100 days of the president: Santa Marta pays the price for security without a comprehensive strategy
The government’s campaign focused on the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN), which operate on three sides of the mountain range. The column describes an effort to defeat the group militarily, alongside presidential visits to Santa Marta for security meetings and announcements of operational successes. The government had promised to capture or kill Bendito Menor in its first days and, the author says, fulfilled that pledge. Bendito Menor was a popular influencer, not a top-level commander. Later, an operation killed Cholo, described as a senior commander, and seven other people, including Ricardo Andrés Rodríguez Martínez. Kfir aircraft also flew over Santa Marta. The column places these actions within the government’s first 100 days, but questions their broader effect. It notes losses of weapons and material, but says there had been no major capture to shake the group. The author also points to more police and army presence, while arguing that military action is not matched by coordination with local civilian authorities or a plan to restore tourism.
What security actions has the national government taken against the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN) during its first 100 days?
The government’s campaign focused on the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN), which operate on three sides of the mountain range. The column describes an effort to defeat the group militarily, alongside presidential visits to Santa Marta for security meetings and announcements of operational successes.
The government had promised to capture or kill Bendito Menor in its first days and, the author says, fulfilled that pledge. Bendito Menor was a popular influencer, not a top-level commander. Later, an operation killed Cholo, described as a senior commander, and seven other people, including Ricardo Andrés Rodríguez Martínez. Kfir aircraft also flew over Santa Marta.
The column places these actions within the government’s first 100 days, but questions their broader effect. It notes losses of weapons and material, but says there had been no major capture to shake the group. The author also points to more police and army presence, while arguing that military action is not matched by coordination with local civilian authorities or a plan to restore tourism.
How large are the reported effects on Santa Marta—how much has tourism fallen in some areas, and how many homicides were recorded this year?
The reported economic shock is stark: tourism fell by more than 80% in some areas. The column connects this decline to the pressure on Santa Marta’s tourism-dependent economy as security measures affect the Sierra Nevada and surrounding destinations.
The other figure is 113 homicides so far this year, according to figures from Legal Medicine cited by the author. The column calls that number high, but says it is at least half the level of previous years. It also stresses that the decline began early in the year, before it could be credited to the new government’s security policy.
The author says increased police and army presence during the government’s first 100 days may have influenced the situation, but does not treat that as proof of a new security outcome. The figures show two different pressures: fewer homicides than in earlier years, yet severe tourism losses in some places. The column gives no further breakdown of either number.
How have the security measures affected tourism businesses, workers, and families who depend on the local economy?
The security measures are described as having consequences beyond armed confrontations: they are also putting livelihoods in a tourism-dependent region at risk. The author says the economic decline affects Santa Marta and nearby destinations, where tourism supports workers and businesses.
This week, at least 40 families who provide services to the Pnnt-Tequendama concession were left adrift. Hundreds of hostels, workers who depend on tourism, and tour operators were watching the downturn with concern. Tourism had fallen by more than 80% in some areas. The column also notes that US, French, British, and German travel restrictions had not been lifted.
The author argues that repression on only one side of the mountain is pushing the city toward financial decline, while no government strategy to revive tourism is visible. The concern extends to the Troncal del Caribe, Minca, and Palomino, among other places. The column does not describe a recovery plan; it warns that families and businesses remain exposed as the local economy weakens.
What does a comprehensive security strategy involve, and what does the article say is missing from the government’s approach in Santa Marta?
A comprehensive security strategy, as the column frames it, would connect military operations with civilian decision-making. Local authorities would take part in discussing and shaping security policy, rather than only attending official events. The approach would also address the effects security measures have on livelihoods and local economic stability.
The author describes a different pattern in Santa Marta: civilian authorities attend to applaud and take photographs, but have little interaction or discussion about security policies for the city or department. The government has sent Kfir aircraft and held security councils, yet the column says it has not built an articulated strategy with those authorities. It also points to the absence of a government plan to revive tourism.
That gap matters because security measures are being applied on one side of the mountain while tourism and related businesses face serious losses. The author says the local economy is declining and that officials do not challenge the approach. The column’s concern is that military pressure alone cannot address the region’s intertwined security and economic problems.
How does the ACSN raise money, and why does the article say it does not need drug trafficking to fund itself?
The author’s central argument is that the ACSN does not need drug trafficking to fund itself. Instead, the group can draw income from extortion. This matters because a strategy aimed mainly at disrupting narcotics would not necessarily cut off the group’s finances, as the author describes them.
The column gives concrete examples from the mountains: the ACSN continues to collect a charge on the coffee harvest and on land used for crops. It also says extortion has reached high levels of innovation. The mechanism is repeated payment demands tied to people’s work, harvests, or land, rather than dependence on a single source of income.
The author argues that extortion has not eased despite economic limitations and security pressure. The scale is difficult to measure, the column adds, because even authorities lack a quantitative basis for understanding it. That means measuring military success only by weapons seized or people captured may miss a key part of the group’s ability to keep operating.
How long have paramilitary and self-defense groups exercised influence in Santa Marta and the Sierra Nevada, according to the article?
The passage gives a broad time span: it says that control and the ability to modify social orders have existed for close to six decades. This is the text’s only clear historical duration for the pattern it describes. It does not provide a detailed timeline or identify each group active during that period.
The statement appears in a discussion of security as more than the presence of police or soldiers. The author says security is still understood through who holds dominion and control and who can change social orders. In the surrounding discussion, the ACSN is presented as an armed group that collects extortion and can impose an armed stoppage.
Because the excerpt ends mid-sentence, it does not explain the full historical claim or specify whether the six decades refer to one organization or a broader pattern of armed control. The grounded answer is therefore limited: the author places this kind of domination at nearly six decades, without supplying further historical detail in the passage provided.
What is criminal governance, and how can an armed group shape rules and daily life alongside—or in place of—the state?
The column uses criminal governance to describe a situation in which armed groups are entangled with the way a territory is administered. It says the term means accepting that there are co-administrations, commitments, and key people whose influence can leave others badly exposed. The idea matters because it describes power operating beyond formal state institutions.
The author links this to the ACSN’s ability to control territory and modify social orders. The group collects extortion, including charges on coffee harvests and land used for crops, and it has called armed stoppages. One such stoppage after Cholo’s death ended only when the group indicated it would end; the column says the group’s demands shaped the timing.
The author also says the ACSN does not sustain itself alone, suggesting links with political allies and friends, though the excerpt does not identify them. It presents criminal governance as more than a rhetorical label: it implies shared or contested authority in daily life. The passage does not detail specific co-administration agreements, so their exact form remains unstated.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
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