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Defence & Security20 Nov 2026 · about 6 min

The Gulf Is America’s Next AI Security Test

The brief

The Gulf is a test because advanced U.S. chips are arriving there for use in data centers run by partners with extensive ties to China. The new U.S. rules aim to prevent restricted users from getting access to U.S. chips and computing power through gaps in existing controls. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are building large AI facilities, where Nvidia chips will be installed and computing power may be rented to customers or cloud tenants. The article warns that Chinese access could come through contractors or cloud customers, even without directly acquiring restricted chips. The new rules make Gulf facilities a test of enforcement in third-country data centers. Operators must prevent restricted users from accessing chip-enabled computing power, including indirectly through cloud services or intermediaries. The article says the challenge is especially significant when partners also work with Chinese technology companies.

01

Why does the article call the Gulf America’s next AI security test?

The Gulf is a test because advanced U.S. chips are arriving there for use in data centers run by partners with extensive ties to China. The new U.S. rules aim to prevent restricted users from getting access to U.S. chips and computing power through gaps in existing controls.

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are building large AI facilities, where Nvidia chips will be installed and computing power may be rented to customers or cloud tenants. The article warns that Chinese access could come through contractors or cloud customers, even without directly acquiring restricted chips.

The new rules make Gulf facilities a test of enforcement in third-country data centers. Operators must prevent restricted users from accessing chip-enabled computing power, including indirectly through cloud services or intermediaries. The article says the challenge is especially significant when partners also work with Chinese technology companies.

02

How many vulnerabilities do the new U.S. rules target, and what are they?

The new interim U.S. rules target three vulnerabilities that can give Chinese companies access to U.S. chips or computing power. The count matters because the controls address more than shipments of physical hardware.

First, they target Chinese rerouting of U.S.-made AI chips through third countries. Second, they address rented access to AI computing power. Third, they cover Chinese chip designers’ ability to manufacture advanced chips at facilities outside China. Together, these targets address routes involving hardware, computing services, and chip production.

The article describes the rules as the most serious effort so far to close loopholes that enabled access to U.S. chips and computing power. It also warns that the rules do not resolve the threat. Gulf data centers will test whether Washington can enforce its approach when U.S. chips are operated in third countries and their computing power may be rented to customers or cloud tenants.

03

How can someone use the computing power of an advanced chip without owning or physically possessing it?

Someone can use an advanced chip’s computing power by renting access to a data center or cloud service that operates the chip. They do not need to own the chip or physically possess it. The article identifies rented access to AI computing power as one of the vulnerabilities addressed by the new rules.

In the Gulf, Nvidia chips are expected to be installed and operated in data centers. Those facilities may rent computing power to customers or cloud tenants. A user can therefore benefit from the chips through a service provided by the facility, rather than by importing the hardware directly.

This matters because controls focused only on where chips are shipped may miss access delivered through computing services. The rules also target rented access, and Gulf facilities will need to prevent restricted users from obtaining chip-enabled compute indirectly through the cloud or other intermediaries. The article presents this as a key challenge for enforcing U.S. controls in third-country data centers.

04

What could happen if Chinese companies or users rent computing power from Gulf data centers?

If Chinese companies or users can rent computing power from Gulf data centers, they could access capabilities enabled by U.S. chips without directly acquiring the restricted hardware. The article identifies rented compute as a loophole the new rules are intended to address.

The mechanism could involve a Gulf operator installing Nvidia chips and offering their computing power to customers or cloud tenants. Access might also come through contractors, cloud customers, or other intermediaries. The article warns that Chinese infiltration could occur through a trusted partner, with or without that partner’s knowledge.

Such access would undermine the aim of preventing restricted users from using U.S. chip-enabled compute. The new rules require Gulf-based facilities to prevent restricted users from accessing that power, including indirectly. The article does not claim that Chinese users have already gained such access through Gulf data centers; it identifies the possibility as a security concern that operators and Washington must address.

05

What would Gulf data-center operators need to verify to keep restricted users from accessing U.S. computing power?

Gulf data-center operators need to show that restricted users cannot access computing power enabled by U.S. chips. That includes indirect access through cloud services or other intermediaries, not only direct use of a facility.

The article says Washington will want evidence that Saudi officials can protect data centers and cloud services from unauthorized access. It also argues that assurances alone are not enough: a partner’s operations, ownership, partnerships, and access to sensitive technology should be independently verifiable and insulated from possible Chinese exploitation.

This is a demanding test because Gulf partners maintain ties with both U.S. and Chinese technology companies. The article does not specify a detailed technical checklist or a particular verification process. It makes clear, however, that facilities must have safeguards against restricted users and that operators’ claims need independent verification. Those protections will help determine whether the new U.S. approach can be enforced in third-country data centers.

06

Why are the UAE and Saudi Arabia investing in AI data centers, and what advantages do they offer?

The UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing in AI data centers as part of efforts to shift their economies away from oil. Both countries place AI at the center of their economic strategies, and their governments are financing massive AI buildouts.

The article points to several advantages: large areas of desert land, access to lower-cost energy, and deep financial resources. These assets help the two monarchies develop data centers where advanced Nvidia chips can be installed and operated. Computing power from those facilities may then be rented to customers or cloud tenants.

In May 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that both countries could purchase advanced U.S. chips to support these efforts. The buildout offers Nvidia an appealing market and Washington a chance to keep U.S. technology central to AI development. But the countries’ deep relations with China mean their facilities also raise questions about access and security.

07

What are export controls, and why must AI rules govern access to computing power as well as the shipment of physical chips?

In general, export controls are government rules that restrict the export, transfer, or provision of specified goods, technology, or services. The article describes new U.S. controls on AI and semiconductors, aimed at closing loopholes that let Chinese companies obtain U.S. chips and computing power.

Physical chips can be rerouted through third countries, but computing power can also be rented from a data center. A customer may use a chip through a cloud service without owning or physically receiving it. The article also identifies Chinese chip designers’ ability to manufacture advanced chips at non-Chinese facilities as a vulnerability.

That is why the new rules address rented compute as well as chip shipments and production. Gulf facilities are a test: operators will need to stop restricted users from reaching U.S. chip-enabled computing power through cloud services or intermediaries. The article says these rules close important gaps, but do not eliminate the broader security threat.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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