Women in high public office doesn’t mean equality throughout society: Justice Nagarathna
Justice B.V. Nagarathna said that seeing a woman in senior public office is not proof that women as a whole have achieved equality. One woman’s position may coexist with other women being excluded from education, employment, property, or effective legal remedies. The distinction matters because a prominent example cannot stand in for the different conditions women face across society. She argued that substantive equality must address those differences, rather than count only formal rights or individual successes. A judgment or law may set a rule, but it cannot by itself make every workplace safe, ensure every girl receives an education, or guarantee protection from domestic violence. Those outcomes also depend on whether rights can be used in practice. At the Cornelia Sorabji Memorial Lecture at Oxford, Nagarathna connected equality to women’s participation in decision-making and to barriers such as stigma, economic insecurity, and unpaid care work. She said progress cannot be measured only by laws passed or discriminatory provisions struck down. Her point is that meaningful equality requires attention to lived conditions and effective remedies.
What did Justice B.V. Nagarathna say the presence of women in senior public office does—and does not—show about equality?
Justice B.V. Nagarathna said that seeing a woman in senior public office is not proof that women as a whole have achieved equality. One woman’s position may coexist with other women being excluded from education, employment, property, or effective legal remedies. The distinction matters because a prominent example cannot stand in for the different conditions women face across society.
She argued that substantive equality must address those differences, rather than count only formal rights or individual successes. A judgment or law may set a rule, but it cannot by itself make every workplace safe, ensure every girl receives an education, or guarantee protection from domestic violence. Those outcomes also depend on whether rights can be used in practice.
At the Cornelia Sorabji Memorial Lecture at Oxford, Nagarathna connected equality to women’s participation in decision-making and to barriers such as stigma, economic insecurity, and unpaid care work. She said progress cannot be measured only by laws passed or discriminatory provisions struck down. Her point is that meaningful equality requires attention to lived conditions and effective remedies.
What is substantive equality, and how is it different from giving everyone the same formal rights?
Substantive equality means looking beyond whether everyone has the same formal rights and asking whether people can meaningfully use them. Justice Nagarathna said equality must respond to differences among women and the obstacles they encounter. This matters because identical rules may leave existing disadvantages untouched, especially when women’s circumstances differ.
For example, a law may recognize a woman’s right to inheritance, but that right may not help if she cannot access a remedy or assert her claim. Similarly, a judgment cannot alone make every workplace safe or ensure that every girl receives education. The mechanism is the gap between a right being formally recognized and the practical ability to exercise it.
Nagarathna said that progress should not be measured only by discriminatory provisions struck down or beneficial laws enacted. She also pointed to stigma, retaliation, economic insecurity, and unpaid care work as realities shaping women’s choices. Substantive equality therefore requires attention to whether institutions act and remedies are accessible, while recognizing that women do not all face the same barriers.
What share of seats in Parliament and State legislatures do the constitutional amendments described in the article provide for women?
The constitutional amendments described in the article provide women one-third of the seats in Parliament and State legislatures. That is the share Nagarathna cited when discussing women’s participation in decision-making. The figure matters because it moves beyond a formal right to vote and addresses who is represented in the institutions that make public decisions.
Nagarathna described the amendments as proof that women should participate in decision-making. She also linked them to a broader point: where historical exclusion has shaped the composition of institutions, formal equality alone may not secure meaningful representation. A guaranteed share of seats is a concrete measure aimed at that representation gap.
The article does not give further details about the amendments’ implementation or their effects. Nagarathna’s wider argument is that representation is important, but it does not establish that equality has been achieved throughout society. Her account also calls attention to whether women can access education, employment, property, and legal remedies, and whether laws work in practice.
Why might equal rights on paper fail to overcome the effects of women’s historical exclusion from decision-making?
Equal rights on paper do not automatically undo a history of exclusion from decision-making. Justice Nagarathna said that where historical exclusion has shaped the composition of institutions, formal equality alone may not be enough to secure meaningful representation. This matters because institutions can retain an unequal composition even when formal rules recognize equality.
The article gives women’s one-third share of seats in Parliament and State legislatures through constitutional amendments as an example of a measure intended to support participation. Nagarathna said women should take part in decision-making, rather than be content with a formal right to vote. The key mechanism is representation: changing who holds seats can address exclusion from the institutions where decisions are made.
She did not claim that representation alone resolves all inequality. She also noted that women may still face barriers to education, employment, property, and legal remedies. Her broader argument is that laws and judgments need to work in practice, and that progress should be judged by more than formal rights or the passage of beneficial laws.
What can happen when legal remedies exist but are hard to access, public authorities do not act, or social stigma discourages women from seeking help?
A remedy written into law may fail to protect someone if she cannot reach it or use it safely. Justice Nagarathna said legislation cannot achieve its full purpose when remedies are inaccessible, public authorities fail to act, or social attitudes prevent women from asserting their rights. The gap between a legal promise and practical protection is central to her argument about substantive equality.
She said that recognizing violence against women as a violation of constitutional rights has not necessarily led women to seek legal protection without fear. Stigma, retaliation, and economic insecurity can discourage them. She also said a judgment alone cannot ensure that every victim of domestic violence receives timely protection. These examples show how barriers and institutional inaction can weaken legal rights.
Nagarathna’s account suggests that laws need accessible remedies and effective action by public authorities to achieve their purpose. It also stresses the role of social conditions: women need to be able to assert their rights without fear of stigma or retaliation. The article does not describe a specific remedy or policy for closing these gaps.
How can factors such as caste, class, disability, religion, and region create different barriers for different women?
Women do not all experience the same barriers. Justice Nagarathna said that caste, class, disability, religion, region, and economic circumstances can profoundly alter the obstacles a woman encounters. This matters because a single, uniform approach may overlook how disadvantages overlap and affect a person’s ability to exercise her rights.
For example, a woman’s economic circumstances may affect whether she can obtain a lawful inheritance or access legal remedies, while disability or region may shape other obstacles she faces. These are illustrations of the article’s broader point, not individual cases it describes. Nagarathna’s key mechanism is that intersecting structural disadvantage changes what equality requires; identical treatment does not necessarily remove those barriers.
She said formal uniformity cannot, by itself, remedy such disadvantage and that equality must be attentive to differences among women. Her wider argument is that rights must work in real life, not only appear in laws or judgments. The article does not set out a detailed policy response, but it makes clear that assessing equality requires attention to women’s varied circumstances.
What is unpaid domestic and care work, and how can an unequal share of it limit women’s choices?
In everyday usage, unpaid domestic and care work means household tasks and caring for other people without receiving pay. The article does not list particular tasks; this explanation uses the general meaning of the term. Justice Nagarathna’s point is that women bear a disproportionate share of this work, and that this burden continues to determine their choices.
When one group carries more unpaid responsibilities, it can have less time or flexibility for other activities and decisions. That is a general explanation of how such a burden can limit choices; the article does not give specific examples or quantify its effects. Nagarathna placed unpaid care work alongside other structural barriers, emphasizing that equality must account for women’s lived circumstances.
Her argument is that formal rights alone may not change the conditions that shape women’s lives. She said there is no single experience of being a woman, and that equality must be attentive to differences. The article does not propose a specific way to redistribute care work. It does underline that women’s choices cannot be understood without considering this unequal burden.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
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