Why is a South China Sea Code of Conduct still unfinished after decades of talks?
The South China Sea Code of Conduct is a proposed set of rules for managing tensions in a heavily disputed waterway. Its purpose is not to decide who owns islands or settle every overlapping claim. Instead, it is meant to provide rules that the parties can agree to follow. That matters because confrontations continue despite decades of efforts to establish a framework. The code was intended to follow an earlier, non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. That declaration was treated as an interim measure while ASEAN sought negotiations on a fuller code. The article describes repeated clashes between the Philippines and China, including dangerous manoeuvres, water cannon use and disrupted resupply missions alleged by Manila. The code remains unfinished. Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro said about 80 per cent of the negotiating text had been provisionally agreed, but there was no conclusion. Whether the final code would be legally binding is unresolved. Singapore is set to inherit the negotiations when it takes over ASEAN’s rotating chairmanship in 2027.
What is the South China Sea Code of Conduct meant to do?
The South China Sea Code of Conduct is a proposed set of rules for managing tensions in a heavily disputed waterway. Its purpose is not to decide who owns islands or settle every overlapping claim. Instead, it is meant to provide rules that the parties can agree to follow. That matters because confrontations continue despite decades of efforts to establish a framework.
The code was intended to follow an earlier, non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. That declaration was treated as an interim measure while ASEAN sought negotiations on a fuller code. The article describes repeated clashes between the Philippines and China, including dangerous manoeuvres, water cannon use and disrupted resupply missions alleged by Manila.
The code remains unfinished. Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro said about 80 per cent of the negotiating text had been provisionally agreed, but there was no conclusion. Whether the final code would be legally binding is unresolved. Singapore is set to inherit the negotiations when it takes over ASEAN’s rotating chairmanship in 2027.
How much of the negotiating text has been provisionally agreed, and what major issues are still unresolved?
About 80 per cent of the negotiating text had been provisionally agreed, according to Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro. That progress has not produced a finished agreement. The code is intended to set rules for managing tensions in the contested South China Sea, so unresolved details matter: they determine where the rules apply and what force they would have.
One major dispute is geographical scope. China does not want the Paracel Islands included, while Vietnam does. More broadly, accepting a boundary based on China’s claim could be interpreted by ASEAN countries as implicitly recognising that claim. Another key question is whether the code would be legally binding; Lazaro said that remains unresolved.
Lazaro said differing positions among ASEAN members and China, along with the time needed for negotiations, prevented finalisation this year. She said there was “no conclusion yet.” The Philippines had made a conclusion a priority during its ASEAN chairmanship, but Singapore will inherit the negotiations when it takes over the bloc’s rotating chairmanship in 2027.
Why are the code’s geographical scope, legal force and rules about provocative actions so difficult to agree on?
The code’s scope and legal force matter because they could affect how countries’ claims are treated. The parties have not agreed where the rules would apply. Dr Collin Koh said that accepting a geographical scope could amount to de facto recognition of other parties’ claims. ASEAN countries also have to consider whether accepting a boundary based on China’s claim could imply recognition of it.
The Paracel Islands show the problem clearly: China does not want them included in the code’s scope, while Vietnam does. On legal force, Lazaro identified whether the code would be legally binding as an unresolved question. A binding code would have a different force from the earlier non-binding declaration, but the article gives no agreed terms on this point.
The article also does not describe proposed rules for particular provocative actions. It does report a deepening trust deficit between the Philippines and China, alongside allegations of dangerous manoeuvres, water cannon use and disrupted resupply missions. Differing positions, competing claims and low trust help explain the difficulty; the specific action rules remain unspecified in the text.
Which countries are negotiating the code, and what role will Singapore take over in 2027?
The negotiations are between ASEAN and China. ASEAN is a regional bloc, and its member states have differing positions; the article does not name every country participating in the talks. Several Southeast Asian states have overlapping maritime claims with China, including the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei. Indonesia is described as a non-claimant state.
The Philippines made concluding the negotiations a priority during its ASEAN chairmanship. Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro said about 80 per cent of the text had been provisionally agreed, while also acknowledging that the talks had not concluded. The code’s scope and whether it would be legally binding remain among the difficult questions.
Singapore is set to take over ASEAN’s rotating chairmanship in 2027, and the long-delayed negotiations will pass to it then. This means Singapore will inherit the task of carrying the talks forward, not an already completed agreement. The article notes that differing views and the time needed for negotiations prevented finalisation during the Philippines’ chairmanship.
What was the earlier Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, and why was it treated as an interim step toward a code?
The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, or DOC, was a non-binding agreement that ASEAN settled for after negotiations on a code stalled. Its role was to provide an interim measure for managing conduct while work toward a fuller Code of Conduct continued. The distinction matters because the code was intended to establish rules the parties could agree to.
The background goes back to ASEAN efforts in 1995 to manage overlapping maritime disputes. Gregory Poling said ASEAN agreed internally on a draft in 1998 and presented it to China, but negotiations then hit a wall. ASEAN’s position, he explained, was that the DOC should immediately lead to code negotiations.
More than two decades later, the code remains unfinished and confrontations continue in the South China Sea. Lazaro reported that about 80 per cent of the text had been provisionally agreed, but no conclusion had been reached. The negotiations are due to pass to Singapore when it assumes ASEAN’s rotating chairmanship in 2027.
How might the absence of agreed rules affect efforts to manage confrontations in the South China Sea?
The code is intended to establish rules for managing tensions in the South China Sea. Its absence matters because confrontations have continued while negotiations have remained unfinished. The article describes repeated clashes between the Philippines and China, as well as overlapping claims involving other Southeast Asian countries and China.
For example, Manila has accused Beijing of aggressive actions inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, including dangerous manoeuvres, water cannon use and disrupting resupply missions. China, in turn, has accused the Philippines of intruding into territory it claims. Indonesia’s North Natuna waters have also seen clashes between its coast guard and Chinese fishing boats. These are the kinds of tensions the proposed rules are meant to manage.
The article does not establish that a completed code would change behaviour, nor does it specify how the absence of rules affects each incident. It does show that the current negotiations have not produced a concluded code. About 80 per cent of the text was provisionally agreed, and Singapore is due to inherit the talks in 2027.
What is an exclusive economic zone, and why can countries still disagree over who has rights in those waters?
An exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, is generally understood in maritime law as a sea area in which a coastal state has specified rights over natural resources. This definition is established world knowledge; the article itself does not define an EEZ. An EEZ is not the same thing as a country’s full territorial sovereignty over the water.
The article’s key point is that China’s expansive South China Sea claim overlaps with the EEZs of several Southeast Asian states. The Philippines has accused China of aggressive actions inside its EEZ, while China has accused the Philippines of intruding into territory Beijing claims. Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei also have overlapping claims with China.
These disagreements complicate a code because countries have not settled where its rules would apply. Koh said accepting a geographical scope could be seen as de facto recognition of another party’s claim. The article says the parties have not agreed on precise scope, and whether the code would be legally binding is also unresolved.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
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