Back to 1997: Russia wants NATO to roll back its eastern expansion
Russia’s reference to 1997 means the NATO alliance as it stood before its first eastward expansion. NATO had 16 members then. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary had been invited to join, but did not formally become members until 1999. The reported Russian document, dated November 10, calls for NATO to withdraw troops and bases from countries that joined after 1997. It also demands an end to Western arms deliveries to Ukraine. The report does not describe an explicit demand for Central and Eastern European countries to leave NATO; instead, Russia wants the alliance to end its military presence there. That distinction matters because membership and military deployment are not the same thing. NATO has since grown to 32 members, including countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe and, most recently, Scandinavia. Russia’s proposal would seek a major change to how the alliance operates across that expanded territory, even without formally removing those countries from NATO.
What does Russia mean by asking NATO to “roll back to 1997”?
Russia’s reference to 1997 means the NATO alliance as it stood before its first eastward expansion. NATO had 16 members then. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary had been invited to join, but did not formally become members until 1999.
The reported Russian document, dated November 10, calls for NATO to withdraw troops and bases from countries that joined after 1997. It also demands an end to Western arms deliveries to Ukraine. The report does not describe an explicit demand for Central and Eastern European countries to leave NATO; instead, Russia wants the alliance to end its military presence there.
That distinction matters because membership and military deployment are not the same thing. NATO has since grown to 32 members, including countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe and, most recently, Scandinavia. Russia’s proposal would seek a major change to how the alliance operates across that expanded territory, even without formally removing those countries from NATO.
How much has NATO grown since 1997, when it had 16 members, compared with its 32 members today?
NATO had 16 member states in 1997 and has 32 today. That means the alliance has doubled in size, adding a net 16 members. The growth is central to Russia’s reported demand to return NATO’s military presence to where it was before the first eastward expansion.
The expansion began after 1997. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary had already been invited to join, but became members two years later. More countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe joined in the following years. Countries in Scandinavia joined most recently, according to the article.
The figures describe membership, not necessarily the location of every NATO troop or base. Russia’s reported proposal calls for the alliance to withdraw its military presence from states that joined after 1997, rather than explicitly demanding those states leave. The article says NATO now has members across Europe and North America, so the proposed rollback would affect a much larger alliance than the one that existed in 1997.
What defenses and military activities in NATO’s eastern member states could be affected by a withdrawal?
A NATO withdrawal from member states that joined after 1997 would significantly weaken their defense capabilities, the article says. It could affect both ongoing missions and planned deployments along the alliance’s eastern flank. The issue is not only whether a country remains a member, but also whether allied forces and facilities stay there.
Since 2004, NATO allies, including Germany, have taken turns policing the airspace over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltic states do not have their own fighter jets for independent air policing, so NATO provides that capability. A German Lithuania Brigade expected to be fully operational by the end of 2027 would also have to be halted under the reported demand.
Romania’s Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base near Constanța is being expanded. Once complete, it is set to become Europe’s largest NATO air base by area, even larger than Ramstein. The article also notes that a withdrawal could make defense harder and reduce the deterrent effect of allied forces already in place.
Why might Article 5’s promise of mutual defense not be enough to deter an attack without troops and equipment already in place?
Article 5 commits NATO members to come to the aid of an ally that suffers an armed attack. But each member decides for itself what measures it considers necessary, and those measures may include military force. The promise is important, but it does not by itself put troops or equipment in a threatened area.
The article says deterrence depends on a potential aggressor believing NATO can intervene militarily quickly and effectively during a crisis. Allied troops already deployed along the eastern flank help demonstrate that capability. Their presence can make a response appear more immediate than a promise that requires forces to be sent later.
If those forces and bases were withdrawn, defending the eastern members would become more difficult. Russia could then believe that attacking NATO territory would involve fewer risks. Article 5 would still be the mutual-defense commitment described in the article, but its deterrent effect could be weakened if an adversary doubts how quickly and effectively the alliance could act.
Under European agreements and NATO’s open-door policy, who decides which alliances a country can join?
Under the European security framework described in the article, each country is free to decide which alliances it wishes to join. That principle means a country’s choice is not meant to be dictated by another state. It is directly relevant to Russia’s reported demand for NATO to withdraw its military presence from later-joining members.
NATO points to Article 10 of its founding treaty, which enshrines an open-door policy for European countries. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act also explicitly said that neither side had the right to veto the other’s decisions. Earlier, in November 1990, CSCE participating states, including the Soviet Union, agreed to respect each country’s freedom to choose its security arrangements.
The article reports that Poland’s prime minister rejected new security rules imposed over Poland and Europe’s heads. Bulgaria’s counterpart called withdrawal unthinkable and unrealistic, while Estonia’s prime minister said Russia had no role in changes to Europe’s security order. These statements reflect opposition to external pressure over alliance choices.
Did Western leaders make a legally binding promise that NATO would never expand eastward?
The article distinguishes remarks made during negotiations from a formal agreement. During talks surrounding German reunification, US Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher used language that suggested limits on NATO’s eastward expansion. But those remarks were part of discussions about unified Germany’s NATO membership and possible deployments in the former East Germany.
The article says no written, legally binding general promise was ever agreed that NATO would never expand to include other former Warsaw Pact countries. In other words, the reported language does not amount to a general commitment covering every future expansion. The article also notes that the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act said neither side had the right to veto the other’s decisions.
The issue matters because Russia now reportedly wants NATO to move its troops and bases back to the alliance’s 1997 position. The article describes European agreements affirming each country’s freedom to choose its security arrangements. It does not say that those agreements created a promise to freeze NATO’s membership at its 1997 size.
What makes deterrence credible: how do military capability, response speed, and the risks of attack shape an adversary’s choices?
Deterrence aims to shape an adversary’s decision before an attack happens. According to the article, a potential aggressor must believe NATO can intervene militarily quickly and effectively in a crisis. A mutual-defense promise may be less convincing if the alliance appears unable to act promptly or defend the territory at risk.
Allied troops deployed along NATO’s eastern flank serve this purpose. The article gives the Baltic air-policing mission as an example: since 2004, NATO allies have taken turns protecting the airspace over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which lack fighter jets for independent air policing. The planned German Lithuania Brigade is another example of a presence meant to support defense.
If troops and bases were withdrawn, defense would become more difficult. The article warns that Russia could believe an attack on NATO territory would involve fewer risks. The forward presence therefore matters not only for capability and speed, but also for the signal it sends about the costs an attacker might face.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
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