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Defence & Security23 Nov 2026 · about 7 min

Ukraine war: “Ukraine is facing the hardest winter of the war” – military expert Franz-Stefan Gady

The brief

Gady’s warning is tied to the effects of Russian attacks far behind the front, not just fighting on the battlefield. He says more Russian missiles have recently been getting through and that deep strikes affect civilians. The coming winter makes pressure on essential services especially significant, though the article does not detail specific winter conditions. One concrete effect Gady names is interrupted water supply. He also describes Ukraine’s weapons industry as remarkably resilient: production can restart relatively quickly or be moved after strikes, even strikes using Iskander ballistic missiles. These examples show that attacks can cause disruption without necessarily stopping production permanently. Gady still expects the industry to face pressure in the coming months, and he calls this Ukraine’s hardest war winter. The article does not give a forecast for the duration or scale of service outages. It also notes that Russian air defenses remain strong, while Ukraine’s front has stabilized and Russia has not achieved a breakthrough in the areas discussed.

01

Why does the expert say Ukraine is facing its hardest winter of the war?

Gady’s warning is tied to the effects of Russian attacks far behind the front, not just fighting on the battlefield. He says more Russian missiles have recently been getting through and that deep strikes affect civilians. The coming winter makes pressure on essential services especially significant, though the article does not detail specific winter conditions.

One concrete effect Gady names is interrupted water supply. He also describes Ukraine’s weapons industry as remarkably resilient: production can restart relatively quickly or be moved after strikes, even strikes using Iskander ballistic missiles. These examples show that attacks can cause disruption without necessarily stopping production permanently.

Gady still expects the industry to face pressure in the coming months, and he calls this Ukraine’s hardest war winter. The article does not give a forecast for the duration or scale of service outages. It also notes that Russian air defenses remain strong, while Ukraine’s front has stabilized and Russia has not achieved a breakthrough in the areas discussed.

02

What happens to civilians when attacks interrupt electricity and water supplies?

The article gives one direct example of harm to civilians: Gady says deep strikes can have an effect on the population, including through interrupted water supplies. It does not state that electricity was interrupted in the events described, or explain how long any outage lasted. So the water example is the firm article-based point.

In general, when water service stops, households may lose access to tap water for drinking, cooking, washing, and sanitation. The exact effects depend on how long the interruption lasts and what other supplies are available. Those specific consequences are general background, not details supplied by Gady in this interview.

Gady’s broader warning is that civilians are already affected by attacks behind the front and that Ukraine faces its hardest war winter. He also says the weapons industry is likely to come under pressure in the coming months. The interview does not quantify the number of people affected or describe measures to restore water service.

03

How much of daily life and weapons production can be affected when electricity fails?

The interview does not describe an electricity-grid failure or measure how much daily life or weapons production could be affected by one. It therefore cannot support a numerical estimate or a specific claim about the scale of disruption. Gady’s direct comments concern deep strikes, interrupted water supplies, and pressure on the weapons industry.

As general background, electricity is used in homes for lighting and appliances, and in factories to operate equipment and support production. A loss of power can therefore disrupt both household activity and manufacturing. How widely that disruption spreads depends on which equipment or services lose power, how long the outage lasts, and whether power can be restored or replaced.

For Ukraine, the article’s relevant facts are that the industry has recovered production relatively quickly or moved it after strikes, including Iskander attacks. Gady nevertheless expects pressure on the industry in coming months. The interview gives no figures on electricity, outage duration, factory output, or the share of production affected.

04

Why do power cuts and air-raid alerts make it harder for Ukraine's weapons factories to keep producing?

The interview does not discuss power cuts or air-raid alerts as specific obstacles to weapons production. It therefore does not establish how either affects factory schedules in Ukraine. Gady does say that strikes deep behind the front affect civilians and that Ukraine’s weapons industry will face pressure in the coming months.

As general background, a power cut can stop electrically powered machinery, while an air-raid alert may require workers to pause work or move to safety. If either interrupts a production process, output can be delayed. These are general mechanisms, not events or impacts detailed in the interview, and the article provides no figures for downtime or lost output.

The concrete resilience Gady describes is that production can be resumed relatively quickly or moved after attacks, even after Iskander ballistic missile strikes. He does not explain the practical arrangements, or say that these steps eliminate disruption. His assessment is that resilience is real, but the industry will still come under pressure in the months ahead.

05

What options does Ukraine have to keep weapons production going when factories are attacked or forced to stop?

Gady says Ukraine’s weapons industry has shown notable resilience after attacks. The options he identifies are practical but broad: production can be resumed relatively quickly, or shifted elsewhere. The interview does not give details about where production moves, how quickly it resumes, or which products are affected.

His example is significant because he says this has been possible even after strikes with Iskander ballistic missiles. That suggests attacks can disrupt production without necessarily ending it permanently. But the article does not say that every factory has these options or that moving production prevents all losses.

The forward-looking picture is mixed. Gady expects the industry to come under pressure in the coming months, despite its demonstrated ability to recover or relocate production. The article does not list other measures, such as backup generators, alternative suppliers, or factory hardening, so those should not be treated as reported Ukrainian options here. The clearest source-based answer is restart production or move it after an attack.

06

What is an electricity grid, and how does it carry power from generators to homes and factories?

An electricity grid is the connected system that carries electrical power from generating stations to the places that use it. The article does not define the grid, so this explanation uses general knowledge. Power may be generated in different places, then sent through transmission lines over long distances and distributed locally to homes, businesses, and factories.

Transformers change voltage along the way: higher voltage is commonly used for long-distance transmission, while lower voltage is delivered to users. Substations and switching equipment help direct power through the network. In ordinary operation, this network links generators and users rather than sending each home power through a separate, isolated route.

The source article focuses on the war, attacks, and Ukraine’s arms industry; it gives no description of electricity infrastructure or how power reaches factories. In general, a grid’s layout and operating condition determine what happens when equipment fails. The interview’s broader point is that damaging critical infrastructure can be difficult, but it does not specifically discuss power grids.

07

Why can damage to a few key parts of an interconnected power grid disrupt service far beyond the attack site?

An interconnected grid uses shared lines and equipment to carry power between generators and users. If an important line, substation, or other component is damaged, power may no longer reach every area through its usual route. The article does not explain this mechanism, so this is general background rather than a claim made by Gady.

Grid operators can sometimes reroute power, but alternate routes may have limits. A fault can also cause protective equipment to disconnect sections of the network to prevent further damage. Depending on the grid’s design and the failure, this can leave customers far from the original damage without service. These outcomes are not described in the interview and should not be read as reported events in Ukraine.

The article does make a related, broader point: destroying critical infrastructure can be difficult and require substantial effort. It gives the Kertch Bridge attack as an example of a complex operation, but does not connect that event to electricity infrastructure. It also says Russia’s size makes an integrated air-defense system impossible, a separate issue from grid operation.

This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.

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