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Defence & Security18 Nov 2026 · about 7 min

Police find 97 links between Morocco's security services and the networks behind the assault on Ceuta

The brief

Police said the 97 connections linked phone numbers that might belong to Moroccan security or intelligence personnel with digital groups involved in organizing the mass entry into Ceuta on July 30 and 31. The groups used social media, including WhatsApp, to generate and spread messages about entering Ceuta by sea or swimming. Investigators examined the contacts stored in phone books linked to monitored numbers. They focused on 19 WhatsApp administrators and 32 people described as group dynamizers. In some cases, contacts in those users’ address books had labels suggesting a security role, such as police or gendarme. The report describes these as connections that could indicate possible membership, not as definitive proof that every number belonged to a security official or that officials organized the event. Police also compared information with open sources, including a database linked to the hacktivist group Jabaroot, and said they found possible identities for 49 people.

01

What did Spanish police say the 97 connections linked together?

Police said the 97 connections linked phone numbers that might belong to Moroccan security or intelligence personnel with digital groups involved in organizing the mass entry into Ceuta on July 30 and 31. The groups used social media, including WhatsApp, to generate and spread messages about entering Ceuta by sea or swimming.

Investigators examined the contacts stored in phone books linked to monitored numbers. They focused on 19 WhatsApp administrators and 32 people described as group dynamizers. In some cases, contacts in those users’ address books had labels suggesting a security role, such as police or gendarme.

The report describes these as connections that could indicate possible membership, not as definitive proof that every number belonged to a security official or that officials organized the event. Police also compared information with open sources, including a database linked to the hacktivist group Jabaroot, and said they found possible identities for 49 people.

02

How many connections did police report, and how many possible identities did they say they found?

The report describes 97 connections between monitored WhatsApp group users’ contacts and phone numbers that might belong to members of Moroccan security or intelligence structures. The number counts possible links, not confirmed individuals or proven coordination. Police sent the findings to Spain’s Audiencia Nacional.

To build the count, investigators examined contact lists associated with 19 group administrators and 32 dynamizers. They found numbers in those address books with labels that suggested a connection to security bodies, including terms such as police or gendarme. Police then checked information against open sources, including the Jabaroot database.

The report says this work produced information about the possible personal identities of 49 members of Moroccan security or intelligence structures. It does not say that all 97 numbers were identified, or that all 49 identities were conclusively verified. The figures therefore describe investigative leads and possible matches, rather than final proof of who was involved.

03

What evidence did investigators use to identify possible links to Moroccan security services?

Investigators examined contact information stored in phone books linked to monitored phone numbers, including phone numbers and email addresses. They focused on contacts associated with 19 WhatsApp administrators and 32 dynamizers from groups involved in promoting the entry into Ceuta.

A key clue was how some contacts were named in those address books. Labels containing words such as police or gendarme suggested possible ties to Moroccan security structures. Investigators also looked at indirect links, including cases where a third person’s contact list connected people who did not have each other saved directly.

To try to identify the people behind the numbers, police compared the data with open sources, including the Jabaroot group’s database. The report says possible identity information was found in 49 cases. These methods generated leads, but the article does not describe them as conclusive proof of every person’s identity or institutional role.

04

What is a “profile of enlace” or link profile, and how can it connect people who do not have each other in their contacts?

The report uses the term profile of enlace for a person who acts as a bridge between two others. The two people may not have each other stored directly in their phone contacts, but both can be connected through the third person’s address book or contact network.

For example, investigators crossed the contacts of WhatsApp group dynamizers with those of intermediary profiles. They said that contacts linked through this process included people identified as members of Moroccan security structures. The report includes photographs of many people identified in this cross-check, though it does not establish that every intermediary held an official role.

Police said intermediaries might make it harder to trace direct links between investigated phones and institutional or security-linked profiles. They also suggested that this arrangement could help obscure who was responsible. The report does not rule out that some of the intermediaries themselves belonged to Moroccan security services, but presents this as a possibility, not a confirmed finding.

05

Why can indirect contacts and intermediaries make it harder to identify who organized an event?

Indirect contacts can make an online network harder to interpret because a phone book may show a chain of connections rather than a direct relationship. If two people do not have each other saved, a third person can still link their contact records. That makes it less obvious who communicated with whom or how closely.

In this investigation, police described link profiles that appeared between group dynamizers and people whose contacts suggested ties to Moroccan security bodies. The report says investigators found such patterns while crossing contact lists. It also notes that labels such as police or gendarme were among the clues used to identify possible institutional links.

Police proposed that intermediaries might act as a screen, making links to security structures harder to trace and helping create diffuse authorship. They did not present that explanation as proven. The report also says investigators cannot rule out that some intermediary profiles themselves belonged to security services, leaving their precise roles unresolved.

06

What are Morocco’s DGSN, DGST, and Royal Gendarmerie, and what kinds of security work do they do?

The article identifies the DGSN as Morocco’s General Directorate of National Security and the DGST as its General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance. It also mentions units of the Royal Gendarmerie. The report says its monitoring brought together officials or contacts from several security and intelligence structures, rather than one police body alone.

The article does not explain each agency’s full remit. In standard usage, the DGSN is Morocco’s national police service, responsible for general public policing and security. The DGST is a domestic intelligence and security service. The Royal Gendarmerie performs policing and security duties, including in areas and contexts outside the ordinary urban police role. These descriptions are general background, not findings in the report.

The report also mentions palace security personnel, coordination rooms, and traffic units, as well as central and territorial DGST offices. It does not specify what each unit did in relation to the Ceuta groups. The reported links therefore span different kinds of security bodies, but do not by themselves establish institutional direction or involvement.

07

In a digital investigation, what does attribution mean, and why is it difficult to prove who is behind a network of online accounts and contacts?

In a digital investigation, attribution is the process of connecting online activity to a person, group, or institution. It matters because a phone number, account, or contact link is not automatically proof of who used it or who directed an event. Investigators need to distinguish a lead from a confirmed identity or role.

The Ceuta report illustrates the challenge: police traced contacts associated with WhatsApp administrators and dynamizers, then looked for links to possible Moroccan security personnel. They also examined link profiles, where a third party might connect two people who did not have each other in their address books. Labels and open-source records helped generate possible matches.

The report describes 97 connections and possible identity information in 49 cases, but it does not establish that every connection proves coordination or responsibility. Indirect contact chains, uncertain phone ownership, and incomplete identity matches can leave competing explanations. Attribution therefore depends on corroborating evidence; the article presents the findings as investigative possibilities rather than final proof.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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