“Get a move on” – WhatsApp messages reveal how a Russian businessman directed the owner of a Finnish company
WhatsApp messages obtained by Finnish Customs suggest that Russian businessman Kirill Tuljakov had a hands-on role in Siberica, a Finnish freight company formally owned by Gabriel Temin. The messages matter because they provide evidence about who may have influenced the company behind exports to Russia. According to the prosecutor, Tuljakov suggested that Temin establish Siberica in Finland. The messages show Tuljakov giving Temin instructions about company matters and urging him to fix problems. Tuljakov also persuaded Temin to hire a woman who had previously worked for a Russian-background Finnish company placed on a US sanctions list. Before the hiring, she visited Siberica and reported directly to Tuljakov. Temin asked Tuljakov for permission to pay bills from Siberica’s account and Tuljakov wanted access to its website. In court, however, Temin said he was responsible for all of Siberica’s operations and described the partnership as mutual. The messages support the prosecutor’s account, but the article does not establish that the allegations have been finally decided in court.
What do the WhatsApp messages reveal about Kirill Tuljakov’s role in directing Gabriel Temin and the Finnish company Siberica?
WhatsApp messages obtained by Finnish Customs suggest that Russian businessman Kirill Tuljakov had a hands-on role in Siberica, a Finnish freight company formally owned by Gabriel Temin. The messages matter because they provide evidence about who may have influenced the company behind exports to Russia.
According to the prosecutor, Tuljakov suggested that Temin establish Siberica in Finland. The messages show Tuljakov giving Temin instructions about company matters and urging him to fix problems. Tuljakov also persuaded Temin to hire a woman who had previously worked for a Russian-background Finnish company placed on a US sanctions list. Before the hiring, she visited Siberica and reported directly to Tuljakov.
Temin asked Tuljakov for permission to pay bills from Siberica’s account and Tuljakov wanted access to its website. In court, however, Temin said he was responsible for all of Siberica’s operations and described the partnership as mutual. The messages support the prosecutor’s account, but the article does not establish that the allegations have been finally decided in court.
Who formally owned Siberica, and who appeared to influence its staffing, finances, and daily operations?
The distinction in the article is between formal ownership and apparent influence. Gabriel Temin officially owned Siberica, the Vantaa-based freight company, while evidence gathered by Customs suggests Russian businessman Kirill Tuljakov had a say in how it operated. This matters because the person listed as an owner may not be the only person shaping a company’s decisions.
Messages show that Tuljakov proposed creating the Finnish company and instructed Temin about its affairs. He also persuaded Temin to hire a woman who had worked at a company with Russian ties that had been placed on a US sanctions list. She visited Siberica and reported to Tuljakov. Temin, despite being the formal owner, asked Tuljakov for permission to pay bills from Siberica’s account. Tuljakov also wanted access to the company’s website.
In court, Temin said he was responsible for all of Siberica’s activities and that he and Tuljakov had each sought a business partner. The case was appealed, so the article presents competing accounts rather than a final ruling on who controlled the company.
How large was the alleged trade operation, in money and in the number of drones involved?
The suspected trade operation was large both financially and in the volume of goods. Temin’s company received money transfers from Russia worth at least 18 million euros, according to the article. The scale is why the case was described as potentially Finland’s largest sanctions-evasion case during the war in Ukraine.
The drone shipments are another striking measure. Temin acquired thousands of drones and said he sent them to Turkey. Information provided to Finnish Customs by Turkish authorities indicated that the drones did not reach Turkey. Instead, they remained in Lithuania near the Belarusian border, and Customs suspected they were then transported to Russia. The article does not give an exact number beyond “thousands.”
These figures describe the reported investigation and allegations, not a final court finding that all the money or drones were involved in crimes. Temin denied wrongdoing. He received a suspended sentence for other offences at the district court, but most charges were dismissed, and both he and the prosecutor appealed. The judgment was not final at the time of the report.
What kinds of goods were sent or sought for Russia, and how were companies in different countries involved?
The reported trade involved both equipment with potential military relevance and other goods. The article says the wider network supplied or sourced electronics and components needed by Russia’s military. It also describes drones, and an attempt by Tuljakov to obtain Porsche parts through Temin. The variety matters because the investigation concerns both alleged sanctions evasion and a broader chain of international trading.
Siberica, based in Vantaa, handled Finnish customs export declarations and stored products that later went to Russia, according to the prosecutor. Tuljakov owned a logistics company in Russia, and his company had previously listed Siberica’s address as its Finnish office. The drone route described by Customs involved Turkey as the stated destination and Lithuania as the place where the drones were found.
The network also included companies owned by Tuljakov and Nikolai Levin, several of which were on EU or US sanctions lists. Two Levin-linked companies had been customers of Finnish retailer Verkkokauppa.com, which later ended both relationships. MOT found no sign that the retailer’s activity breached EU sanctions.
What are economic sanctions, and why can they restrict the sale or export of goods to a country?
Economic sanctions are government or international restrictions on financial, commercial, or other economic dealings. They may target a country, particular people or companies, or specified activities. Their purpose and scope depend on the authority imposing them. In general, trade restrictions can prohibit selling certain goods to a destination or doing business with listed parties.
Export controls are related rules that govern whether particular goods, technology, or services may be sent abroad. For example, a rule may require a licence or forbid an export because an item could have military uses. The article describes companies connected to the investigation as being on EU or US sanctions lists, and it reports that Porsche would not sell parts when their export to Russia would breach sanctions.
The exact restrictions depend on the applicable rules and the goods, parties, and route involved. In this case, the article reports allegations and an ongoing appeal, not a final finding that every shipment or company violated sanctions. The court outcome and the evidence about particular transactions therefore matter.
What can happen when drones or electronics subject to export controls are diverted to Russia?
Export controls can limit where certain goods go and who may receive them. If controlled goods are sent through an intermediary or a different route to reach a prohibited destination, authorities may investigate whether sanctions or export rules were broken. Potential consequences can include prosecution or penalties, depending on the law and the evidence. These are general possibilities, not a statement that every diversion leads to conviction.
The article describes a specific suspected route: Temin said thousands of drones were delivered to Turkey, but information from Turkish authorities showed they had instead remained in Lithuania near the Belarusian border. Finnish Customs suspected they were taken onward to Russia. The wider network was also reported to have supplied electronics and components needed by Russia’s military.
Temin denied committing crimes. The district court sentenced him to nine months of suspended imprisonment for two offences, but dismissed most charges. Both Temin and the prosecutor appealed, so the judgment was not final. The case shows why investigators examine a shipment’s actual route and destination, not just its paperwork or stated recipient.
What is a front company, and why can hidden ownership and complex supply chains make sanctions harder to enforce?
A front company is a business that appears to conduct ordinary activity but is used to conceal who is really behind particular dealings. The term can describe different arrangements, so it should not be assumed that every company with foreign partners is a front. In the article, investigators’ account is that Temin acted as a “bulvaani,” or nominal figure, through companies in Vantaa.
Siberica was formally owned by Temin, yet messages suggest Tuljakov proposed its creation, directed company matters, and influenced hiring. Temin also asked Tuljakov about paying bills. Siberica handled export declarations and stored goods that later went to Russia. The alleged chain involved businesses and people in Finland, Russia, and elsewhere, with drones reportedly found in Lithuania.
When ownership and control are unclear, authorities may need to compare company records, messages, payments, and the goods’ actual routes. Multiple intermediaries can make it harder to see the final buyer or destination. The article describes the evidence and allegations in a case that was still under appeal, not a final finding that Siberica was legally a front company.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
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