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Defence & Security17 Nov 2026 · about 7 min

Zelensky: Over Half of Russian Refinery Capacity Shut Down by Ukrainian Drones

The brief

“Offline” describes lost operating capacity, not necessarily a destroyed refinery. A facility may be unable to process crude because key equipment is damaged, operations are interrupted, or it is unsafe to run. The article reports reduced capacity and strikes, but does not establish that every affected refinery was destroyed or say how long each outage will last. The distinction matters because a refinery can sometimes resume work after repairs or safety checks, even if a strike caused a fire. At Ilsky, drones hit the main AT-4 and AT-5 processing units and gasoline production lines. The article does not give details about the damage or recovery timeline. Zelensky said more than 55% of Russian refining capacity was disabled; Bloomberg had reported almost 40% offline before the latest attacks. Those figures describe capacity unavailable at the time, not necessarily permanently lost. Whether facilities return to service depends on their damage and repairs, details the article does not provide.

01

What does it mean for a country’s oil-refining capacity to be “shut down”—are refineries destroyed, or temporarily unable to process crude oil?

“Offline” describes lost operating capacity, not necessarily a destroyed refinery. A facility may be unable to process crude because key equipment is damaged, operations are interrupted, or it is unsafe to run. The article reports reduced capacity and strikes, but does not establish that every affected refinery was destroyed or say how long each outage will last.

The distinction matters because a refinery can sometimes resume work after repairs or safety checks, even if a strike caused a fire. At Ilsky, drones hit the main AT-4 and AT-5 processing units and gasoline production lines. The article does not give details about the damage or recovery timeline.

Zelensky said more than 55% of Russian refining capacity was disabled; Bloomberg had reported almost 40% offline before the latest attacks. Those figures describe capacity unavailable at the time, not necessarily permanently lost. Whether facilities return to service depends on their damage and repairs, details the article does not provide.

02

How large is the reported disruption: how many Russian refineries have been hit, and what share of refining capacity do the article’s sources say is offline?

The article gives two different estimates of how much Russian oil-refining capacity was unavailable. Zelensky claimed that more than 55% had been disabled. Bloomberg’s Friday analysis put the share at almost 40% before the Sunday-Monday attacks. These are reported estimates from different points in the campaign, not a single agreed measurement.

The article also cites a September International Energy Agency assessment: Ukrainian drones had hit 27 of Russia’s 32 major refineries. A count of facilities hit is not the same as the share of total capacity offline, since refineries differ in size and damage. The article does not reconcile the estimates.

The latest strikes hit the Ilsky refinery and oil storage reservoirs near Azov, after Zelensky’s statement. He said the campaign had disabled more than 55%, while Bloomberg’s earlier estimate was lower. The article also reports that Russia has classified most oil-related data, making the scale difficult to verify independently.

03

How can a drone strike on a refinery’s processing units or production lines force the facility to stop operating?

A refinery needs its processing units and production lines to turn crude oil into usable products. If key equipment is damaged or must be shut down for safety, the refinery may have to stop some operations or reduce output. A strike on a core unit can therefore affect more than the piece of equipment directly hit. This is general refinery knowledge; the article does not detail the specific technical damage.

The article gives a concrete example at Ilsky. It says Ukrainian drones targeted the AT-4 and AT-5 processing units, as well as production lines for automobile gasoline. Local authorities reported a fire at an industrial facility and said emergency teams responded. The report does not say exactly which components were damaged or how much output was lost.

If a critical unit cannot operate, other parts of the production process may also be constrained. That can reduce a facility’s effective capacity even if the whole site is not destroyed. The article reports repeated attacks on Ilsky, but gives no repair schedule or confirmation of when its operations might resume.

04

Why is Ukraine targeting refineries, fuel depots, and pipelines as part of the war?

The article describes Ukraine’s campaign as an effort to degrade Russia’s ability to export oil and deliver usable fuel to Russians. Refineries, pumping stations, storage sites, and pipelines are part of the energy system targeted in the reported attacks. Disrupting these assets can put pressure on fuel production and distribution, though the article does not measure the campaign’s economic effect.

Zelensky said the attacks were a “perfectly justified response” to Russia’s refusal to de-escalate and its attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The reported strikes illustrate the campaign: drones hit the Ilsky refinery’s processing units and gasoline lines, while attacks near Azov left oil reservoirs burning. Other drones hit energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk.

The article says the campaign has reached sites more than 2,500 kilometers into Russia and reports competing estimates of refining capacity disabled. It does not establish the full impact on Russian fuel supplies or export earnings. It presents the strikes as an ongoing effort, with Zelensky saying results were appearing practically every day.

05

What could happen to Russia’s supplies of gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel—and to its oil-export earnings—if refining capacity stays offline?

When refinery capacity is unavailable, less crude can be processed into products such as gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel. If disruptions persist, that could tighten supplies of those fuels or reduce the amount available for export. This is a conditional implication, not a shortage the article reports. The source says Russian processing has been severely curtailed but provides no product-by-product supply figures.

Russia might also lose earnings if it cannot process and sell as much fuel, or if disruptions reduce its oil exports. But the article does not quantify export revenue or establish that earnings have fallen because of these strikes. It says the campaign aims to weaken Russia’s ability to export oil and deliver usable fuel to Russians.

The scale remains uncertain: Zelensky claimed more than 55% of capacity was disabled, while Bloomberg earlier reported almost 40% offline. Russia has classified almost all oil-related data, according to the article. If outages continue, the effect could grow, but actual shortages, imports, and revenue changes are not described in the source.

06

What options does a country have to keep fuel available when some refineries are offline, such as using other refineries, stored fuel, or imports?

When some refineries are offline, a country may try to keep fuel available by increasing output at other operating refineries, releasing stored fuel, or importing supplies. These are general options for managing a disruption, not actions the article reports Russia taking. Whether they can fill a gap depends on the available capacity, stocks, transport, and access to imports.

For example, stored fuel can provide a temporary buffer while repairs are made, while other refineries may raise production if they have spare capacity. Imports can also supplement supply when they can be obtained and delivered. The article mentions Russian oil storage reservoirs burning near Azov, but does not say they held finished fuel or describe Russia’s overall stockpiles.

The source reports that 27 of 32 major Russian refineries had been hit, and cites estimates of almost 40% or more than 55% of capacity offline. It gives no information about replacement supplies, imports, or spare refinery capacity. So these options explain possible responses, not Russia’s current response or its effectiveness.

07

How does refining turn crude oil into useful products such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel?

Crude oil is a mixture of many hydrocarbons, not a ready-made fuel. In general, refineries heat crude and separate parts of the mixture by their different boiling points. Further processing can change some of those materials and help produce fuels such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. This is general background; the article does not describe the chemistry or equipment in detail.

The article’s example is Ilsky, where drones hit the AT-4 and AT-5 processing units and production lines for automobile gasoline. That shows why the distinction between crude oil and finished fuel matters: damage to processing equipment or production lines can interrupt the making of specific products, even if crude oil remains available.

Refining capacity measures how much crude facilities can process, rather than how much crude a country owns. The article reports claims that a large share of Russia’s refining capacity was disabled, but gives no breakdown of gasoline, diesel, or jet-fuel output. It also does not say how much crude Russia can still process at unaffected sites.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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