The tank was once king of the battlefield, drones have changed the rules, and India is adapting
India is seeking ways to adapt its T-72 and T-90 tanks and BMP-II vehicles to a battlefield where threats can be detected and attacked from farther away. The aim is to keep these vehicles effective by linking them with other systems, rather than treating each tank as an isolated platform. The article identifies several areas for improvement: unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, better firepower, electronic warfare and new forms of protection. It does not give detailed specifications for each upgrade. Its central example is a connected force in which drones and sensors can help link tanks to weapons and information across the battlefield. The Army is looking to retain its combat edge while facing threats such as reconnaissance drones, FPV drones, loitering munitions and precision-guided weapons. The article says the T-72, T-90 and BMP-II are to be upgraded. Its broader point is that tanks remain useful, but their employment must adapt to modern surveillance and attack systems.
What changes is the Indian Army seeking for its T-72 and T-90 tanks and BMP-II vehicles?
India is seeking ways to adapt its T-72 and T-90 tanks and BMP-II vehicles to a battlefield where threats can be detected and attacked from farther away. The aim is to keep these vehicles effective by linking them with other systems, rather than treating each tank as an isolated platform.
The article identifies several areas for improvement: unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, better firepower, electronic warfare and new forms of protection. It does not give detailed specifications for each upgrade. Its central example is a connected force in which drones and sensors can help link tanks to weapons and information across the battlefield.
The Army is looking to retain its combat edge while facing threats such as reconnaissance drones, FPV drones, loitering munitions and precision-guided weapons. The article says the T-72, T-90 and BMP-II are to be upgraded. Its broader point is that tanks remain useful, but their employment must adapt to modern surveillance and attack systems.
How have drones and loitering munitions made it more dangerous for tanks to move or remain in exposed positions?
Drones make it more dangerous for tanks to move or stay in exposed positions because they can reveal where the vehicles are. Once a tank is spotted, forces can direct other weapons toward it. The danger comes not just from a drone’s own attack, but from the chain of detection and response it can set in motion.
In Ukraine, Russian and Ukrainian forces have used reconnaissance UAVs, FPV drones and loitering munitions, often alongside artillery and anti-tank guided missiles. The article describes a reconnaissance drone finding a tank, which may then be hit by artillery, a loitering munition or a missile. Persistent aerial surveillance can make it difficult for armour to move or concentrate without being seen.
This does not mean tanks have become irrelevant. It means using them has become more demanding, and they need to operate as part of a wider system. The article points to unmanned systems, sensors, electronic warfare and new forms of protection as areas the Indian Army is considering.
What is a loitering munition, and how can it help a tank crew attack a target?
In established military usage, a loitering munition is an unmanned weapon designed to remain in an area while searching for a target, then strike it. The source article names loitering munitions as a threat to tanks but does not define them. It also does not describe a system that lets a tank crew control one, so that detail should not be assumed.
A force using such a weapon can use it to attack a target it has identified, potentially from beyond the tank’s immediate position. In the article’s account of Ukraine, loitering munitions are used alongside reconnaissance UAVs, FPV drones, artillery and anti-tank guided missiles. The key mechanism is finding a target and directing an attack against it.
For a tank crew, the useful implication is that these weapons can be part of a network of sensors and weapons supporting an operation; the article does not say crews directly operate them. India is seeking to connect tanks with unmanned systems, sensors and weapons, while adding electronic warfare and new protection.
Why can tanks still be useful even when drones and precision weapons can attack them?
Tanks can remain useful because they combine firepower, mobility and protection. Unlike artillery, which generally fires from a distance, tanks can move ahead of advancing troops, engage targets directly and provide sustained fire support. Their armour also lets crews operate in places where lightly protected vehicles and troops on foot would face greater exposure.
Indian examples show how those qualities can matter in different settings. In November 1948, Stuart light tanks were taken apart, carried toward the Zoji La sector and reassembled for Operation Bison. In 2020, T-72 and T-90 tanks and BMP-II vehicles were moved to high-altitude positions in eastern Ladakh, where they added to India’s ability to deliver firepower and deter.
Drones and precision weapons have made tanks more vulnerable, as the Ukraine conflict demonstrated. But the article argues that this makes adaptation more important, not that tanks are obsolete. India is looking at upgrades involving unmanned systems, AI, firepower, electronic warfare and protection so armoured vehicles can work within a wider network.
For how long have tanks been a central part of land warfare?
Tanks have been a central component of land warfare for more than a century, according to the article. They bring together three qualities: firepower, mobility and protection. That combination has helped make them important in mechanised operations, where forces need to move and fight on land while supporting advancing troops.
The article traces their battlefield history to the Somme offensive in 1916, when tanks were introduced. It also describes Indian uses across later conflicts: Stuart tanks at Zoji La in 1948, armoured battles in 1965, Centurions at Basantar in 1971 and tanks in eastern Ladakh in 2020. These examples span different terrain and military tasks.
The article does not give a precise starting date for the full period of “more than a century,” but 1916 is its stated historical marker for the tank’s introduction. It stresses that modern drones and precision weapons have exposed tanks to new dangers. Their long-standing role continues, but forces must adapt how they employ them.
How have Indian forces used tanks in different terrain and conflicts, from Zoji La to eastern Ladakh?
India’s tank history shows armour being adapted to very different terrain and missions. In the 1947–48 war in Jammu and Kashmir, Stuart light tanks of 7th Light Cavalry were dismantled and carried toward Zoji La, then reassembled for Operation Bison in November 1948. Their use helped Indian forces recapture a pass thought unsuitable for armour.
In 1965, the battles of Asal Uttar and Phillora demonstrated the offensive power of armoured formations and the value of terrain and combined-arms tactics. In 1971, Centurion tanks of 17 Poona Horse helped repel Pakistani counterattacks at Basantar and protect a bridgehead. In the east, amphibious PT-76 tanks outflanked Pakistani forces and helped advance toward Dhaka.
In 2020, India moved T-72 and T-90 tanks and BMP-II vehicles to high-altitude locations along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. Keeping them ready required fuel, ammunition, repairs and support in sub-zero temperatures with limited infrastructure. Their presence also served as deterrence, not only as a means of attack.
What is combined-arms warfare, and why do tanks need to work with other forces and technologies?
Combined-arms warfare means using different kinds of military forces and weapons together, rather than relying on one platform alone. The article links this approach to Heinz Guderian, a pioneer of keeping tanks at the spearhead of an attack. It describes Blitzkrieg, or “lightning war,” as a type of such an attack.
The article’s Indian examples show why coordination matters. At Asal Uttar and Phillora in 1965, it notes the importance of terrain and combined-arms tactics. On today’s battlefield, a reconnaissance drone can spot a tank, then artillery, a loitering munition or an anti-tank guided missile can attack it. Tanks therefore face threats that reach beyond a direct encounter with another vehicle.
India’s current approach is to connect tanks with a wider network of drones, sensors and weapons, not to replace them with unmanned systems. The Army is also looking at AI, electronic warfare, better firepower and new protection. The article’s lesson is that doctrine and equipment must adapt as warfare changes.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
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