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International Relations18 Nov 2026 · about 7 min

Positive economic statecraft in a fractured world: Development finance and cooperation as geoeconomic instruments—ASEAN in focus

The brief

Positive economic statecraft (PES) is the deliberate use of economic benefits to shape sovereign behavior and align interests. It matters because governments can be encouraged through cooperation and incentives, rather than pressured through coercion. The framework connects development finance with countries’ strategic goals. Its tools include grants, concessional finance, preferential trade, guarantees, budget support, project finance, and technical assistance. For example, a donor could offer a grant or favorable trade access as an inducement. These tools are meant to make cooperation attractive and help align the interests of the parties involved. The Atlantic Council introduced its PES framework in 2023, but the global landscape has since changed. Aid is contracting, debt distress limits what some governments can absorb, and more actors now provide development finance. The article suggests PES could help sustain support for development by connecting it with economic security priorities, without abandoning development objectives.

01

What is positive economic statecraft, and what kinds of financial or trade incentives does it use?

Positive economic statecraft (PES) is the deliberate use of economic benefits to shape sovereign behavior and align interests. It matters because governments can be encouraged through cooperation and incentives, rather than pressured through coercion. The framework connects development finance with countries’ strategic goals.

Its tools include grants, concessional finance, preferential trade, guarantees, budget support, project finance, and technical assistance. For example, a donor could offer a grant or favorable trade access as an inducement. These tools are meant to make cooperation attractive and help align the interests of the parties involved.

The Atlantic Council introduced its PES framework in 2023, but the global landscape has since changed. Aid is contracting, debt distress limits what some governments can absorb, and more actors now provide development finance. The article suggests PES could help sustain support for development by connecting it with economic security priorities, without abandoning development objectives.

02

Why are the 2026 IMF–World Bank meetings in Bangkok especially relevant to understanding ASEAN’s role?

The 2026 IMF–World Bank annual meetings are especially relevant because they take place in Bangkok, Thailand, for the first time in thirty-five years. The IMF has framed the gathering as recognition of the region’s central role in global economic and financial stability. That makes the meetings a timely setting to examine development finance and cooperation in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN provides a useful lens on positive economic statecraft. The region is a target of deliberate US and European economic statecraft, while also developing its own multidirectional approach. The article points to ASEAN’s emerging free trade agreements as one example of its own statecraft. In the region, development finance, geopolitical competition, and industrial policy visibly intersect.

These circumstances reveal both the potential and limits of using incentives in development cooperation. The meetings take place amid contracting aid, debt pressures, and a wider set of development finance actors. For PES, ASEAN shows why approaches must account for local agency as well as outside influence, while connecting economic security priorities with development objectives.

03

How much did official development assistance fall in 2025?

Official development assistance fell 23 percent in 2025. The article describes this as the steepest decline on record, making the scale of the drop especially striking. ODA is part of the wider development finance landscape discussed in the article, where shrinking aid budgets complicate efforts to sustain cooperation.

The decline forms part of a broader shift in the conditions for positive economic statecraft. The framework uses tools such as grants, concessional finance, guarantees, preferential trade, and technical assistance to encourage governments to align interests. But aid is contracting as geopolitical tensions reshape the world order, and debt distress limits what some recipient governments can absorb.

The article does not give a dollar amount for the decline or a breakdown by donor. It does argue that PES may offer development cooperation a narrative tied to economic security priorities without abandoning development goals. The Bangkok meetings and ASEAN’s experience provide a lens for considering that approach amid a more fragmented field of finance actors.

04

How can grants, loans, trade preferences, or technical assistance encourage governments to change their behavior without using coercion?

Positive economic statecraft works through inducements. Instead of coercing a government, it offers economic benefits that can make cooperation more attractive and align interests. The article describes this as a deliberate effort to shape sovereign behavior through economic tools, linking development finance with geoeconomic aims.

The tools can include grants, concessional finance, preferential trade, guarantees, budget support, project finance, and technical assistance. For instance, a government might be offered access to preferential trade or a grant as part of a cooperative relationship. The key mechanism is the incentive itself: a benefit is offered to encourage alignment, rather than a threat being used to force a choice.

The article does not provide a specific country deal or spell out conditions attached to individual incentives. It says the PES framework launched in 2023 and that its setting has since changed. Aid cuts, debt distress, geopolitical tension, and new finance actors all affect how much governments can respond to these offers.

05

What happens to countries’ ability to use development finance when they are already struggling with debt?

The article says debt distress across the Global South limits what recipient governments can absorb. This matters for positive economic statecraft because PES depends on governments being able to respond to economic inducements. When debt pressures restrict that capacity, development finance may not translate easily into the intended cooperation or alignment.

PES can involve grants, concessional finance, guarantees, project finance, and budget support, alongside trade preferences and technical assistance. The article does not quantify how debt distress affects individual countries or distinguish the effects of different tools. It does identify debt pressures as a constraint on recipient governments’ ability to respond to offers.

Debt is one of several changes shaping the current landscape: ODA fell 23 percent in 2025, and development finance now comes from actors beyond traditional Western donors. These conditions sharpen the limits of PES as a development cooperation approach. The article argues that PES may still connect development aims with economic security priorities, but countries’ capacity to absorb inducements remains an important constraint.

06

How is ASEAN both a target of outside economic statecraft and a practitioner of its own, including through trade agreements?

ASEAN occupies a dual role in the article’s account of positive economic statecraft. The region is a target of deliberate economic statecraft by the United States and Europe, but it also practices an increasingly sophisticated and multidirectional approach of its own. This makes ASEAN useful for examining how development finance and geoeconomic competition intersect.

The article names ASEAN’s emerging free trade agreements as an example of its own statecraft. Trade agreements can be instruments of economic statecraft because they structure preferential trade relationships. The source does not name a specific agreement or detail its terms, so it does not support claims about particular partners or outcomes.

The region’s role is especially relevant as the IMF and World Bank hold their 2026 annual meetings in Bangkok. The article says development finance, geoeconomic competition, and industrial policy visibly intersect in ASEAN. This case highlights both the potential and the limits of PES, especially as aid contracts and finance actors extend beyond traditional Western donors.

07

What does geoeconomics mean, and how can countries use economic relationships to pursue strategic goals?

The article discusses geoeconomic competition but does not define geoeconomics. In established usage, the term means using economic tools and relationships to pursue strategic goals. These can include trade, finance, and investment ties. This definition draws on general knowledge beyond the article, which focuses on how development finance and economic cooperation can serve strategic purposes.

The article’s positive economic statecraft framework provides a related example. It describes grants, concessional finance, preferential trade, guarantees, and technical assistance as inducements that can shape sovereign behavior and align interests. A country or group can use these economic relationships to make cooperation attractive, rather than relying on coercion. ASEAN’s emerging free trade agreements illustrate its own role in economic statecraft.

The framework is being considered in a more fractured world, with geopolitical tensions, debt distress, declining aid, and more development finance actors. The article argues that PES may connect development cooperation to economic security priorities while retaining development objectives. It also cautions that ASEAN’s experience shows both the potential and limits of this approach.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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