Thirty years of progress, lost at sea
The lost progress is the long period when ships could travel through international waters with relative safety. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, helped establish freedom of navigation, and countries mostly followed its rules. That made global shipping highly efficient and kept transport costs lower. Before 2022, even during conflicts, merchant ships were generally spared. The article identifies Somali piracy in the early 2000s as the most serious threat during that period; countries joined forces and defeated it in the early 2010s. Armed attacks on shipping were otherwise rare, despite some countries violating UNCLOS in other ways. That changed with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The article describes attacks across six waterways and says Russia, Iran, the Houthi rebels, and others now target merchant shipping as a geopolitical tool. The shipping sector has adapted rather than stopped, but routes are riskier and some companies charge significant premiums.
What does the article mean by saying 30 years of progress in maritime security has been lost?
The lost progress is the long period when ships could travel through international waters with relative safety. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, helped establish freedom of navigation, and countries mostly followed its rules. That made global shipping highly efficient and kept transport costs lower.
Before 2022, even during conflicts, merchant ships were generally spared. The article identifies Somali piracy in the early 2000s as the most serious threat during that period; countries joined forces and defeated it in the early 2010s. Armed attacks on shipping were otherwise rare, despite some countries violating UNCLOS in other ways.
That changed with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The article describes attacks across six waterways and says Russia, Iran, the Houthi rebels, and others now target merchant shipping as a geopolitical tool. The shipping sector has adapted rather than stopped, but routes are riskier and some companies charge significant premiums.
How many major waterways does the article identify as unsafe, and which are they?
The article names six waterways where attacks on shipping have become pervasive: the Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Black Sea, and Sea of Azov. Taken together, these routes show that the danger is not limited to one conflict or one region.
The article gives a specific example in the Black Sea. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it declared what it called a blockade in parts of the sea. In the following days and weeks, several merchant vessels without military links were attacked, and those attacks have been widely attributed to Russia.
The wider reality is that ships now face danger in all six named waterways, according to the article’s opening summary. Russia, Iran, the Houthi rebels, and others deliberately target merchant shipping as a tool of geopolitics. Shipping has not simply stopped: companies continue to risk some routes, with significant premiums charged for Strait of Hormuz transits.
Which countries and groups are targeting merchant ships, and how are the attacks used as a geopolitical tool?
The article identifies Russia, Iran, the Houthi rebels, and other actors as deliberately targeting merchant shipping in several waterways. It frames these attacks as a way to use shipping and sea routes in geopolitical contests. It does not give a separate motive or objective for each actor, so their individual aims cannot be specified from the text.
Russia’s actions in the Black Sea provide the article’s concrete example. After the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia declared what it labeled a blockade in parts of the sea. In the following days and weeks, several merchant vessels without military links were attacked; those attacks have been widely attributed to Russia. The article says such attacks violate the laws of naval warfare.
The article’s broader picture is that targeting is now widespread across six waterways, rather than confined to that Black Sea example. Shipping companies have adjusted instead of suspending operations. In the Strait of Hormuz, companies willing to risk transit charge significant premiums, showing how geopolitical violence can change the conditions under which commerce moves.
How are shipping companies adapting to dangerous routes, and what happens to the cost of shipping?
The article describes a shipping sector that has adjusted to violence rather than suspending operations altogether. That matters because the named waterways remain important routes, but companies must now account for the danger when deciding whether to make a transit.
The clearest example is the Strait of Hormuz. Shipping companies that are willing to risk the transit charge significant premiums. The article does not give a premium amount or explain how companies calculate it, so the key mechanism it identifies is simply that risk is reflected in a higher charge for the transit.
This means shipping continues, but under less secure and more costly conditions for companies using the route. The article’s opening summary places the Strait of Hormuz among six waterways where attacks have become pervasive. It does not quantify any wider effect on freight rates or the final price of goods, but it shows that danger can add costs to operating a route.
Under the laws of naval warfare, when can a merchant ship become a military target?
The San Remo Manual sets out when merchant vessels may be treated as military objectives. The key idea is whether a ship is helping an enemy’s military effort, rather than simply being a civilian vessel travelling through a conflict zone. The article says attacks on ordinary merchant ships without military links violate the laws of naval warfare.
For enemy merchant ships, grounds include belligerent acts, military assistance, intelligence work, sailing under enemy military convoy, resisting capture, or carrying military materials. A ship armed enough to damage a warship may also qualify; light personal defensive weapons and purely deflective systems are excluded. These are examples from Article 60.
Article 67 gives neutral-flag ships protections: they can be attacked only in listed circumstances, such as carrying contraband or helping the enemy’s military, and may need to refuse a warning or meet other conditions. Unless circumstances prevent it, a warning should allow the ship to reroute, unload, or take precautions. The text also requires a place of safety for passengers and crew in a specified case.
What is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and what does it say about freedom of navigation?
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, known as UNCLOS, is an international convention governing many aspects of the world’s oceans. Adopted in 1982, it came into force in 1994. Its rules cover navigation, among other matters, and establish a shared framework for how vessels use the seas.
In particular, UNCLOS codifies all vessels’ right to freedom of navigation, including through straits. The article says that a few countries, including the United States, Iran, and Israel, have not ratified the convention, but have mostly adhered to its rules. Countries that did ratify it have also mostly followed the rules.
The resulting order has allowed global shipping to operate extremely efficiently, as UNCLOS negotiators intended. That matters because more than 80 percent of all cargo travels by sea. The article links this efficient system to lower transportation costs for cargo moving by ship. Attacks on shipping therefore threaten not only individual vessels but also the conditions that have supported efficient maritime trade.
Why does freedom of navigation matter to the global economy when more than 80 percent of cargo travels by sea?
Freedom of navigation matters because the sea carries most of the world’s cargo. The article states that more than 80 percent of all cargo travels by sea. If ships can move efficiently across oceans and through straits, goods can use the routes that support global trade rather than facing unnecessary barriers or delays.
UNCLOS helps provide that framework. Adopted in 1982 and in force from 1994, it codifies vessels’ freedom of navigation, including passage through straits. The article says countries have mostly adhered to its rules, even though a few, including the United States, Iran, and Israel, have not ratified the convention. This order has allowed shipping to operate extremely efficiently.
The economic consequence is lower transportation costs for cargo travelling by sea. The article warns that attacks on merchant ships now endanger this established system across six waterways. Shipping companies have adjusted to the danger, but companies risking Strait of Hormuz transit charge significant premiums. The text does not quantify the wider effect on cargo prices.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
Read more in the JupiteX app
Pulse is free. New stories every 4 hours, each one broken into the questions that explain it.
Or read more news on the web