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Defence & Security18 Nov 2026 · about 6 min

How the Houthis fund war effort and tighten grip on Yemen

The brief

The Houthis fund their war effort through a mix of public revenue, contributions, and oil sales. Their sources include taxes, customs duties, religious zakat levies, extra fees, and income linked to fuel and telecommunications. These streams matter because they help sustain military operations and strengthen Houthi control in areas they govern. Residents are asked to contribute through phone messages, envelopes, and public rallies. Some give small amounts of cash; others donate rifles, pistols, or traditional daggers. A Houthi financial system also draws revenue from imported oil, including shipments the US Treasury said Iran sold or provided to the group through affiliated companies. The scale is substantial: a US Treasury estimate put annual proceeds from illicit oil sales above $2bn. Separately, a research report estimated the wider Houthi financial system’s resources and costs at about $2.5bn a year. These funding streams support forces and recruitment while poverty deepens and public services deteriorate.

01

What sources of money and goods do the Houthis use to fund their war effort?

The Houthis fund their war effort through a mix of public revenue, contributions, and oil sales. Their sources include taxes, customs duties, religious zakat levies, extra fees, and income linked to fuel and telecommunications. These streams matter because they help sustain military operations and strengthen Houthi control in areas they govern.

Residents are asked to contribute through phone messages, envelopes, and public rallies. Some give small amounts of cash; others donate rifles, pistols, or traditional daggers. A Houthi financial system also draws revenue from imported oil, including shipments the US Treasury said Iran sold or provided to the group through affiliated companies.

The scale is substantial: a US Treasury estimate put annual proceeds from illicit oil sales above $2bn. Separately, a research report estimated the wider Houthi financial system’s resources and costs at about $2.5bn a year. These funding streams support forces and recruitment while poverty deepens and public services deteriorate.

02

How much revenue does the Houthi financial system generate, and how much is directed to security and the military?

The article gives two related but distinct measures. A Mokha Center for Strategic Studies report estimated the Houthi financial system generates direct and indirect financial resources and costs worth approximately $2.5bn annually. A separate paper from the same institution estimated that nearly 60 percent of revenues collected in Houthi-controlled areas are directed to security and military sectors.

The report listed about $800m from taxes and customs, $600m from additional fees and levies, $300m from cash and in-kind war contributions, and around $100m linked to mobilisation events. These listed categories are not presented as a complete breakdown of the $2.5bn total, so they should not be treated as the whole system’s income.

The figures show how much economic activity is tied to funding the group and its forces. The article also cites a US Treasury estimate of over $2bn annually from illicit oil sales. Taken together, the estimates describe large funding streams, while the article warns of deepening poverty and deteriorating public services.

03

How do small donations, public rallies, and oil sales bring money or supplies to the Houthis?

Small donations, public rallies, and oil sales provide the Houthis with money or material for their war effort. These methods range from individual contributions to revenue from imported oil. They matter because funds and supplies help keep fighters equipped while the conflict continues.

Sanaa resident Ali Naji said people receive phone messages asking for contributions to missile and drone forces; some reportedly give as little as 100 Yemeni riyals. Envelopes are also handed out to solicit donations. At rallies, people give cash or items such as rifles, pistols, and jambiyas. The article says millions of riyals can be raised at one rally. Separately, the US Treasury said Iranian oil shipments enabled illicit sales that generated over $2bn annually.

These mechanisms combine many small gifts with larger commercial revenue. They also show that contributions can include goods, not only money. The article does not quantify how much rally donations or individual gifts raise overall, but it describes them as part of a broader funding system supporting the war effort.

04

How does control over import permits, fees, fuel, and foreign currency give the Houthis leverage over businesses?

Control over permits, fees, and foreign currency gives Houthi authorities influence over whether businesses can import goods and operate. The article says this control gives them considerable leverage over traders and companies. Fuel and telecommunications are also identified as income sources, alongside taxes, customs duties, zakat, and additional levies.

Yazeed Al-Jeddawy, a research manager at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, explained that authorities control import permits, set fees, and influence access to foreign currency. This can make businesses dependent on decisions by the authorities for key parts of their work. The article does not give individual examples of a business being blocked or charged, but it describes the broader system of economic control.

Al-Jeddawy said these resources sustain the security apparatus and patronage networks through which the movement enforces compliance and consolidates authority. As a result, economic controls are not just a way to raise money; they can also help strengthen political and security influence. The article presents this as part of a self-reinforcing system.

05

How can poverty, unemployment, and unpaid salaries make joining Houthi forces more attractive to young men?

Poverty and fewer ways to earn a living can make military recruitment more attractive. The article says employment opportunities are shrinking and public-sector salaries are unpaid. For some young men, joining Houthi forces has become one of the few available sources of income. This helps explain how economic hardship can support recruitment during the war.

Yazeed Al-Jeddawy, a research manager at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, described the recruitment link. He said the Houthi financial system supports recruitment amid shrinking employment and unpaid state-sector salaries. The article also states that recruitment is accompanied by ideological indoctrination. It does not give specific pay rates or say how many recruits join because of financial need.

The article connects recruitment to a wider system in which economic control finances coercion, and coercion enables further economic control. As long as jobs remain scarce and salaries go unpaid, military service may continue to offer income to some young men. The article does not forecast recruitment levels, but it describes the economic pressures that can sustain it.

06

What costs do civilians face when money and resources are directed toward the military rather than public services?

Civilians face worsening hardship as the war economy grows. The article’s opening summary says poverty is deepening and public services are deteriorating. It also cites a research paper estimating that nearly 60 percent of revenues collected in Houthi-controlled areas go to security and military sectors. This gives a picture of resources being heavily directed toward the conflict and security apparatus.

The article describes taxes, customs, extra levies, and public contributions as parts of the Houthi funding system. A research report estimated its direct and indirect resources and costs at about $2.5bn a year. The article does not itemise which services are deteriorating, explain specific budget cuts, or measure the exact civilian cost of military spending.

Still, the reported combination matters: a large share of collected revenue supports security and military sectors while poverty deepens and public services deteriorate. The article also says shrinking job opportunities and unpaid public-sector salaries contribute to recruitment. It does not quantify how these conditions may change, but it portrays civilians as bearing hardship alongside the prolonged war.

07

What is a war economy, and how can control of everyday economic activity help an armed group sustain a conflict?

In general use, a war economy is an economic system in which money, goods, and work are organised or redirected to support a conflict. The article’s example is the Houthi financial system in Yemen. It matters because control of ordinary economic activity can provide armed forces with funding and supplies while extending an organisation’s authority.

The article describes taxes, customs, levies, oil sales, donations, and control over import permits and foreign currency. Residents contribute cash or weapons at rallies, while the Houthis’ control over fees and access to currency gives them leverage over businesses. Al-Jeddawy summarised the mechanism as economic control financing coercion, which then enables further economic control.

A research report estimated the system’s annual resources and costs at about $2.5bn, and another paper put the share of collected revenue directed to security and military sectors at nearly 60 percent. The article says poverty deepens and services deteriorate. It portrays this economic grip as helping sustain the war and consolidate Houthi authority.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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