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Defence & Security17 Nov 2026 · about 7 min

Japan’s Defense Lessons From Ukraine and the Middle East

The brief

Japan is treating domestic weapons production as part of deterrence, not just an industrial issue. A prolonged, high-intensity war could consume weapons faster than they can be replaced. Production must be adequate in peacetime and ready to expand quickly if fighting begins. Tokyo plans a new defense industrial base strategy, likely to include subsidies for defense firms’ production capacity. The government has also said it will accelerate support for domestic industry. In April, Japan revised its defense-transfer policy to promote exports of weapons and nonlethal military equipment. The Defense Ministry’s 2027 fiscal year budget request identifies domestic production as critical to deterrence. An August ministry analysis of the U.S.-Israel war against Iran stresses maintaining production capacity before conflict and rapidly scaling it during conflict. The excerpt gives no factory targets or planned output levels. It does show Japan making production readiness part of defense planning, so a long war is less likely to outlast available weapons.

01

What steps is Japan taking to expand its domestic weapons production?

Japan is treating domestic weapons production as part of deterrence, not just an industrial issue. A prolonged, high-intensity war could consume weapons faster than they can be replaced. Production must be adequate in peacetime and ready to expand quickly if fighting begins.

Tokyo plans a new defense industrial base strategy, likely to include subsidies for defense firms’ production capacity. The government has also said it will accelerate support for domestic industry. In April, Japan revised its defense-transfer policy to promote exports of weapons and nonlethal military equipment. The Defense Ministry’s 2027 fiscal year budget request identifies domestic production as critical to deterrence.

An August ministry analysis of the U.S.-Israel war against Iran stresses maintaining production capacity before conflict and rapidly scaling it during conflict. The excerpt gives no factory targets or planned output levels. It does show Japan making production readiness part of defense planning, so a long war is less likely to outlast available weapons.

02

How much has Japan increased defense and security spending as a share of GDP?

Japan raised defense and other security-related spending to approximately 1.8 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2025–2026. In 2022, the figure was around 1 percent. That is a rise of about 0.8 percentage points, rather than an increase of 0.8 percent.

The increase is part of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s broader defense-policy reforms. Her government is revising the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program amid heightened instability and uncertainty over U.S. engagement in the region. Japan also revised its defense-transfer policy in April to promote exports of weapons and nonlethal military equipment.

The spending figure shows a substantial shift in resources, but the article does not say that all of the increase goes to weapons production. The Defense Ministry’s 2027 fiscal year budget request separately singles out domestic military production as a critical element of deterrence. Japan’s planned industrial strategy and possible subsidies point to a focus on turning defense resources into lasting production capacity.

03

How could limited weapons production make it harder for Japan to sustain a long conflict?

A long conflict can drain weapons and other resources over time. If a country cannot replace what its forces consume, its available equipment may shrink as the fighting continues. The article identifies this challenge through the replacement rate: whether weapons output keeps pace with consumption in the battlespace.

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have shown the prolonged, high-intensity, resource-draining nature of modern warfare. Japan’s Defense Ministry says adequate production capacity should be maintained in peacetime, with readiness to scale up output rapidly during conflict. That preparation matters because building capacity only after a war begins may not meet immediate needs.

The article says Japan is increasingly concerned about sustaining operations in a protracted conflict. It does not quantify how many weapons Japan could produce or how quickly it could increase output. But if its production rate fell behind wartime use, replenishment would lag. The government’s planned industrial strategy and support for domestic firms are intended to address production capacity as part of deterrence.

04

What is deterrence, and what roles do capability, credibility, and communication play in it?

Deterrence means shaping an adversary’s calculation so it is discouraged from taking a feared action. NATO frames it around three elements: capability, credibility, and communication. Together, these ask whether a state can defend itself, whether it would use its forces, and whether an adversary understands what it would face.

Capability depends on having the weapons needed for military operations. Credibility involves more than willingness to begin using force in a long conflict; it also means willingness and ability to sustain the effort. Communication matters because an adversary must recognize the state’s capacity and resolve for these to affect its calculation.

The article argues that production capacity increasingly shapes all three pillars. It affects weapons availability before and during a war, while durable public and private investment can signal support for sustaining production. Japan’s plans to support domestic industry and prepare to expand output are therefore relevant both to military capacity and to the message its defense posture sends. The article does not claim production alone guarantees deterrence.

05

What do the replacement rate and cost-to-kill ratio reveal about a military’s ability to keep fighting?

The replacement rate and cost-to-kill ratio reveal different pressures on a military’s ability to keep fighting. Replacement rate asks whether production can match the weapons being consumed in the battlespace. Cost-to-kill ratio compares the price of a defensive weapon with the offensive threat it counters.

Recent conflicts have highlighted both measures, according to the article. If weapons are used faster than they are produced, a military’s available stock can decline during a prolonged fight. If a defensive weapon costs much more than the threat it defeats, repeated use can also place a greater financial burden on the defender. The article gives no specific ratios or examples of weapon prices.

Together, these measures help assess whether military operations can be sustained, not just started. Japan’s Defense Ministry emphasizes adequate production capacity in peacetime and rapid expansion during conflict. That focus reflects concern that a high-intensity war could last long enough for both replenishment speed and the cost of defense to shape a country’s staying power.

06

What have the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East shown about the duration and resource demands of modern warfare?

The article draws a clear lesson from Russia’s yearslong war against Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the Middle East: modern warfare can be prolonged, intense, and demanding of resources. This challenges expectations that a major conflict will necessarily be short and decisive.

That experience matters because long wars consume weapons over time. Military planners must consider whether production can replace equipment as it is used, and whether output can grow during fighting. The article says recent conflicts have highlighted replacement rates and the cost-to-kill ratio as important aspects of replenishment capability.

Some analysts now expect a potential conflict over Taiwan to unfold in similar ways, rather than as the quick, decisive campaign many experts had long assumed as their base case. The article presents this as an expectation, not a certainty. For Japan, the possibility of a drawn-out conflict helps explain why the Defense Ministry stresses maintaining production capacity in peacetime and being able to scale it up rapidly.

07

How do factories, skilled workers, materials, and financing turn defense spending into weapons that can be replenished?

Defense spending is not itself a weapon. In general, money supports the facilities, equipment, skilled workers, materials, and supplier networks needed to make weapons. Those inputs let firms produce equipment, while steady financing can help maintain output and prepare for higher demand. This is general context; the article does not list these specific inputs.

The article’s core mechanism is production capacity: output must be available in peacetime and able to rise rapidly during conflict. That capacity affects whether weapons can be replenished as forces consume them. The Defense Ministry says maintaining adequate production beforehand is important, and Japan plans a strategy likely to include subsidies for defense firms’ production capacity.

Japan’s 2027 fiscal year budget request calls domestic military production critical to deterrence. The article does not give factory counts, workforce figures, material plans, or production targets. Its broader point is that public and private investment in capacity can support sustained output, helping a state keep military operations supplied during a prolonged conflict.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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