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Defence & Security19 Nov 2026 · about 6 min

Russia’s new low-cost munitions pose a fresh threat to Ukraine

The brief

These names refer to a new generation of Russian weapons, including the Dan-T, Filin and Banderol. The article says they are difficult to classify: they do not fit neatly into the established categories of missiles, drones or loitering munitions. Some observers therefore call them quasi-cruise missiles. The Banderol shows why the label is useful. It looks like a cruise missile, but is described as neither a conventional drone nor a missile. It has a shorter range than the Kh-101 and uses cheaper components, including a motor designed for model aircraft. Its combination of speed and relatively low cost sets it apart from more expensive weapons. The term is a description, not a precise technical category in the article. The weapons are designed to strike deep into Ukraine and challenge air defences built to intercept slower drones. The article identifies them as part of Russia’s effort to produce more weapons for strikes on cities and infrastructure.

01

What are the Dan-T, Filin and Banderol, and why are some of these weapons called quasi-cruise missiles?

These names refer to a new generation of Russian weapons, including the Dan-T, Filin and Banderol. The article says they are difficult to classify: they do not fit neatly into the established categories of missiles, drones or loitering munitions. Some observers therefore call them quasi-cruise missiles.

The Banderol shows why the label is useful. It looks like a cruise missile, but is described as neither a conventional drone nor a missile. It has a shorter range than the Kh-101 and uses cheaper components, including a motor designed for model aircraft. Its combination of speed and relatively low cost sets it apart from more expensive weapons.

The term is a description, not a precise technical category in the article. The weapons are designed to strike deep into Ukraine and challenge air defences built to intercept slower drones. The article identifies them as part of Russia’s effort to produce more weapons for strikes on cities and infrastructure.

02

What makes these weapons harder for Ukraine to intercept than slower Shahed drones?

Speed is the main difference highlighted in the article. Ukrainian air defences are used to counter waves of Shahed drones flying at about 150 km/h. The Banderol and Dan-T, by contrast, are described as small missiles flying at more than 400 km/h. That gives defenders less time to respond and makes current interceptor drones less suited to stopping them.

The article also describes a difficult numbers problem. Kateryna Bondar says Ukraine may need to use three interceptor drones to bring down one Russian-launched drone. Russian weapons arriving together can therefore stretch the effort to protect cities. The new weapons add another challenge because they are faster than the targets those interceptors are used to engage.

Their low production cost matters too: Russia can make them in large numbers, while Ukraine’s interceptors cost more. The article says Ukraine cannot intercept these new weapons with the interceptor drones it currently uses. It does not give a complete account of how every Ukrainian air-defence system performs against them.

03

How do the Banderol’s estimated cost and range compare with those of the Kh-101 cruise missile?

The Banderol trades range and capability for a much lower estimated price. The article puts its range at 500 kilometres, compared with up to 2,500 kilometres for the Kh-101 cruise missile. In other words, the Banderol’s stated range is one-fifth of the Kh-101’s maximum range.

The price gap is just as striking. A Kh-101 can cost up to $2 million, while the Banderol is thought to cost between $50,000 and $100,000. The article links the lower price to cheaper construction, including civilian components. Its motor was designed for model aircraft and is sold online.

The Banderol is not superior to the Kh-101 in most respects, according to the article. Its advantage is cost. That makes it a different kind of threat: Russia can use a shorter-range weapon that is far cheaper to produce, while Ukraine must consider the resources needed to intercept incoming weapons. The article gives estimates, not confirmed purchase prices.

04

What can happen when low-cost weapons are launched in large numbers against cities and infrastructure?

Low-cost weapons can make repeated strikes more sustainable for the attacker, while forcing defenders to spend resources intercepting them. The article says Russia is increasing production of weapons capable of striking Ukraine’s rear areas, including cities and infrastructure. It also reports that Ukraine may need three interceptor drones to shoot down one Russian-launched drone.

A concrete example came in Kharkiv. An explosion hit an apartment building at 7am on August 9, injuring 16 people. Investigators from the city’s public prosecutor and the NGO Airwars identified the weapon as a Banderol, which they said differed from weapons usually deployed.

The article does not claim that every large-scale launch will cause a particular amount of damage. It does explain why protecting every target is difficult: Russian weapons converge on cities daily, and the new, fast, cheap munitions add pressure on air defences. Their ability to be mass-produced could sustain that challenge.

05

How can the Banderol navigate when satellite signals are being jammed?

The Banderol relies on satellite signals to check its position, but those signals can be jammed. To keep navigating in that situation, it carries a Kometa antenna. The article says the antenna has patches that help it distinguish real signals from jammed waves.

Kateryna Bondar explains that the antenna’s patches pick up signals sent by satellites. More patches make it easier for the weapon to receive a signal despite jamming. Early Russian antennas had four patches and were less effective; some newer models can have up to 30.

This feature does not mean the weapon is immune to interference. The article describes it as a way to counter attempts to jam navigation signals. Ukrainian forces often jam the airwaves to prevent drones from navigating, so the antenna is one design response to that defence. The article gives no further detail about how reliably it works in different conditions.

06

How do civilian parts and different launch methods help Russia produce and deploy these weapons?

The article explains one way civilian parts can reduce production costs. The Banderol’s motor was originally designed to power model aircraft, is produced by the Chinese company Swiwin and can be bought on e-commerce sites. Its manufacturer, Russia’s Kronshtadt, uses civilian components to make the weapon cheaper. The Banderol is estimated to cost $50,000–$100,000.

The article also describes a Kometa antenna, whose patches help the weapon receive satellite signals despite jamming. Along with the model-aircraft motor, this shows that at least some components are not purpose-built military parts. Lower costs support the Russian strategy of producing more weapons for strikes on Ukraine’s rear areas.

The supplied text does not name any launch methods or compare how different methods affect deployment. It would therefore be inaccurate to claim that particular launch methods help Russia use these weapons. In general, launch method can affect where and how a weapon is deployed, but that broad context is not specific evidence about the weapons in this article.

07

How does air defense detect and intercept incoming weapons, and why do speed and flight path matter?

The article focuses on interception outcomes rather than detection equipment. As general background, air-defence systems use sensors, often including radar, to find and track incoming threats. Defenders then assess a track and may send an interceptor to destroy or disable the target. The specific sensors and procedures used by Ukraine are not detailed in the supplied text.

Speed matters because it reduces the time available to detect, identify and engage a weapon. The article contrasts Shahed drones flying at about 150 km/h with the Banderol and Dan-T, which can fly at more than 400 km/h. It says Ukraine’s current interceptor drones are too slow to intercept the Banderol and Dan-T.

Flight path can also affect whether sensors can track a target and whether an interceptor can reach it in time; that is general context, not a detail supplied about these weapons. The article’s central point is that fast, low-cost weapons complicate Ukraine’s defences and can be produced in large numbers.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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