JupiteX Get the app
Economy & Business18 Nov 2026 · about 7 min

How crony capitalism keeps Nepalis poor

The brief

Crony capitalism is a market economy where success depends on connections more than contribution. Politicians may give connected businesses licences, contracts, cheap loans or protection. It matters because firms can earn advantages without being the most skilled or productive, while competitors and the public lose out. In Nepal, business associations can act as cartels that block new firms. Public transport committees once decided which buses could use particular routes, and newcomers had to join a committee to enter. Such barriers limit competition and give insiders control over access. The article describes the wider result as resources going to well-connected firms instead of the most productive ones. Nepal scores 34 out of 100 on Transparency International’s index, and about one in five Nepalis lives below the national poverty line. The article estimates that much less cronyism could mean substantially higher incomes, though it presents that estimate as rough.

01

What does crony capitalism mean, and how is it different from success based on competition and skill?

Crony capitalism is a market economy where success depends on connections more than contribution. Politicians may give connected businesses licences, contracts, cheap loans or protection. It matters because firms can earn advantages without being the most skilled or productive, while competitors and the public lose out.

In Nepal, business associations can act as cartels that block new firms. Public transport committees once decided which buses could use particular routes, and newcomers had to join a committee to enter. Such barriers limit competition and give insiders control over access.

The article describes the wider result as resources going to well-connected firms instead of the most productive ones. Nepal scores 34 out of 100 on Transparency International’s index, and about one in five Nepalis lives below the national poverty line. The article estimates that much less cronyism could mean substantially higher incomes, though it presents that estimate as rough.

02

How do political connections help Nepali businesses get licences, contracts, loans, or protection?

Political connections can open doors that are closed to other businesses. The article says politicians hand out licences, contracts, cheap loans and protection to connected firms. These advantages can secure access to markets, public work or credit without firms having to win solely through price or performance.

The exchange benefits both sides. Business owners fund parties and election campaigns, while politicians provide favours. In public transport, bus committees long decided who could operate on each route. Newcomers had to join a committee to get in, making access depend on insider approval rather than open competition.

Nepal’s competition law dates from 2007, but the board created to enforce it stayed inactive for almost a decade. Business associations often act as cartels and syndicates that block new entrants. When political ties steer licences and contracts toward connected firms, productive competitors can be shut out and resources may be used less effectively.

03

How much higher might Nepal’s income per person be today if cronyism had been much lower?

The article estimates that Nepal’s per capita income could be about $2,200 to $2,600 today if cronyism had been much lower. It gives current per capita income as about $1,536. That implies an increase of roughly 40 to 70 percent, not a precise prediction.

The estimate builds on research linking cleaner government with more investment and faster growth. One cross-country study found that reducing corruption to a moderately honest level raises investment by almost five percentage points of GDP and annual growth by more than half a percentage point. The article adds losses from cartels, misdirected credit and stolen public funds, while noting some effects overlap.

It says an extra 1 to 1.5 percentage points of yearly growth is plausible. Compounded over the 35 years since 1990, that could lift incomes substantially. The estimate is rough, but even its low end would mean a much richer country and, the article argues, fewer people in poverty and less pressure for young people to seek work abroad.

04

What happens to productivity when credit and contracts go to connected firms instead of the most productive ones?

Productivity is lower when money, contracts and licences go to firms because of connections rather than because they can use resources best. Less productive firms then control resources that could produce more in stronger businesses. That means the economy gets less output from its available workers, capital and materials.

The article points to studies showing that moving resources to the best firms in China and India could raise factory productivity by 30 to 60 percent. Nepal likely pays a similar price in lost output each year. The mechanism is misallocation: connected firms receive credit and contracts, while more productive firms may not get the resources they need to expand.

This is not just a loss for individual competitors. Lower output means fewer opportunities to create good jobs and build businesses at home. The article links scarce domestic jobs to young Nepalis leaving for work abroad; in 2024-25, the government issued 839,266 labour permits, including renewals. It does not provide a precise productivity figure for Nepal itself.

05

How can cronyism contribute to poverty, higher prices, weaker public services, and young people leaving Nepal for work?

Cronyism can deepen poverty by sending credit, contracts and licences to connected firms instead of productive ones. It can also close doors to honest entrepreneurs and leave good jobs scarce. The article says about one in five Nepalis lives below the national poverty line, while ordinary people pay higher prices for transport, fuel, housing and basic goods.

The harm also reaches public services. When money meant for the public is diverted or poorly delivered, schools, clinics and safety nets can weaken. The article gives examples from other countries: Ugandan schools once received only 13 percent of a central grant, and at least 18 percent of Indonesia’s subsidised rice went missing. It also warns that ignored building rules can make earthquakes deadlier.

With few good jobs at home, many young Nepalis leave for work abroad. The government issued 839,266 labour permits in 2024-25, including renewals, and remittances now equal well over a quarter of GDP. Families survive, but the article says the home economy does not build new firms or skills.

06

How do political parties and business owners each benefit from keeping this system in place?

The system is a two-way exchange. Political parties need money to fight elections, while business owners seek licences, contracts, cheap loans and protection. Connections can help firms secure these advantages, and campaign funding helps parties compete for power.

The article describes this as a cycle: business owners fund parties and campaigns, and politicians hand out favours. Many large Nepali business houses grow through political ties. The result is that firms can receive scarce opportunities because of their relationships, rather than because they are the most productive. Competitors can be shut out, especially where associations or syndicates block new entrants.

The arrangement can benefit insiders while imposing costs on the wider public, through higher prices, weaker competition and resources flowing to less productive firms. The article says youth-led protests against corruption in September 2025 left at least 77 people dead and brought down the government. In March 2026, voters gave a new party 182 of 275 seats, in a sign of public frustration with the rigged game.

07

What are economic rents, and why can controlling scarce access create income without creating new value?

Economic rents are extra income someone receives because they control something scarce, rather than because they work harder, create something new or add value. Scarcity can be natural, but the article stresses that political favours can create it artificially. A licence, exclusive access or regulatory privilege can become a valuable advantage when others are prevented from competing.

For example, a politically connected firm might receive a licence or protection that limits entry by rivals. It can then earn income from its privileged position, rather than from producing more efficiently or offering a better service. The article describes this kind of advantage as a rent, and says politicians and regulators may end up serving the firms they are meant to police.

In Nepal, cartels and syndicates can block new entrants, and bus committees once controlled access to routes. This restricts competition and helps insiders hold scarce opportunities. The broader cost is that credit, contracts and licences may go to connected firms instead of productive ones, reducing output and opportunities across the economy.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

Read more in the JupiteX app

Pulse is free. New stories every 4 hours, each one broken into the questions that explain it.

Or read more news on the web