysts.

The ISW identified four naval task forces between Taiwan and Guam, alongside vessels near Taiwan. They reportedly came from China’s eastern, northern and southern theatre commands. The Liaoning moved around the southern Philippines into the Philippine Sea, while other warships passed through straits near Japan. These routes placed Chinese formations farther into the Pacific.

The article does not establish that all vessels were operating as one coordinated force. Japan’s defence minister said the passage of navy and coastguard vessels was publicly confirmed, but their degree of coordination remained unclear. Still, three-command participation was described as rare.

The first island chain is a line of strategically important islands stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. In the article’s geography, it separates China’s near seas from the Philippine Sea. That makes the chain more than a map feature: it marks a possible boundary between waters closer to China and a wider approach route.

US and allied forces responding to a Taiwan conflict could use the Philippine Sea to approach the island. Chinese movements beyond the chain could therefore aim to monitor, delay or block those forces before they reach Taiwan. The Liaoning’s route around the southern Philippines placed it directly in this broader space.

The chain also creates several passages and straits that naval forces can use. Chinese ships entered the Pacific through straits near Japan, while the Liaoning avoided the Luzon Strait. Analysts said this could help practise isolating Taiwan, and potentially the Philippines, from outside support.

To disrupt outside intervention, the PLA would need to control access across several domains at once. Analysts described a layered system involving naval forces, aircraft, land-based missiles, drones and anti-submarine defences. Its purpose would be to make intervention routes dangerous and to keep foreign forces from interfering with PLA operations around Taiwan.

A concrete task would be hunting US submarines, surface ships and aircraft east of Taiwan. Chinese naval groups could monitor adversaries and attack forces approaching the island. Missile, air and drone zones could add pressure from different directions. Anti-submarine measures would address underwater threats, while other ships could screen against intervention.

The PLA would also need to attack the support system behind outside forces. Bradley Martin said resupply to forces already operating in contested areas would need to be disrupted. The article presents these as possible tasks, not confirmed actions in an announced exercise.

The central challenge would be sustaining combat power beyond Taiwan while facing opposition. Ships operating east of Taiwan or between Taiwan and Guam would be farther from China’s near seas. They would need continued supplies and reliable coordination while monitoring or attacking US and allied forces. The article links this problem to the need to disrupt resupply.

Bradley Martin said Chinese forces would have to do more than attack approaching ships and aircraft. They would also need to disrupt supplies reaching outside forces already operating in contested areas. Lyle Goldstein added that Chinese groups might need to coordinate under limited communications while monitoring adversaries and maintaining several defence zones.

The reported deployments may help the PLA practise that coordination and demonstrate readiness. But the article does not say China has solved the sustaining problem. It presents the movements as possible preparation for a layered Taiwan operation, not proof that such an operation would succeed.

Geography shapes the routes forces must use. The first island chain runs from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines and separates China’s near seas from the Philippine Sea. That creates passages, such as straits near Japan and the Luzon Strait, which can be monitored or contested. Forces moving beyond the chain could watch approaches to Taiwan.

Logistics determines whether control can last. Ships and aircraft operating far from home must be supported, while forces already in contested areas need resupply. Martin said disrupting that resupply would be essential. Control also requires several tools working together: naval forces, aircraft, missiles, drones and anti-submarine systems.

The recent activity may show China practising this layered access control. Four task forces were identified between Taiwan and Guam, and forces from three theatre commands reportedly participated. Yet coordination was not fully established, and China announced no large-scale drill, so the outcome remains uncertain.