Japan to conduct military drills at Indian firing ranges: What Jaishankar’s Tokyo visit means for India’s defence agenda
The proposed access would allow Japan’s Self-Defence Forces to train with live fire at Indian firing ranges for the first time. It marks a move from broad defence partnership toward more practical military cooperation. The two countries say stronger cooperation supports deterrence and security in the Indo-Pacific. At their fourth Foreign and Defence Ministers’ Dialogue in Tokyo, the ministers welcomed a Letter of Intent on Japan’s use of the ranges. The training could include exercises involving surface-to-ship missiles. The LoI sets a basis for the arrangement; defence authorities will coordinate further to make it operational. The access is proposed, not described as already in use. The ministers agreed to accelerate coordination between their defence authorities. If put into effect, the arrangement would expand Japan’s training opportunities in India and could support closer military interoperability. The article does not give a start date or specify which ranges would be used.
What did India and Japan agree to about Japanese forces using Indian firing ranges?
The proposed access would allow Japan’s Self-Defence Forces to train with live fire at Indian firing ranges for the first time. It marks a move from broad defence partnership toward more practical military cooperation. The two countries say stronger cooperation supports deterrence and security in the Indo-Pacific.
At their fourth Foreign and Defence Ministers’ Dialogue in Tokyo, the ministers welcomed a Letter of Intent on Japan’s use of the ranges. The training could include exercises involving surface-to-ship missiles. The LoI sets a basis for the arrangement; defence authorities will coordinate further to make it operational.
The access is proposed, not described as already in use. The ministers agreed to accelerate coordination between their defence authorities. If put into effect, the arrangement would expand Japan’s training opportunities in India and could support closer military interoperability. The article does not give a start date or specify which ranges would be used.
What is live-fire training, and what is a surface-to-ship missile?
Live-fire training means troops practise using weapons with live ammunition or operational munitions, rather than simply rehearsing with simulations or unloaded weapons. The article uses the term but does not give a definition. A surface-to-ship missile is, in standard military usage, a missile launched from a surface platform and directed at a ship.
The distinction matters because the proposed Indian-range arrangement is not described as a classroom or simulator exercise. Japan’s Self-Defence Forces would be able to undertake live-fire training in India, with exercises involving surface-to-ship missiles. The source does not specify the missile systems, firing locations, or exact training activities.
The arrangement remains proposed: India and Japan signed a Letter of Intent and agreed to accelerate coordination between their defence authorities. The article presents the plan as a first for Japan’s forces in India and as an expansion of operational cooperation. It gives no date for the first training session or further technical details.
How many countries took part in the February 2026 trilateral naval exercise, and which were they?
The February 2026 trilateral naval exercise brought together three countries: India, Japan and Indonesia. It was the first naval Passage Exercise, or PASSEX, involving these three partners, according to the article. The exercise adds a multilateral element to India-Japan defence engagement.
A PASSEX is identified in the article as a naval exercise, but the source does not describe its activities or the forces involved. It places the drill alongside other expanding training links, including the first visit by Japanese Air Self-Defence Force fighter aircraft to India for the Veer Guardian 26 air exercise. These examples show cooperation taking place across air and naval settings.
The ministers welcomed the February exercise at their fourth 2+2 dialogue in Tokyo. They also agreed to make bilateral military exercises more complex, integrate unmanned systems and pursue bilateral and multilateral drills at short notice. The article does not announce another trilateral PASSEX or give a date for one.
What could change when India and Japan make their exercises more complex and include unmanned systems?
The ministers agreed to make military exercises more complex, integrate unmanned systems and pursue drills at short notice. Together, these steps point to training that tests coordination under a wider range of conditions. The article links the broader expansion to closer interoperability and deeper operational cooperation, rather than describing a specific new exercise plan.
The source gives concrete examples of growing activity: Japanese Air Self-Defence Force fighter aircraft visited India for the Veer Guardian 26 air exercise, and India, Japan and Indonesia held a trilateral naval PASSEX in February 2026. These exercises show that cooperation is extending across air and naval settings. The article does not say which unmanned systems will be used or how they will be integrated.
The agreed direction is to make exercises more demanding and flexible, including short-notice bilateral and multilateral drills. This could give the forces more opportunities to practise coordinating, but the article does not report measured results or set a schedule. It presents the changes as part of the countries’ effort to strengthen security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
Why are India and Japan putting more emphasis on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific?
India and Japan are putting emphasis on maritime security because the article identifies sea lanes, freedom of navigation and regional stability as important in the Indo-Pacific. Both countries also describe the regional security environment as increasingly complex and cite growing security uncertainties. Their cooperation is framed as part of a wider effort to support a free, open and rules-based international order.
At the dialogue, they agreed to turn their recently signed Memorandum of Arrangement on Maritime Security Cooperation into concrete outcomes. The Indian Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force will explore cooperation in Maritime and Air Domain Awareness, search and rescue, information sharing, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The countries also welcomed expanding coast guard cooperation.
These are areas for further exploration and implementation, not outcomes the article says are already complete. India is scheduled to host the fifth Coast Guard Global Summit in February 2027; the initiative was launched by the Japan Coast Guard. The ministers’ commitments indicate that maritime coordination will remain a key part of the partnership.
How does the partnership extend beyond exercises into defence technology and production?
India and Japan want their defence partnership to extend beyond joint exercises into production, technology and industrial collaboration. The ministers reaffirmed a framework called “Design with Japan, Make in India,” linking India’s domestic defence manufacturing ambitions with Japan’s technological and industrial capabilities. The article describes this as a way to build practical cooperation between the countries’ defence sectors.
The two sides expressed interest in exploring joint development opportunities in naval shipbuilding and design. They also discussed cooperation to strengthen mine countermeasure capabilities. In addition, the ministers looked forward to early formulation of arrangements related to the UNICORN project and India’s Acceptance of Necessity, or AoN, by February 2027. The article does not explain the project’s details.
These plans are described as opportunities and arrangements still to be pursued, not completed joint production. They show that the partnership’s next steps could include industrial and technology links alongside military training and maritime cooperation. The article gives no specific production contract, project cost or delivery timeline beyond the February 2027 reference.
What does military interoperability mean, and why does it matter when countries work together?
In standard military usage, interoperability is the ability of different forces to coordinate and work together effectively. The article does not define the term, but says the proposed firing-range arrangement points to growing interoperability between India’s and Japan’s militaries. That matters because cooperation involves more than diplomatic agreement: forces need to coordinate during training and other shared activities.
The article describes several steps that could support closer coordination. Japan’s Self-Defence Forces are set to train at Indian firing ranges, and the ministers agreed to make exercises more complex, integrate unmanned systems and pursue drills at short notice. They also welcomed the first trilateral naval PASSEX involving India, Japan and Indonesia in February 2026.
These developments indicate an effort to deepen operational cooperation, but the article does not measure interoperability or claim that all systems and procedures are already aligned. It says defence authorities will coordinate to operationalise the range arrangement. More complex bilateral and multilateral drills are among the agreed directions for future cooperation.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
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