‘It’s Impossible to Refuse’: State-Imposed Forced Labor and Exploitation in Uzbekistan’s Silk Sector
The report calls cocoon production forced labor because farmers are assigned quotas and may face pressure or punishment if they refuse. Calling the system voluntary does not make refusal safe. Many farmers depend on local authorities for land, irrigation, credit, and machinery, so challenging officials can carry serious risks. A farmer in Fergana said prosecutors called, police came to homes, and a district governor shouted at farmers demanding cocoons. In a 2025 case, police handcuffed and beat a Kamashi farmer who refused his quota. Other farmers said they agreed because disputing the order seemed harder than buying cocoons to deliver. The report finds that production targets create an obligation beyond farmers’ cotton and grain leases. Fear of reprisals helps keep the system operating, while producers may also struggle to get paid. The gap between official claims of choice and farmers’ reported experience is central to the report’s finding of state-imposed forced labor.
What makes cocoon production “forced labor” if officials describe it as voluntary?
The report calls cocoon production forced labor because farmers are assigned quotas and may face pressure or punishment if they refuse. Calling the system voluntary does not make refusal safe. Many farmers depend on local authorities for land, irrigation, credit, and machinery, so challenging officials can carry serious risks.
A farmer in Fergana said prosecutors called, police came to homes, and a district governor shouted at farmers demanding cocoons. In a 2025 case, police handcuffed and beat a Kamashi farmer who refused his quota. Other farmers said they agreed because disputing the order seemed harder than buying cocoons to deliver.
The report finds that production targets create an obligation beyond farmers’ cotton and grain leases. Fear of reprisals helps keep the system operating, while producers may also struggle to get paid. The gap between official claims of choice and farmers’ reported experience is central to the report’s finding of state-imposed forced labor.
How do national cocoon production targets become quotas for individual farmers?
Each year, the government sets a national cocoon production target. Official decisions call the figures “prognoses,” but in practice they are divided among regions and districts, then assigned to individual producers as quotas. This turns a national industry goal into a direct demand on farmers and home-based producers.
District governors, or hokims, are assessed on whether their districts meet their targets. The report says farmers are assigned about 65 percent of the annual national target. A farmer in Kamashi, for example, was told to deliver 80 kilograms, despite having no suitable mulberry trees and a land lease requiring cotton and grain, not cocoons.
The system covers districts across the country and draws on long-standing agricultural target practices, especially in cotton and wheat. Because farmers rely on officials for land, water, credit, and machinery, many feel unable to challenge their assigned amount. The report describes this as a mechanism that pushes production beyond the farmers’ lease obligations.
How widespread is the quota system, and what share of production comes from farmers versus rural families?
The quota system reaches most districts where cocoons are produced. Official documents reviewed for the report show production in 150 of Uzbekistan’s 162 districts. Farmers are assigned about 65 percent of the annual national production target, making their role in the quota system substantial.
The remaining share cannot be assigned precisely to home-based rural families from the figures provided. The report documents that such families raise silkworms at home and face exploitative conditions, but it does not state what percentage of total production they supply. The 65 percent figure is about the target assigned to farmers, not a complete breakdown of actual output by producer type.
The report draws on 85 interviews conducted between 2024 and 2026 with farmers and home-based cocoon producers in 21 districts across five regions and Karakalpakstan. Its findings indicate that both groups are affected, but the stated statistics quantify district coverage and farmers’ target share, not the home-based families’ share.
What can happen to farmers who refuse or fail to meet their quotas?
Refusing a quota can bring pressure from local authorities, who have influence over farmers’ access to land, irrigation, credit, and machinery. Most farmers interviewed said they did not try to object because they feared reprisals. One farmer described prosecutors calling, police visiting homes, and a hokim shouting at farmers in closed meetings.
The report documents a 2025 case in Kamashi district, Kashkadarya region, where police handcuffed and beat a farmer who refused to fulfill his quota. Failure to meet a target can also affect payment. A farmer interviewed in Kamashi said he had received no payment the previous year because he had fallen short of the quota set by local officials.
These examples show that the consequences can involve both personal safety and income. The report also says farmers may find it easier to agree or buy cocoons at delivery time than to dispute demands. Such risks reinforce the quota system, despite cocoon production not being required by their cotton and grain land leases.
How do the work and costs of raising cocoons compare with what producers are paid?
The report describes a mismatch between what cocoon production costs producers and what they receive. Farmers may have to pay for silkworm eggs and other resources themselves, while the government approves the prices that silk enterprises pay. The article does not provide a general price or cost figure, but it records producers’ concerns about getting paid.
A Kamashi farmer said he delivered cocoons the previous year but earned less than it cost to produce them, because he had covered the expense of eggs and other resources. He also said he received no payment that year after falling short of the quota set by local officials. At the start of the next year, he signed a blank contract without knowing his payment price.
The report says rural families raising silkworms at home also face exploitative conditions and struggle to get paid. Without clear contract terms or reliable payment, producers can bear the work and expenses while receiving uncertain or inadequate returns. The report does not specify whether all producers experience the same costs or payment outcomes.
How do local officials and private silk-processing enterprises each shape the quota system?
Local officials help make the quota system work on the ground. National targets are divided among regions and districts, then assigned to producers. District governors, or hokims, are assessed on whether their districts meet targets, giving them an incentive to press farmers to deliver cocoons even when their land leases do not require it.
Silk-processing enterprises, also called clusters, receive the cocoons and process them. They are privately owned, but operate within government programs to develop the industry. The government retains control over much of the sector, including allocating land for mulberry trees, setting production targets, and approving the prices enterprises pay producers.
The report says there were 62 processing enterprises as of October 2026. This arrangement links local enforcement to private processing: officials push production, while clusters operate within state-set rules and prices. Farmers describe threats and uncertainty over payment, but the article does not say that every enterprise directly threatens producers or sets their quotas.
How are silkworm cocoons produced, and why do silkworms need mulberry leaves?
Cocoon production involves raising silkworms until they produce cocoons, which are delivered to silk-processing enterprises. The article says that mulberry leaves are the food base for silkworms and that the government allocates land for mulberry trees. This matters because producers need suitable leaves to raise the worms.
One farmer in arid Kamashi district had no mulberry trees with leaves suitable for feeding silkworms, yet was told to deliver 80 kilograms of cocoons. More generally, as biological context beyond the article’s detail, silkworm larvae feed on mulberry leaves and spin silk around themselves to form cocoons.
The article focuses on who is required to produce cocoons and the conditions they face, rather than explaining silkworm biology or the full production process. It reports that farmers and rural families raise the worms, and that cocoons are delivered to processing enterprises. The Kamashi example shows how quotas can be set even when a farmer lacks a suitable food supply for the silkworms.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
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