Two men found guilty of helping Iran try to ‘eliminate’ UK-based journalists
The key difference was that both Mostafa Sepahvand and Farhad Javadi Manesh were found guilty of assisting a foreign intelligence service, while the jury convicted only Sepahvand of preparatory conduct. That second conviction means the verdicts against the two men were not identical. The case concerned surveillance and reconnaissance linked to an alleged plan to attack people in the UK. The court heard that Sepahvand photographed and researched targets, and told handlers he was prepared to escalate from surveillance to violence. He hoped to receive £150,000 for what he described as finishing the job. Manesh also carried out surveillance, but the jury did not find him guilty of preparatory conduct. He said he did not know he was working with Iranian intelligence. A third defendant, Shapoor Noori, was cleared of both charges. Sepahvand and Manesh were remanded until sentencing at the Old Bailey on 17 December. The verdicts distinguish between the two men’s convictions, not between whether the jury found them to have assisted a foreign intelligence service.
What did the jury find each man had done, and how did their verdicts differ?
The key difference was that both Mostafa Sepahvand and Farhad Javadi Manesh were found guilty of assisting a foreign intelligence service, while the jury convicted only Sepahvand of preparatory conduct. That second conviction means the verdicts against the two men were not identical. The case concerned surveillance and reconnaissance linked to an alleged plan to attack people in the UK.
The court heard that Sepahvand photographed and researched targets, and told handlers he was prepared to escalate from surveillance to violence. He hoped to receive £150,000 for what he described as finishing the job. Manesh also carried out surveillance, but the jury did not find him guilty of preparatory conduct. He said he did not know he was working with Iranian intelligence.
A third defendant, Shapoor Noori, was cleared of both charges. Sepahvand and Manesh were remanded until sentencing at the Old Bailey on 17 December. The verdicts distinguish between the two men’s convictions, not between whether the jury found them to have assisted a foreign intelligence service.
What does it mean for a hostile state to use a “proxy” to carry out an operation?
A proxy is an intermediary who carries out an operation for another actor. Here, the article uses the term for people hired to work for foreign security forces. Instead of officials openly conducting surveillance or violence themselves, a state can use someone outside its own organisation. The article describes this as a growing tactic used by hostile states.
Sepahvand and Manesh were recruited through social media and carried out surveillance and reconnaissance in the UK. They visited addresses connected to targets, took photographs and videos, and researched people online. The article says proxies may have little idea who they are targeting or why. That separation can leave the hired person doing the visible work while the foreign service remains behind the scenes.
The article links this approach to other UK cases involving recruits approached through Telegram or by the Wagner group. Such examples show different routes for finding intermediaries, but they do not establish that every recruit is unaware of the sponsor or purpose. In this case, the jury found both men guilty of assisting a foreign intelligence service; sentencing was still to come.
How many men were tried, how many were convicted, and how many people were named as targets?
Three men faced trial in the case: Mostafa Sepahvand, Farhad Javadi Manesh and Shapoor Noori. Two were convicted of assisting a foreign intelligence service: Sepahvand and Manesh. Noori was cleared of that charge and of preparatory conduct. The figures matter because the case involved two convicted defendants, but not all three men accused.
The article names three people as targets of surveillance or threats. They were Iran International journalists Mojtaba Pourmohsen and Kambiz Hosseini, and Jonathan Turner, a founder member of UK Lawyers for Israel. The men visited addresses connected to targets, took photos and videos, and researched people online. The article describes their activity as surveillance and reconnaissance.
The verdicts differed on the additional preparatory-conduct charge: Sepahvand was convicted, while Manesh was cleared. Noori was cleared of both charges. The article does not say that all three targets faced the same actions or consequences. It gives the most detail about Hosseini, who had to leave home and stop working as a standup comedian after threats.
What is Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and what role does it play in the country’s security system?
The article identifies Amin as an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander and as Sepahvand’s handler. It does not explain what the Guard is or describe its full role in Iran’s security system. Established background knowledge is needed here: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, often called the IRGC, is a major Iranian military institution created after the 1979 revolution, separate from the regular armed forces.
The IRGC’s stated role is to protect the Islamic Republic and the revolutionary system. It has military and security responsibilities, and its Quds Force handles operations beyond Iran’s borders. That broader context does not prove what role the institution had in this specific alleged plot; the article reports the court heard that Amin was Sepahvand’s handler.
In December 2024, Sepahvand and Amin exchanged WhatsApp messages about pictures and the location of a target’s office. Sepahvand said he would go there the next day. The jury later convicted Sepahvand of assisting a foreign intelligence service and preparatory conduct. The article reports Amin’s alleged role, but does not say that he was tried in this case.
How did the threats affect the journalists and their families?
The threats had a direct effect on journalist and satirist Kambiz Hosseini’s life. He had to leave his home and stop working as a standup comedian. The article also reports that his family in Iran received threats and had to leave the country. These details show that the pressure extended beyond the person being watched.
One message sent to Hosseini included a picture of his car and warned that it would blow up the next time he started the engine. The article says the defendants carried out surveillance of Hosseini, and that he eventually had to leave home because of threats. It does not identify who sent that particular message.
The article also names Iran International journalist Mojtaba Pourmohsen as a target. Sepahvand used Axiom to find Pourmohsen’s home address and hoped to be paid £150,000 for a violent attack. The article does not describe comparable personal consequences for Pourmohsen, so the clearest reported impacts are Hosseini’s displacement, loss of work and family’s departure from Iran.
What other cases of people recruited for state-linked attacks in the UK does the article describe, and how were they recruited?
The article describes several other UK cases involving people recruited for attacks linked to foreign states or state-backed groups. It says Norwegian teenager Johannes Natland agreed to carry out a hit in Huddersfield for the Foxtrot Network, a Swedish organised crime group backed by the Iranian regime. Natland was jailed for life. The article does not specify how he was recruited.
In another case, Roman Lavrynovych and Stanislav Carpiuc were jailed for arson attacks on property connected to Keir Starmer. An anonymous Russian-speaking figure called El Money recruited them on Telegram. Six Britons were also jailed for roles in a Russian-ordered arson attack on a London warehouse providing aid to Ukraine. The ringleader, Dylan Earl, was recruited by the Wagner group.
These examples show varied recruitment routes in the cases described: social media in the trial of Sepahvand and Manesh, Telegram for Lavrynovych and Carpiuc, and the Wagner group for Earl. The article presents them as examples of intermediaries being hired for operations. It does not say that every case had the same sponsor or method.
What can a government gain by using intermediaries instead of openly carrying out an operation itself?
A government may use intermediaries to keep its own officials away from the visible work of an operation. In general, that distance can provide plausible deniability, make responsibility harder to establish, and reduce the direct risk to state personnel. These are established possible advantages of using proxies; the article does not state which motives applied to the Iranian government in this case.
The article describes people hired as proxies for foreign security forces, sometimes with little idea who they are targeting or why. Sepahvand and Manesh conducted surveillance, visited addresses and took photographs and videos. Other examples include recruits approached through Telegram and a ringleader recruited by the Wagner group. These routes place intermediaries between the alleged sponsor and the actions carried out on the ground.
The approach can also create risks for the sponsor: recruits may be identified, arrested and tried, as happened here. The jury convicted both men of assisting a foreign intelligence service, and Sepahvand of preparatory conduct. The article calls proxy recruitment a growing tactic, but gives no figures for its scale or evidence that intermediaries guarantee secrecy or prevent attribution.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
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