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Defence & Security19 Nov 2026 · about 7 min

The military needs strategic thinkers, not just operators

The brief

Secretary Pete Hegseth announced professional military education reforms in a 33-point memorandum and a companion speech at the Naval War College. The article does not spell out the memorandum’s individual provisions, so it cannot identify a detailed list of changes. It does describe the thrust of Hegseth’s guidance and the author’s objection to it. The article says Hegseth repeatedly frames the Armed Forces’ fundamental purpose as fighting and winning the nation’s wars. The author argues that this approach overemphasizes battlefield operations and does not give enough attention to the political purpose of military power. The criticism is not that military leaders lack skill at planning or winning battles. Instead, the author says PME should better prepare senior leaders to deter conflict and help turn military advantages into durable political outcomes. That means studying adversaries, escalation, diplomacy, economics, and information alongside military operations. The article’s central concern is that Hegseth’s guidance does not address this strategic gap.

01

What changes to professional military education did Secretary Hegseth announce?

Secretary Pete Hegseth announced professional military education reforms in a 33-point memorandum and a companion speech at the Naval War College. The article does not spell out the memorandum’s individual provisions, so it cannot identify a detailed list of changes. It does describe the thrust of Hegseth’s guidance and the author’s objection to it.

The article says Hegseth repeatedly frames the Armed Forces’ fundamental purpose as fighting and winning the nation’s wars. The author argues that this approach overemphasizes battlefield operations and does not give enough attention to the political purpose of military power. The criticism is not that military leaders lack skill at planning or winning battles.

Instead, the author says PME should better prepare senior leaders to deter conflict and help turn military advantages into durable political outcomes. That means studying adversaries, escalation, diplomacy, economics, and information alongside military operations. The article’s central concern is that Hegseth’s guidance does not address this strategic gap.

02

What is professional military education, and what is it meant to prepare service members to do?

Professional military education, or PME, is the umbrella term for educational opportunities service members receive as they advance through their careers. For officers, the sequence begins at commissioning and continues through senior-level programs. It matters because military leaders take on greater responsibilities as they rise in rank, from leading small units to advising on consequential national decisions.

The article gives a clear example of that progression: a junior officer may command a couple dozen service members, while a colonel or Navy captain may lead a few thousand. PME is meant to help leaders handle those growing demands. The article also emphasizes that the preparation should reach beyond operational skills and include the strategic understanding needed to advise civilian officials.

The author says U.S. forces are highly capable at battlefield operations, but have struggled to turn military success into political outcomes. PME, especially at intermediate and senior levels, shapes the strategic culture of military leadership. The author argues it should prepare leaders to deter conflict and connect military power to lasting political advantage.

03

How far does an officer’s military education extend, from commissioning through senior command?

An officer’s professional military education begins at commissioning, which may come through a military academy, the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, or Officer Candidate School. The article describes the educational sequence as extending all the way to capstone programs for generals and flag officers. This long path reflects how dramatically an officer’s responsibilities can grow over a career.

The shift is visible in the scale of command. A junior officer may lead a couple dozen service members. A colonel or Navy captain may command a few thousand. PME opportunities are intended to prepare officers for these increasing responsibilities as they move up the ranks, rather than treating education as a single course at the start of service.

The article says intermediate- and senior-level institutions play a critical role in shaping the strategic culture of U.S. military leadership. It argues that preparation should not stop at managing larger units or campaigns. Senior leaders also need to understand how military choices relate to political goals, deterrence, and advice to civilian defense officials.

04

What can happen when a military wins battles but cannot turn those victories into political results?

Winning battles does not by itself settle the political questions that made a conflict matter. The article argues that tactical success is necessary but not sufficient to defend or advance U.S. interests. If leaders cannot connect battlefield gains to political goals, an opponent or governing regime may remain in place and a conflict’s wider problems can continue.

The article says U.S. forces achieved immediate military objectives efficiently in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet the United States struggled to translate those battlefield accomplishments into meaningful political outcomes. It offers Iran as another example: U.S. and Israeli forces penetrated defenses, eliminated senior leadership, and degraded missile and naval capabilities, but the governing regime remained in power.

Nearly nine months after that conflict began, the Strait of Hormuz was still too dangerous for commercial shipping, and the Trump administration had not secured a durable political settlement aligned with U.S. interests. The author uses these outcomes to argue that military effectiveness must be judged not only by operational performance, but also by whether force produces lasting political advantage.

05

What does deterring a conflict require beyond having the military power to fight it?

The article calls sustained deterrence the apex of military effectiveness. Deterrence means preventing conflict, not merely preparing to win after it begins. That takes a wider intellectual foundation than battlefield maneuvers or even running a theater-level campaign, because leaders must understand how an adversary may interpret U.S. actions and commitments.

The author lists several elements: understanding adversaries, anticipating their calculations, managing escalation, and communicating resolve. Military capabilities must also be integrated with diplomatic, economic, and informational tools of national power. Those connections shape the choices available to opponents and the credibility of U.S. intentions.

For that reason, military leaders need to contribute meaningfully to whole-of-government decision-making and advise civilian defense officials. The article argues that Hegseth’s emphasis on fighting and winning wars misses this broader role. In a contested global security environment, operational strength alone may not prevent a crisis or secure a durable settlement; strategic judgment is needed to turn that strength into deterrence.

06

In the Taiwan example, what political, economic, and alliance factors would U.S. leaders need to consider?

The article presents Taiwan as a potential flashpoint between the United States and China. Deterring Beijing from blockading the island or launching a full-scale invasion is not simply a matter of building the forces needed to respond. Leaders must understand the political setting that shapes each side’s decisions, because deterrence depends on how those decisions are perceived.

The author names several factors to weigh: Beijing’s perceptions of American resolve, the political calculations of Chinese leadership, Taiwan’s domestic politics, and the economic consequences of conflict. Leaders must also consider whether American commitments to regional allies are credible. These factors help determine how an adversary interprets threats, promises, and possible costs.

The article argues that military leaders who cannot think across these dimensions will struggle to provide effective options to civilian decision-makers, however skilled they are at operational planning. It presents strategic understanding as necessary for deterrence, not an optional addition to military capability. The passage ends while developing this point and does not describe a specific policy choice or outcome for Taiwan.

07

Why is warfare fundamentally political, rather than simply a matter of winning battles?

Warfare is political because military force is used in pursuit of national interests and political outcomes. The article argues that battlefield performance alone cannot show whether a military has been effective. A force may win engagements and meet immediate objectives while failing to secure a durable settlement or change an adversary’s choices.

The article points to U.S. operational success in Iraq and Afghanistan, alongside difficulty translating those achievements into meaningful political outcomes. In the Iran example, military strikes degraded capabilities and eliminated senior leaders, yet the governing regime remained and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was still dangerous. The examples show the gap between tactical results and broader political aims.

That gap matters for both deterrence and decisions about using force. Military leaders need to understand adversaries, political calculations, escalation, and the contributions of diplomacy, economics, and information. The author argues that without this strategic perspective, leaders may be good at executing operations but less able to advise civilian officials or help turn military power into lasting advantage.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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