US warned supplying nuclear-powered submarines to Australia would diminish its own fleet for ‘many years’
The CBO’s central warning is that transferring Virginia-class attack submarines would leave fewer boats in the US Navy for many years. It matters because the Navy already lacks enough production capacity to meet its own demand. The report says the submarine industrial base is struggling to deliver the submarines the Navy needs. The US currently builds Virginia-class submarines at a rate of 1.13 a year. The CBO says production must reach two annually for US needs, and 2.33 annually to provide additional boats for Australia. So replacing submarines transferred to Australia would require shipyards to build more, even as they face delays. Construction now takes an average of 10 to 11 years, compared with five to six years in the 2000s. Virginia-class boats are delayed by 24 to 36 months. The US can refuse transfers if losing a submarine would degrade its undersea capabilities, and the agreement carries no penalty for doing so.
Why does the CBO say transferring Virginia-class submarines to Australia could reduce the number available to the US Navy for many years?
The CBO’s central warning is that transferring Virginia-class attack submarines would leave fewer boats in the US Navy for many years. It matters because the Navy already lacks enough production capacity to meet its own demand. The report says the submarine industrial base is struggling to deliver the submarines the Navy needs.
The US currently builds Virginia-class submarines at a rate of 1.13 a year. The CBO says production must reach two annually for US needs, and 2.33 annually to provide additional boats for Australia. So replacing submarines transferred to Australia would require shipyards to build more, even as they face delays.
Construction now takes an average of 10 to 11 years, compared with five to six years in the 2000s. Virginia-class boats are delayed by 24 to 36 months. The US can refuse transfers if losing a submarine would degrade its undersea capabilities, and the agreement carries no penalty for doing so.
How many submarines could the US transfer to Australia, and how many Virginia-class submarines are US shipyards currently producing each year?
Under AUKUS’s Pillar One, the US has agreed to sell Australia between three and five in-service Virginia-class submarines. The first transfers are scheduled to begin in 2032. These are not additional boats already set aside in the US Navy’s current shipbuilding plan: that plan’s footnote says transfers to Australia have not been factored in.
The article gives the current US production rate as 1.13 Virginia-class submarines a year. The CBO says production needs to reach two per year to meet America’s own needs. It would need to rise to 2.33 per year to produce extra submarines for transfer to Australia.
That gap matters because the submarine industry is already struggling to meet Navy demand. Building a submarine now takes an average of 10 to 11 years, and Virginia-class boats are delayed by 24 to 36 months. The CBO warns that increasing production further would add to the challenges facing the Navy and shipyards.
What is a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), and how is it different from a nuclear-armed submarine?
An SSN is a nuclear-powered attack submarine. “Nuclear-powered” describes how the submarine gets energy to propel itself; “attack” describes its military role. The article uses SSN to mean “attack submarine” but does not explain the technology or the weapons such submarines carry.
In established naval terminology, a nuclear-powered attack submarine is different from a nuclear-armed submarine because propulsion and armament are separate things. An SSN is not nuclear-armed simply because it uses a nuclear reactor for power. Nuclear-armed submarines carry nuclear weapons; they may be designed for a different role, such as carrying ballistic missiles. An attack submarine can carry conventional weapons.
That distinction matters in this debate because the CBO report is discussing the number of US attack submarines available to the Navy, not a transfer of nuclear weapons. The article says the US has agreed to sell Australia in-service Virginia-class submarines, and focuses on the impact on US undersea capability and production capacity.
What is AUKUS’s Pillar One, and when are the first submarine transfers supposed to begin?
AUKUS is the agreement at the centre of the submarine deal between Australia and the US. Its “Pillar One” includes the planned sale of between three and five in-service Virginia-class submarines to Australia. The arrangement matters because the transfers could strengthen Australia’s submarine force, but they would also reduce the number of attack submarines available to the US Navy for many years.
The article says the first transfers are due to begin in 2032. The US Navy’s latest shipbuilding plan does not include the transfer in its forecasts; a footnote says it has not been factored into the plan. The CBO separately assessed what the deal could mean for the US fleet and shipyards.
The plan faces questions about production capacity. US shipyards currently produce 1.13 Virginia-class submarines a year, while the CBO says 2.33 would be needed annually to meet US needs and provide additional boats for Australia. US law also says a transfer can happen only if it will not degrade US undersea capabilities.
Why might Australian-controlled submarines not automatically take part in a US conflict with China?
Australian-controlled submarines would not automatically join a US conflict with China because Australia would retain control over them. The CBO notes that Australia’s submarines could add to allied capability, especially if based in the Western Pacific, but says their participation in any particular conflict would not be guaranteed.
Australia’s defence minister, Richard Marles, said in 2023 that Australia would make no promises to deploy its submarines in support of a US conflict with China. He said future Australian submarines would be under the complete control of the Australian government of the day. That means a US request alone would not ensure they were sent into action.
The Congressional Research Service has discussed an alternative: submarines earmarked for Australia could remain under US command while operating from Australian bases. Its report argued that, in a crisis over Taiwan, US-commanded boats could be deployed immediately, whereas Australian-commanded boats could not be ordered into operation by the US. This option has been discussed, not established as the arrangement.
What alternative arrangement has been discussed if submarines are not transferred to Australian control?
If submarines are not transferred to Australian control, one alternative is to keep them under US command and operate them from Australian bases. The Congressional Research Service discussed this possible division of labour in its January report on AUKUS. It would change who commands the boats, rather than necessarily abandoning their use from the region.
The key mechanism is command authority. The report argued that during a conflict or crisis with China over Taiwan, submarines under Australian command could not be ordered into operation by the US. US-commanded submarines based in Australia, by contrast, could be deployed immediately. The distinction addresses the uncertainty over whether Australia would choose to take part in a particular conflict.
This is a discussed alternative, not a confirmed replacement for the deal. AUKUS still has bipartisan political support in both countries, and the US and Australia continue to affirm their commitment to it. But the US can refuse transfers without penalty, and US law bars a transfer if it would degrade American undersea capabilities.
Why are submarines important in naval strategy, especially in the Western Pacific?
Submarines matter in naval strategy because they provide undersea military capability. The article does not explain their broader strategic uses, but established naval knowledge is that submarines can operate beneath the surface and carry out missions that surface ships cannot perform in the same way. Their value depends partly on where they are based and who can order them into action.
The CBO’s specific point is about geography and response time. It says Australian submarines based in the Western Pacific could respond more quickly to a conflict with China over Taiwan or other issues in the South China Sea. That regional presence could help offset a potential loss of US Navy capability if submarines were transferred to Australia.
But proximity does not guarantee participation. Australia would control its submarines, and the CBO says involvement in a particular conflict would not be assured. The Congressional Research Service has therefore discussed keeping boats under US command at Australian bases, which could allow them to be deployed immediately in a crisis.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
Read more in the JupiteX app
Pulse is free. New stories every 4 hours, each one broken into the questions that explain it.
Or read more news on the web