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Defence & Security21 Nov 2026 · about 7 min

Supon chief Juha Martelius: People preparing sabotage attacks against companies have already been in Finland

The brief

Supo chief Juha Martelius said people preparing or exploring the possibility of company-targeted sabotage have been in Finland. He stressed that this does not mean an attack is currently being prepared: according to him, no concrete preparation is underway at least for now. The distinction matters because reconnaissance and planning can happen before any attack is imminent. Martelius said intelligence gathering has particularly concerned the defense industry and sites connected to national defense. He also said that Finland is not immune to this kind of activity. The article describes sabotage planning as a long process that can begin with finding possible targets and identifying their weak points. Supo has not given a number of people identified in Finland or named specific companies under scrutiny. Martelius said it is more likely than not that something similar will happen in Finland. Companies are ultimately responsible for protecting themselves, while Supo offers security clearances and training to help reduce risks.

01

What did Supon chief Juha Martelius say about people preparing sabotage attacks who had been in Finland?

Supo chief Juha Martelius said people preparing or exploring the possibility of company-targeted sabotage have been in Finland. He stressed that this does not mean an attack is currently being prepared: according to him, no concrete preparation is underway at least for now. The distinction matters because reconnaissance and planning can happen before any attack is imminent.

Martelius said intelligence gathering has particularly concerned the defense industry and sites connected to national defense. He also said that Finland is not immune to this kind of activity. The article describes sabotage planning as a long process that can begin with finding possible targets and identifying their weak points.

Supo has not given a number of people identified in Finland or named specific companies under scrutiny. Martelius said it is more likely than not that something similar will happen in Finland. Companies are ultimately responsible for protecting themselves, while Supo offers security clearances and training to help reduce risks.

02

What is sabotage, and what kinds of actions might count as a sabotage attack on a company?

Sabotage generally means deliberately damaging, disrupting, or interfering with a company or its operations. The article does not provide a formal definition or a complete list of possible acts. It describes planning as a process that may involve finding targets and looking for weaknesses, so the concern is broader than an attack already taking place.

The concrete example is from Viimsi, near Tallinn in Estonia, where an attempt was made to set fire to the production facilities of a company that develops and manufactures drones. Estonia’s security service said Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, was behind the operation. Arson is therefore one example of the kind of attack discussed in the report.

The article does not say that a particular company in Finland has been attacked, nor does it specify other planned methods. It does say intelligence gathering has focused especially on defense-industry and national-defense-related targets. Supo’s warning is that Finland is not immune, and Martelius considers a similar incident more likely than unlikely.

03

Which kinds of Finnish companies or sites have attracted reconnaissance, according to Supo?

Supo says intelligence gathering in Finland has been connected particularly to the defense industry and targets related to national defense. This identifies broad areas of interest, not named companies or confirmed attack sites. The distinction matters: reconnaissance can be part of long-term planning, but it is not itself proof that an attack is imminent.

The article says sabotage planning starts by identifying possible targets and their weak points. It gives an example from Estonia: an attempt was made to set fire to the production facilities of a company that develops and manufactures drones. In Finland, Supo also provides training to high-technology companies and, among others, defense-industry startups.

Martelius said people who had explored the possibility of similar attacks have been in Finland, while adding that no concrete preparation is underway at present. The article does not identify which businesses were examined. It says companies bear ultimate responsibility for their own protection, with Supo offering support through security clearances for employees and training.

04

What does Supo say about how many people or active attack plans have been identified, and how likely it is that Finland will face a similar attack?

Supo has not stated how many people have been identified in Finland, and the article gives no number of active attack plans. Martelius’s description is that people who have explored the possibility of similar attacks have been in Finland. He also said there is no concrete preparation for an attack underway at least at present.

The article places this warning in the context of long-term sabotage planning. Such planning can begin by searching for possible targets and their weak points. Martelius said the intelligence gathering has particularly concerned the defense industry and targets related to national defense, but he did not identify specific sites or individuals.

Despite the lack of a disclosed count or current concrete plan, Martelius said it is more likely than unlikely that something similar will happen in Finland. He also said Finland is not immune to this kind of activity. The warning is therefore about future risk, not a claim that an attack is currently in progress.

05

Why might a state use civilian intermediaries recruited from outside the target country instead of its own soldiers or intelligence officers?

Martelius says the current Russian approach is to use so-called intermediaries rather than special forces or intelligence officers to carry out attacks. The article says the people involved are often civilians and are commonly recruited from outside the country being targeted. It describes the method, but does not state the reason for choosing it.

In general, using intermediaries can create distance between a state and an operation, making direct responsibility harder to establish. That is a general explanation, not a motive given by Martelius in this article. The report does say that sabotage planning is long-term: it starts with identifying potential targets and their weak points before any attack takes place.

The article gives the attempted arson at a drone company’s facilities in Estonia as an example, and says Estonia’s security service attributed the operation to Russia’s GRU. Martelius said people who had explored similar possibilities had been in Finland, but no concrete attack preparation was underway there at the time. Supo says companies remain ultimately responsible for protection.

06

What effects are these attacks intended to have on Western societies and support for Ukraine?

Martelius says sabotage attacks in Western countries are intended to create uncertainty and weaken public willingness to support Ukraine. The intended impact is therefore not limited to physical damage at a target: the attacks are also meant to affect confidence and political attitudes. The article does not quantify how much influence any attack has had.

It gives the attempted arson at a drone company’s production facilities in Estonia as a concrete example of the threat being discussed. Martelius says sabotage may not be the most effective way to influence Western societies. In his view, influence through people’s wallets can be more powerful, including cheap Russian gas and attractive economic cooperation.

He connects these everyday economic issues to efforts to influence election results, saying that ordinary matters are ultimately used to exert influence. The article describes this as a wider concern alongside sabotage. It does not report a particular election outcome caused by these methods, but Martelius’s point is that economic choices can shape public attitudes and political decisions.

07

How do intelligence services and companies work together to spot and reduce security threats before an attack happens?

The article describes security as a shared effort, with companies holding the ultimate responsibility for protecting themselves and Supo offering support. The aim is to help businesses address risks before an attack. This matters particularly for firms connected to defense and advanced technology, which the article identifies as areas relevant to the threat.

Supo can conduct security clearances for company employees and provide training to high-technology firms and, among others, defense-industry startups. The report also describes how sabotage planning can begin with identifying potential targets and their weak points. Security work and awareness can help companies consider those vulnerabilities before an incident occurs.

Martelius said Western intelligence communities are now more closely connected than ever before because of the Russian threat. The article does not describe a specific joint program or give details about how intelligence is shared with each company. It says Supo offers assistance, but emphasizes that companies remain ultimately responsible for their own protection.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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