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International Relations20 Nov 2026 · about 7 min

ASEAN’s South China Sea code is ‘85% to 90%’ done. Will it bind China?

The brief

The Code of Conduct, or COC, is a proposed agreement between ASEAN and China about behavior in the South China Sea. The article describes it as a set of rules and accepted norms for those involved. After more than two decades of negotiations, the parties are still working to complete it. The existing 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties already calls for self-restraint. It asks countries, among other things, to refrain from occupying previously uninhabited maritime features. The proposed COC would set out conduct in a new code, but the article does not list all the rules it would contain. That distinction matters because a code that simply repeats existing commitments may offer little improvement. A source familiar with negotiations says its value depends partly on whether it will be legally binding. ASEAN and China have not settled that question, and the article reports that the COC’s geographical scope is also unresolved.

01

What is the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC), and what behavior is it meant to govern?

The Code of Conduct, or COC, is a proposed agreement between ASEAN and China about behavior in the South China Sea. The article describes it as a set of rules and accepted norms for those involved. After more than two decades of negotiations, the parties are still working to complete it.

The existing 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties already calls for self-restraint. It asks countries, among other things, to refrain from occupying previously uninhabited maritime features. The proposed COC would set out conduct in a new code, but the article does not list all the rules it would contain.

That distinction matters because a code that simply repeats existing commitments may offer little improvement. A source familiar with negotiations says its value depends partly on whether it will be legally binding. ASEAN and China have not settled that question, and the article reports that the COC’s geographical scope is also unresolved.

02

Marcos says the COC is 85% to 90% complete, but how many of the four negotiating milestones have actually been settled?

Foreign Affairs Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro said ASEAN and China had resolved only one of four milestone issues. That is a sharper measure of progress than President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s estimate that the negotiations were 85% to 90% complete. The figures refer to different descriptions of the talks, and the article does not explain how Marcos calculated his percentage.

The single resolved milestone is the relationship between the proposed COC and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Lazaro said the other three milestones remained pending. She specifically confirmed that the COC’s legally binding status was still unresolved.

The gap between the optimistic percentage and the milestone count highlights that substantial questions remain. The article identifies legal force and geographical scope among them. Marcos said definitions and wording still needed work, but his estimate did not mean the key negotiating milestones were all complete. The next chairmanship is Singapore’s, and completion remains uncertain.

03

Which major issues remain unresolved, including the COC’s legal force and the area it would cover?

Two of the major unresolved questions are whether the COC will be legally binding and which geographical area it will cover. These are central issues: legal force affects what commitments the parties accept, while scope determines where the code would apply. The article describes both as unfinished after more than two decades of talks.

Foreign Affairs Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro said only one of four milestones had been resolved: the relationship between the COC and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. She said the other three remained pending and confirmed that legal binding status was among the unresolved matters. Marcos, meanwhile, emphasized definitions, phrases, and paragraphs that still needed clarification.

The parties therefore have more to settle than wording alone. The article does not identify every one of the three pending milestones by name, but it specifically identifies legal force and geographical scope as outstanding. Until those questions are addressed, Marcos’s estimate of 85% to 90% completion does not mean the central terms are settled.

04

What does it mean for an international agreement to be legally binding, and how could that make the COC different from a political declaration?

In general international law, an agreement is legally binding when its parties consent to obligations governed by international law. That means the commitments are intended as legal duties, not just political promises. The exact obligations and ways to address noncompliance depend on the agreement’s terms and the parties’ consent.

A political declaration can state shared aims or expectations without creating the same legally binding duties. The article contrasts the proposed COC with the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, or DOC. It reports that the DOC calls for self-restraint, but a source familiar with negotiations argues a COC without legal force would not improve much on that declaration.

The COC’s legal status is still unsettled. Lazaro said it was one of the pending issues, and only one of four negotiating milestones had been resolved. So the article does not establish whether the final code will create binding legal obligations or how any such obligations would be enforced.

05

How does the proposed COC relate to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, and what does that declaration ask countries to do?

The proposed Code of Conduct is being negotiated by ASEAN and China, while the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, or DOC, has been in place since 2002. The COC’s relationship to the DOC was the one milestone that Foreign Affairs Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro said had been resolved.

The DOC calls on countries to exercise self-restraint. One example in the article is refraining from occupying previously uninhabited maritime features. In 2015, Manila accused Beijing of violating that commitment through island-building activities. China rejected the accusation. Marcos said ASEAN and China had reached a tacit agreement to keep observing the DOC while the new code remains unfinished.

The COC’s legal force is still pending. A source familiar with negotiations argues that, without legal force, the new code may offer little improvement over the DOC. The existing declaration’s commitments therefore remain important, even as parties continue negotiating what a new code would add.

06

What could happen if countries keep disputing maritime claims but the COC has no legal force?

If the COC has no legal force, it may not create binding duties that change how countries handle maritime disputes. The article does not predict a specific outcome, but a source familiar with negotiations says a nonbinding code would offer little improvement over the existing 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties.

That declaration already calls for self-restraint, including refraining from occupying previously uninhabited maritime features. Yet the Philippines accused China of breaching that commitment through island-building in 2015, and China rejected the accusation. The article also describes continuing confrontations involving Chinese vessels in the West Philippine Sea, including water-cannon attacks and dangerous maneuvers.

A COC without legal force could therefore leave the parties relying on commitments similar to those they already dispute. Whether the new code will be binding remains unresolved, as does its geographical scope. The article says trust between China and other parties may matter to settling the legal question, but it does not establish what consequences a nonbinding code would produce.

07

How does international law determine a country’s rights in the sea around its coasts and islands?

The article does not explain how international law sets maritime rights. As general background, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) uses a coastal baseline, usually linked to a state’s coast, to measure maritime zones. A country has sovereignty in its territorial sea, generally up to 12 nautical miles, and specific resource rights in an exclusive economic zone, generally up to 200 nautical miles.

Islands can also generate maritime zones, but their legal status matters. Under UNCLOS, a qualifying island may generate an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf; a rock unable to sustain human habitation or economic life does not generate those zones. These rules concern maritime entitlements, not necessarily which country owns disputed land features.

The article states that a 2016 arbitral ruling rejected the legal basis for China’s sweeping claims within its nine-dash line, and that Beijing does not recognize the ruling. It does not provide the ruling’s legal reasoning or explain how maritime zones apply to individual disputed features.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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